¹ These golpes are probably the most comparable to the Chilean golpe of 1973. Civil-military relations in Argentina, Brazil and Peru are comparable to those of Chile with regard to the development of the military profession. See my article ‘The Latin American Military Establishment: Some Thoughts on the Origins of its Socio-Political Role, and an Illustrative Bibliographical Essay ’, The Americas, xxviii, 2 (10 1971), pp. 135–51;Google Scholar and ‘Effects of European Military Training in Latin America: The Origins and Nature of Professional Militarism in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru, 1890–1940’, Military Aflairs, xxxix, 1 (02, 1975), pp. 1–7.Google Scholar

² ‘Intervention’ may no longer be an appropriate term, owing to the frequency of military political action, increased participation of military offficers in government, and the realization that the military may be considered a legitimate political power group in developing countries.

³ Civilism implies strong, enduring or broad-based belief in, and acceptance of, civilian domination of political life, and an ability on the part of civilians to withstand military political action. For comments on the lack of civilism in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, see my ‘Notes on the “Junta Phenomenon” and the “Military Regime” in Latin America, With Special Reference to Peru, 1968–1972’ The Americas, XXXI, 3 (01., 1975), pp. 237–51.Google Scholar

⁴ There is still no comprehensive treatment of this bizarre civil-military episode, but see the recent treatments by Carlos, López Urrutia, Historia de la marina de Chile (Santiago, 1969),Google Scholar and Leonardo, Guzmán, Une episodio olvidado de la historia nacional: Julio-Noviembre de 1931 (Santiago, 1966).Google Scholar

⁵ On the Ariostazo and other manifestations of military anti-Marxism during the 1938–55 period, see Leonidas, Bravo Ríos, Lo qua supo un auditor de guerra (Santiago, 1955,Google Scholar) Horacio, Gamboa Núñez, En Ia ruta del 2 de abril Santiago, 1962,Google ScholarErnesto, Würth Rojas, Ibáñez, caudillo enigmático (Santiago, 1958),Google Scholar and the following works by René, Montero Moreno, La verdad sobre Ibáñez (Santiago, 1952,Google Scholar) and (Confesiones politicas: Autobiografía civil (Santiago, 1959).Google Scholar

⁶ On PUMA and Linea Recta, see the works of Bravo, , Gamboa, and Würth, cited in notes 5,Google Scholar and Rúl, Silva Maturana, Camino al abismo Lo que no se ha dicho sobre el proceso de la linea rects Santiago, 1955),Google Scholar and Donald, W. Bray, ‘Chilean Politics during the Second Ibáñez Administration’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University, 1961).Google Scholar

⁷ Full title, Bases para una acción politica de contenido nacional y popular: Plan linea recta.

⁸ For data and early interpretations of the 4 March 1973 elections, see CER (Santiago), iii, 10 (03, 1973);Google Scholar and Chile Economic News, 16/38 (15 03 1973);Google ScholarChile, 252 (6 03 1973);Google Scholar and Latin America, Nos. 10, II (9, 16 03 1973). These are the principal sources used in compiling Table I, below.Google Scholar

⁹ In his, ‘Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics,’ World l'Politics, xx, 1 (10 1967), 83–110; Putnam classified Chile as a country in which civilian groups are pre-eminent, but in which the armed forces played a significant non-political role. Thus, Chile was compared with Mexico and post-1957 Colombia. As of 1967, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Bolivia (!) were classified as countries where the armed forces formed a minor pressure group. Over-reliance on quantification led Putnam to imply that Chile was an unlikely place for a golpe. He also stressed that a ‘tradition of militarism’ increased chances for military political action, and that ‘social mobilization’ increased prospects for civilian rule. Both of these points must be questioned in the light of Allende's fall to armed forces.Google Scholar

¹⁰ In his solid study, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, N.J., 1971), Alfred Stepan notes that Chile is an ‘anomaly’, for despite having the ‘second largest military establishment in relation to its population’, it had a low ‘military intervention score’. Stepan continued, however, by emphasizing the importance of ‘factors stemming from the political system’ in considering propensity for military political action.Google Scholar

¹¹ Nevertheless, comparisons of civil-military relations during the Allende regime and those of the 1920–4 administration of Arturo Alessandri Palma are striking. On Alessandri and his fall from power see my Chilean Politics, 1920–1931: The Honorable Mission of Armed Forces (Albuquerque, N.M., 1970).Google Scholar

¹² Luis, Soza, ‘Papel de la industria militar en la movilización de la industria civil,’ MECH (05–June 1931), pp. 539–53. There are several errors in MECh volume numbers beginning in the 1930s. Therefore, to avoid confusion in notes from this point forward only months of issue will be given. Unless otherwise indicated (*) all authors are military figures.Google Scholar

¹³ Ramón, Cañas Montàlva, ‘Petróleo, el oro negro magallánico’,MECh (08 1931), 163–67.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Jorge, Carmona, ‘Hacia la economía í La racionalización de nuestra instrucción militar’, MECH, (11 1931), pp. 587–93;Google Scholar‘Reclutador’, ‘La educación militar del pais’, MECh (01 1932), pp. 39–44.Google Scholar

¹⁵ MECh (01 1932), pp. 45–53.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cañas, Montalva, ‘Fuerzas morales’, MECh (10 1932), pp. 369–74.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Angel, Varela R., ‘La instrucción escolar en ci ejército’, MECh (05–06 1935), pp. 395–400.Google Scholar See also, Víctor, Molina Pino, ‘El ejército y su función social de acuerdo con la necesidad de capacitar al individuo en un oficio que Ic permita desempeñarse en forms más eficiente al ser restituido a la sociedad civil’, MECh (09–10. 1935, pp. 833–41.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Eduardo, Guerra, ‘Algo de to que significa la movilización civil y militar’, MECh 07–08 1936), pp. 563–8;Google ScholarGuillermo, Barrios T. ‘Consideraciones generales sobre Ia movilización’, MECh (07–08 1936), pp. 533–47; and (09–10 1936), pp. 665–73.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Barros, Ortiz, ‘Apuntes y notas sobre la formación del oficial de hoy’, MECh (01–02 1937), pp. 1–28. I refer to (Freiherr) Colmar von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms: A Treatise on Modern Military Systems and the Conduct of WarGoogle Scholar (tr. Phillip, A. Ashworth, London, 1913). The first German edition appeared in 1883.Google Scholar

²⁰ Germán, Reinhardt R., ‘La influencia militar en la formación y desarrollo del territorio de Magallanes’, MECh (07–08 1937), pp. 655–67; (09–10 1937), pp. 849–60.Google Scholar

²¹ Arturo, Fuentes Rabé (tr.), ‘Generlidades sobre movilización industrial’, MECH (01–02 1938), pp. 5–27.Google Scholar

²² Maxime, Weygand, ‘Como educar a nuestra juventud’, MECh (07–08 1938), pp. 453–67; (07–08. pp. 585–602).Google Scholar I refer to Lyautey's, , ‘Du Ròlc Social de l'Officier’, Revue des Deux Mondes (15 03 1891), pp. 443–59, translated and published in Chile as ‘La función social del oficial’, MECh (11–12 1939), pp. 851–67.Google Scholar That the idea that the military had an educative function (had always) appealed to Chilean officers was evidenced by the publication of Francisco Castillo Náera (Mexican ambassador to the United States), ‘El eérciro como instrumento de cducación’, MECh (04–05 1940), pp. 271–76. This is a remarkable piece of pro-military propaganda presented by Castillo as an address to the American Legion Convention, Washington, D.C., 28 Nov. 1939.Google Scholar

²³ Aldona, , ‘El ejército: Escuela de civismo e institución de equilibrio social’, MECh (09–10 1940), pp. 687–709.Google Scholar

²⁴ MECh (07–08 1941), pp. 489–93.Google Scholar

²⁵ Toro, Concha, ‘Algunos aspectos de la misión militar y social de las fuerzas armadas de la república’, MECh (11–12 1942), pp. 2021–8.Google Scholar

²⁶ See Enrique, Bollmann Mora, ‘La iunstrucción escolar pre-militar’, MECh (01–02 1943), pp. 51–6;Google ScholarAniceto, Muíoz F., ‘El departamento de movilización económica y los problemas de la defensa nacional’, MECh (03–04 1943), pp. 239–42.Google Scholar

²⁷ MECh (07–08 1943), pp. 555–7;Google ScholarLuis, Vargas Feliú, ‘Chile y Argentina’, MECh (03–04 1944), pp. 305–6.Google Scholar

²⁸ Joseph, J. Thorndike Jr,* ‘Geopolítica: La fantástica carrera de un sistema científico que un británico inventó, los alemanes usaron, y los americanos necesitan estudiar’, MECh (09–12 1943), pp. 881–901.Google Scholar This piece appeared in Life (12 21, 1942), and was translated and published in the Revista Militar del Perú before appearing in MECh. It is the first thoughtful work on geopolitics to appear in MECh.Google Scholar

²⁹ Enrique, Alvarez Vásquez de Prada*, ‘El problema del fierro en la economía chilena’, MECh (03–04 1944), pp. 225–91.Google Scholar

³⁰ As examples see, Armando, Bueno Ortiz,* ‘Algunos aspectos geopolitícos del Perú y la defensa nacional’, MECh (01–02 1946), pp. 77–90;Google ScholarBernardino, Parada Moreno, ‘El ejército potencial’, MECh (03–04 1946), pp. 11–26;Google ScholarMarcial, Delgado Lazcano, ‘La instrucción primaria en el ejército: Su evolución metodoiógica y pedagógica que hay que tener en cuenta para su desarrollo’. MECh (03–04 1946), pp. 41–56; and Cañas Montalva, ‘Zona austral antártica’ (in all 1945 issues).Google Scholar

³¹ A significant example would be Eduardo Saavedra R., ‘Aspecto geopolítico de Ia Antártica chilena’, MECh (september–october 1948), pp. 95–9. This brief essay included maps showing the center of the Pacific Ocean and Antarctica as center points, and emphasizing Chile's stritegic location in relation to both. To my knowledge, this was the first example of alternate cartographic projections used by Chilean geopoliticians to draw attention to Chile's national interests. See also Cañas, Montalva, ‘Reflexiones geopolíticas sobre el presente y el futuro de America y de Chile’, MECh, (11–12 1948), Pp. 1–26. Cañas' approach here was much the same as that of Saavedra.Google Scholar

³² Benjamín, Videla V., ‘La intervención del ejército en obras de beneficio público’, MECh: (09–10 1947), pp. 64–80.Google Scholar

³³ Montaldo, Bustos, ‘Ningún cuerpo armado puede deliberar’, MECh (07–08 1953), pp. 79–84.Google Scholar See also Horacio, Arce Fernández, ‘La fuerza armada y la seguridad nacional’, the prologue to Estatuto jurídico de las fuerzas armadas (Santiago, 1957);Google Scholar ‘Inquietud profesional’, an editorial in MECh (05–06 1958), pp. 3–4;Google Scholar and, in the same issue, Luis, Valenzuela Reyes, ‘Misión de las fuerzas armadas y su participación en el desenvolvimiento normal de nuestra vida democrática’, pp. 22–29.Google Scholar

³⁴ Tomo xxv (Santiago, 1964).Google Scholar

³⁵ Hernán, Hiriart Laval, ‘La política militar y la opinión pública’, MECh (05–06 1964), pp. 15–19.Google Scholar

³⁶ Raúl, Poblete Vergara, ‘Recursos naturales de la provincia de Aisén’, MECh (09–10 1967), esp. pp. 137–48.Google Scholar Nevertheless, in 1965 there appeared the book-length, René, Gonzales Rojas, Contribución de las juerzas armadas al desarrollo económico: Hacia una revisión de conceptos conveniente para países sub-desarrollados (Santiago, 1965). This is a general work.Google Scholar

³⁷ Between 1970 and 1973 there were a few MECh articles depicting, perhaps, a change in attitudes on the part of the army. See Claudio, López Silva, ‘Las fuerzas armadas en el tercer mundo’, MECh (07–08 1970), pp. 11–51,Google Scholar in which the author seeks to explain the ‘internally oriented’ role of the military in developing countries; Gustavo, A. Díaz Feliú ‘El soldado alemán: El ejército chileno debe conservar su tradición prusiana’, MECh (05–06 1971), pp. 126–7, a troubled little essay in which the author yearns for the ‘good old days’ and considers the army to be the ‘people in arms’ (pueblo en armas);Google ScholarGiancarlo, Fortunato,* ‘Sociología militar’, MECh (11–12. 1971), pp. 44–68.Google Scholar The translation from Italian and publication of this essay indicates, I believe, a resurgence of consideration for where the army should stand with regard to the society around it. MECh (11–12 1970), devoted 148 pages to coverage of the funeral of René Schneider, and made no bones about the High Command's shock at his assassination.Google Scholar

³⁸ In The Soldier and the State: The Theory and the Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), pp. 11–18,Google Scholar Huntington viewed the characteristics of professionalism as ‘expertise’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘corporateness’. The professional officer, he posited, is responsible to the state and cannot impose his decisions upon it. This would appear to proscribe political action. However, responsibility to the state, even in Chile, is taken to mean responsibility to the nation and society as well. Therefore, malfunction of the state, threats to security and sovereignty, or social disintegration, as viewed from a military stand. point, can necessitate political action to avert disaster. Hence, ‘responsibility’ becomes a motivative factor, more so given the addiction of Argentine, Brazilian, Peruvian and Chilean officers to the ‘statist’ doctrines of geopolitics. General Pinochet, of course, is a specialist in geopolitics. Charles D. Corbett states that in contrast to Argentina, Brazil and Peru, the Chilean (and Colombian) armed forces have a ‘different perception of profession’. This ‘different perception of profession’ (a far more descriptive than explanatory conclusion), did not militate against political action in Chile in 1973, reinforcing the belief that professionalism, whatever its nature, is hardly a guarantee against political action, given certain political, social and economic conditions. See his, ‘Politics and Professionalism: The South American Military’, Orbis, XVI, 4 (Winter 1973), pp. 927–52.Google Scholar

³⁹ Yet many readers of The Atlantic Monthly (02 1974),Google Scholar may have the impression that, ‘in this century juntas have come and gone in Santiago, some right-wing and some left-wing’, and that the army is, ‘more conservative’ in the 1970s than it supposedly was in 1932 when it opposed the air force in the latter's attempt at ‘vast social reform’. These misrepresentations of Chilean civil-military relations are as misleading as any based on the myths discussed in this essay. See Robert, F. Kennedy Jr, ‘Chile’, pp. 14–20.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See Stepan's comments on the limitations of the Nun thesis and military-middle class ties, in The Military and Politics, pp. 45–54.Google Scholar See also similar comments by Carlos, A. Astiz, ‘The Argentine Armed Forces: Their Role and Political Involvement’, Western Political Quarterly, 21, 4 (12 1969), pp. 862–78;Google Scholar and José, E. Miguens, ‘The New Latin American Coup’, Studies in Comparative International Development, 6, 1 (1970-1971).Google Scholar These and other recent literature on the Latin American military are reviewed in Richard, C. Rankin, ‘The Expanding Institutional Concerns of the Latin American Military Establishments: A Review Article’, Latin American Research Review, 9, 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 81–108.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Alain, Joxe, Las fuerzas armadas en el sistema politico de Chile (Santiago, 1970).Google Scholar

⁴² See Roy, Allen Hansen, ‘Military Culture and Organizational Decline: A Study of the Chilean Army’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1967).Google Scholar

⁴³ I refer to Karl, Liebknecht, Militarism and Anti-Militarism (tr, Alexander Sirnis, Glasgow, 1917, and New York, 1972).Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Robinson, Rojas, ‘The Chilean Armed Forces: The Role of the Military in the Popular Unity Government’, in Dale, L. Johnson (ed.), The Chilean Road to Socialism (New York, 1973), pp. 310–22. This volume contains valuable essays on all facets of the 1970–3 experience.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ According to Hansen's 1966 data, the social origins of Chilean army officers are beyond doubt ‘middle class’. Fully 35% of the officers he polled stated that their fathers were ‘white collar’, ‘professionals’ or ‘management’; 20% gave ‘business’ as their father's occupation; 26% gave ‘military’ as their father's occupation; and 20% responded, ‘agriculture’. A case could be made for even stronger ties using Hansen's data on the occupations of the fathers-in-law of the same sample group: 23% ‘white collar’, ‘professional’, and ‘management’; 31% ‘business’, 14% ‘military’, and 31% ‘agriculture’. These figures have been rounded off.

⁴⁶ Writing in the New York Review of Books, Laurence Birns claimed what the Chilean armed forces did on 11 Sept. 1973 may have surprised or astonished ‘students of Chilean history and society’. I would reply that despite many indicators, no serious ‘student of Chilean history and society’ should be amazed at all. Birns' lack of expertise and his lack of credentials as a ‘student of Chilean history and society’ are manifested by his insistence that the Chilean military acted as a tool of the upper classes. ‘The Death of Chile’, in Ibid.., 1 Nov. 1973.

⁴⁷ See my essay on Peru after the 1968 golpe cited in note 3 above.

⁴⁸ An incomplete listing of Defense Ministers supplied by the Defense Ministry indicates that of 20 ministers since 1932, 12 have been civilians. General Arnaldo Carrasco served as minister under President Juan Antonio Rios; General Guillermo Barrios served under President Gabriel González Videla; and five officers (three generals, two admirals), served under Carlos Ibáñez in his second presidency: Generals Adrián Barrientos, Luis Vidal and Abdón Parra (promoted after appointment), and Admirals Francisco O'Ryan and Vicente Merino. General (r) Tulio Marambio served briefly under Eduardo Frei. The second Ibáñez presidency is the only time military figures dominated the ministerial scene, and they were not popular. Conclusions reached on the National Defense Ministry and the Commander-in-Chief are based on extensive interviews with General (r) Oscar Novoa Fuentes, Santiago, 12 Sept. and 24 Oct. 1962; with General (r) Bartolomé Blanche Espejo, Santiago, 10 Sept. 1969; and numerous interviews and conversations with Defense Ministry officials, both civilian and military, March-Dec. 1962, Sept. 1969, and May 1972. These last go unnamed for obvious reasons.

⁴⁹ More often than not, Defense Ministers have come from the President's own party. Only Liberal Manuel Bulnes Sanfuentes, who served under the Radical González, Conservative Julio Pereira Larraín, who served under Liberal Jorge Alessandri, and Radical Alejandro Ríos Valdivia who served as Salvador Allende's first Defense Minister, did not come from the chief executive's party. Bulnes, of course, had a magic name for military men, and his political affiliation was secondary. Ríos was a one-time instructor at the Escuela, and had numerous friends and former students in the officer corps.

⁵⁰ None of Jorge Alesandri's appointees from 1958 to 1964, for example, could be considered a major political figure when compared to his appointees in other ministerial positions.

⁵¹ For example, Juan de Dios Carinona, Eduardo Frei's first (and best) Defense Minister.

⁵² Emilia Bello is the best example of a civilian popular with military men. He was also noncontroversial and a capable administrator.

⁵³ Cited in MECh (07–09 1972), p. 19.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Apparent normalcy in executive-military relations during 1970–1 is evident upon reading various essays in MECh (09–10. 1971).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Salvador, Allende Gossens, ‘Fuerzas armadas y carabineros’, in Nuestro camino al socialismo: La vía chilena (Buenos Aires, 1971), p. 128.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ In a press conference, 5 May, 1971, Ibid., 125.

⁵⁷ For examples, see note 37 above.

⁵⁸ Cristián, Zegers Ariztía, ‘The Armed Forces: Support of a Democratic Institutionality’, in Tomás, P. McHaIe et al. , Chile: A Critical Survey (Santiago, 1972), p. 314.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ For an interpretation of the army schism, see Pablo, Piacentini, ‘La doctrina Schneider-Prats y el gobierno de la unidad popular’ Estrategia, 3, No. 17 (07-08 1972), pp. 24–28.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ In the 2, 3, 4, and 5 March editions.

⁶¹ See Zegers, Ariztía, p. 318;Google Scholar and Ted, Córdova-Claure, ‘Las fuerzas armadas de Chile ante el proceso de cambio’, Estrategia, 3, No. 17 (07-08 1972), pp. 20–23.Google Scholar

⁶² See note 19 above.

⁶³ Much of my interpretation of the situation in 1972 is based on interviews conducted in Santiago, and on Santiago, Lima and Buenos Aires press coverage. See also ‘Las fucrzas armadas en 1972’, Portada, No. 35 (november–Decmber. 1972), pp. 36–38; Ricardo, Claro Valdés, ‘La participación de las fuerzas armadas’, in Jose, Garrido Rojas, et al., Participación para una nueva sociedad (Santiago, 1973?);Google Scholar and Bicheno, H. W., ‘Las fuerzas armadas en ci sistema político de Chile’, MECh (05–06 1972), pp. 26–37.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Cited in Córdova-Claure, , loc. cit., p. 20.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ During March 1972, General Pedro Palacios served briefly as Minister of Mines, and rumor had it that General Orlando Urbina Herrera would be named Interior Minister in an attempt to show the administration's willingness to act against civil disorder. See the interview with Urbina, ‘Un hogar chileno para la humanidad’, MECh (05–06 1972), pp. 72–76. Urbina was actively involved in planning the 5972 UNCTAD meeting.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ CER, III, No. 9 (Feb. 1973). Such ‘difficulties’ were the subject of a timely essay on Chile's socio-economic problems, heretofore uncharacteristic of MECh: Guido, Serrano,* ‘Economia internacional y desarrollo económico’, MECh (01.–04 1973), pp. 3–17.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ El Mercurio, 3 12. 1972.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ For an extensive treatment of Chilean military attitudes in the aftermath of the golpe of 11 Sept. 1973, see ‘Chile: Los sucesos del li de setiembre’, Estrategia, v, No. 24 (09. 10. 1973), pp. 49–120.Google Scholar