No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Hedging Comes to Latin America: Gauging Brazil’s Coping Strategies vis-à-vis the Sino-US Peer Competition
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 March 2025
Abstract
The proliferating Sino-US peer competition is increasingly impacting Latin American states and triggering uncertainty. As China’s expanding influence in the region challenges longstanding US supremacy in the western hemisphere and reshapes the strategic calculus for regional states, hedging behaviour becomes increasingly opportune. This most notably includes Brazil, the largest state in Latin America both politically and economically, whose hedging behaviour oscillated between governments, a characteristic normally associated with states facing higher systemic pressures. As such, how does the Sino-US peer competition impact Brazil’s hedging strategy? And why do coping behaviours differ on various indices between different administrations, from Lula to Bolsonaro? Findings suggest that depending on whether the incumbent government was left- or right-wing, Brazil’s hedge was recalibrated as either pro- or anti-US regional supremacy.
La proliferación de la competencia sino-estadounidense está cada vez más impactando a los estados latinoamericanos y generando incertidumbre, en la medida que la creciente influencia de China en la región desafía la supremacía estadounidense de larga data en el hemisferio occidental, mientras remodela el cálculo estratégico de los estados regionales, haciendo que el comportamiento de ‘hedging’ sea más oportuno. Esto incluye en particular a Brasil, como el estado más grande política y económicamente de América Latina, cuyo comportamiento de ‘hedging’ osciló entre diferentes gobiernos, una característica normalmente asociada con estados que enfrentan presiones sistémicas mayores. Entonces, ¿cómo la competencia sino-estadounidense impacta la estrategia de ‘hedging’ de Brasil? ¿Y por qué los comportamientos de enfrentamiento difieren en varias medidas entre las administraciones, desde Lula hasta Bolsonaro? Los hallazgos sugieren que según si el gobierno es de izquierda o de derecha, el comportamiento de Brasil se recalibra como a favor o en contra de la supremacía regional estadounidense.
A proliferação da competição sino-americana está cada vez mais impactando os estados latino-americanos e provocando incertezas, já que a influência crescente da China na região desafia a supremacia de longa data dos EUA no hemisfério ocidental e reformula o cálculo estratégico dos Estados regionais, tornando o comportamento de ‘hedging’ mais oportuno. Isso inclui notavelmente o Brasil, o maior estado da América Latina em termos políticos e econômicos, cujo comportamento de ‘hedging’ oscilou entre governos diferentes, uma característica normalmente associada a estados que enfrentam pressões sistêmicas maiores. Sendo assim, como a concorrência sino-americana afeta a estratégia de ‘hedging’ do Brasil? E por que os comportamentos de enfrentamento diferem em várias medidas entre os diferentes governos, desde Lula até Bolsonaro? Os resultados sugerem que, dependendo do fato de o governo em exercício ser de esquerda ou de direita, o ‘hedging’ brasileiro foi recalibrado como pró ou contra a supremacia regional dos EUA.
Keywords
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
1 Richard J. Cook, Maximilian Ohle and Han Zhaoying, ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle: Reactions from Germany and the UK’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 27: 2 (2022), pp. 493–518; Evan Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, ‘A Tale of Two Asias’, Foreign Policy, 31 Oct. 2012: https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/ (all URLs last accessed 26 Nov. 2024); Rosemary Foot, ‘US–China Relations in the Era of Xi and Trump: Implications for Europe’, in Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø and Wang Dong (eds.), US–China Foreign Relations: Power Transition and its Implications for Europe and Asia (New York: Routledge, 2021), pp. 63–74; John M. Owen, ‘Two Emerging International Orders? China and the United States’, International Affairs, 97: 5 (2021), pp. 1415–31.
2 Michael J. Mazarr et al., ‘Understanding Influence in the Strategic Competition with China’, RAND Corporation, RR-A290-1, 2021.
3 The White House, ‘Remarks by President Biden in Address to a Joint Session of Congress’, 29 April 2021: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/29/remarks-by-president-biden-in-address-to-a-joint-session-of-congress/.
4 Alexander Korolev, ‘Shrinking Room for Hedging: System-Unit Dynamics and Behavior of Smaller Powers’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 19: 3 (2019), pp. 419–52.
5 See Arnold Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962).
6 Sebastian Biba, ‘Germany’s Relations with the United States and China from a Strategic Triangle Perspective’, International Affairs, 97: 6 (2021), pp. 1905–24; Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, pp. 499–500; Elena Gnedina, ‘“Multi-Vector” Foreign Policies in Europe: Balancing, Bandwagoning or Bargaining?’, Europe–Asia Studies, 67: 7 (2015), pp. 1007–29; Van Jackson, ‘Power, Trust, and Network Complexity: Three Logics of Hedging in Asian Security’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, 14: 3 (2014), pp. 331–56; Kai Koga, ‘The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited: The Case of Japan’s Foreign Policy Strategy in East Asia’s Power Shift’, International Studies Review, 20 (2018), pp. 633–60; Alexander Korolev, ‘Russia in the South China Sea: Balancing and Hedging’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 15: 2 (2018), pp. 263–82; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30: 2 (2018), pp. 159–85; Guangyi Pan and Alexander Korolev, ‘The Struggle for Certainty: Ontological Security, the Rise of Nationalism, and Australia-China Tensions after COVID-19’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 36 (2021), pp. 115–38; Lloyd Thrall, ‘China’s Expanding Africa Relations: Implications for U.S. National Security’, RAND Corporation, RR-905-A, 2015; Denghua Zhang, ‘China in the Pacific and Traditional Powers’ New Pacific Policies: Concerns, Responses and Trends’, Security Challenges, 16: 1 (2020), pp. 78–93.
7 William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and State Control (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016); David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020).
8 Ryan C. Berg and Henry S. Ziemer, ‘Latin America's Role in Great Power Competition’, in Kari Roberts and Saira Bano (eds.), The Ascendancy of Regional Powers in Contemporary US–China Relations: Rethinking the Great Power Rivalry (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023), p. 243; China Global Investment Tracker, ‘Worldwide Chinese Investments & Construction (2005–2022)’, American Enterprise Institute, 2022: www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker; The Dialogue, ‘China–Latin America Finance Databases’, 2023: www.thedialogue.org/map_list/; Francisco Urdinez et al., ‘Chinese Economic Statecraft and U.S. Hegemony in Latin America: An Empirical Analysis, 2003–2014’, Latin American Politics and Society, 58: 4 (2016), pp. 3–30; Carol Wise, Dragonomics: How Latin America is Maximizing (or Missing Out on) China's International Development Strategy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2020).
9 Evelyn Goh, ‘Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asia Regional Security Strategies’, Policy Studies 16, East–West Center, 2005: www.eastwestcenter.org/publications/meeting-china-challenge-us-southeast-asian-regional-security-strategies.
10 Xiaoyu Pu, Rebranding China: Contested Status Signaling in the Changing Global Order (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2019), p. 19.
11 Feliciano de S. Guimarães and Irma D. Oliveira e Silva, ‘Far-Right Populism and Foreign Policy Identity: Jair Bolsonaro's Ultra-Conservatism and the New Politics of Alignment’, International Affairs, 97: 2 (2021), pp. 345–63; Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni, ‘Lula's Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification’, Third World Quarterly, 28: 7 (2007), pp. 1309–26.
12 Andrés R. Puntigliano, ‘Beyond “Left” and “Right”: A Zean Perspective of Latin American Dichotomies’, Stockholm Review of Latin American Studies, 3 (2008), pp. 33–43.
13 Francisco Urdinez and Pietro Rodrigues, ‘Trapped in Proto-Bipolarism? Brazilian Perceptions of an Emerging Chinese-American Rivalry’, Rising Powers Quarterly, 2: 2 (2017), pp. 105–23.
14 Xiaoyu Pu and Margaret Myers, ‘Overstretching or Overreaction? China's Rise in Latin America and the US Response’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 21: 5 (2021), pp. 40–59.
15 Gerson Moura, Autonomia na dependência: a política externa brasileira de 1935 a 1942 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1980); Mateus Bilhar et al., ‘Brazil's Pragmatic Equidistance: Hedging and the Second World War’, International Relations, 2023: https://doi.org/10.1177/00471178231211499; Berg and Ziemer, ‘Latin America's Role’, p. 244; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001); Gonzalo S. Paz, ‘China, United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America: An Overview and Some Lessons from Previous Instances of Hegemonic Challenge in the Region’, The China Quarterly, 209 (2012), pp. 18–34.
16 Tom Chodor, Neoliberal Hegemony and the Pink Tide in Latin America: Breaking up with TINA? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
17 Tom Long, Latin America Confronts the United States: Asymmetry and Influence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Luis L. Schenoni and Diego Leiva, ‘Dual Hegemony: Brazil between the United States and China’, in Florian Böller and Welf Werner (eds.), Hegemonic Transition: Global Economic and Security Orders in the Age of Trump (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), pp. 233–55.
18 Rhys Jenkins, ‘China's Global Expansion and Latin America’, Journal of Latin American Studies, 42: 4 (2010), pp. 809–37.
19 Carol Wise and Victoria C. Ching, ‘Conceptualizing China–Latin America Relations in the Twenty-first Century: The Boom, the Bust, and the Aftermath’, The Pacific Review, 31: 5 (2018), pp. 553–72.
20 Matt Ferchen, ‘China–Latin America Relations: Long-term Boon or Short-term Boom?’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 4 (2011), pp. 55–86.
21 Kevin P. Gallagher and Amos Irwin, ‘China's Economic Statecraft in Latin America: Evidence from China's Policy Banks’, Pacific Affairs, 88: 1 (2015), p. 121.
22 Xi Jinping, ‘Striving to Build a Hand-in-hand Community of Common Destiny: Keynote Speech by President Xi Jinping at China–Latin America and the Caribbean Summit’, China's Diplomacy in the New Era, 2014: http://en.chinadiplomacy.org.cn/2021-01/27/content_77158765.shtml; Gaio M. G. Doria and Nehemias J. J. Celada, ‘CELAC and China in Perspective: Regional Integration and Engagement Redefinition’, in Shoujun Cui and Manuel P. Garcia (eds.), China and Latin America in Transition: Policy Dynamics, Economic Commitments, and Social Impacts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 113–28.
23 Jean-Marc Blanchard, ‘The Politics of Latin America's Investment and Other Links with China: Contextualizing the Region's Cash Chasing while Racking Richer Research Rewards’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24 (2019), pp. 565–82; Hongying Wang, ‘The Missing Link in Sino-Latin American Relations’, Journal of Contemporary China, 24: 95 (2015), pp. 922–41.
24 Kim Emmanuel, ‘China's Rise in Latin America and the Caribbean 1990–2019: Navigating Perceptions in the Relationship’, The Pacific Review, 35: 5 (2022), pp. 946–70; Wise and Ching, ‘Conceptualizing China–Latin America Relations’, p. 16.
25 Timothy W. Crawford, ‘Preventing Enemy Coalitions: How Wedge Strategies Shape Power Politics’, International Security, 35: 4 (2011), pp. 155–89.
26 Paz, ‘China, United States and Hegemonic Challenge in Latin America’, p. 33.
27 Urdinez et al., ‘Chinese Economic Statecraft’, pp. 4–6.
28 Shoujun Cui, ‘China's New Commitments to LAC and its Geopolitical Implications’, in Shoujun Cui and Manuel P. Garcia (eds.), China and Latin America in Transition: Policy Dynamics, Economic Commitments, and Social Impacts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 15–33; Carmen A. Mendes, ‘China in South America: Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela’, East Asia, 30: 1 (2013), pp. 1–6.
29 Hee-Yong Yang and Seunghuo Lee, ‘China's Engagement with Latin America and its Implications for Soft Balancing against the United States’, Asian Perspective, 44: 4 (2020), pp. 587–615; Lei Yu, ‘China's Partnership with Latin America: A Fulcrum in China's Rise’, International Affairs, 91: 5 (2015), pp. 1047–68.
30 John Bolton, ‘National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton Delivers Remarks at Bay of Pigs Veterans Association Brigade’, US Embassy in Nicaragua, 17 April 2019: https://ni.usembassy.gov/national-security-advisor-ambassador-john-r-bolton-delivers-remarks-at-bay-of-pigs-veterans-association-brigade-2506/.
31 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1987).
32 Ibid., p. 17.
33 Jack S. Levy, ‘Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Prepositions, and Research Design’, in John. A. Vasquez and Colin Elman (eds.), Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate (Hoboken, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), pp. 128–53.
34 Randall L. Schweller, ‘Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In’, International Security, 19: 1 (1994), pp. 72–107.
35 Goh, ‘Meeting the China Challenge’, p. 3.
36 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, After Hedging: Hard Choices for Indo-Pacific States between the United States and China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), p. 6; Robert J. Art, ‘Europe Hedges its Security Bets’, in T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (eds.), Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 179–213.
37 For ‘engage-and-resist strategy’ see Vidya Nadkarni, Strategic Partnerships in Asia: Balancing without Alliances (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 45; for ‘dual-track’ see Jackson, ‘Power, Trust, and Network Complexity’, p. 335.
38 Alfred Gerstl, Hedging Strategies in Southeast Asia: ASEAN, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam and their Relations with China (London: Routledge, 2022), p. 17; Adam P. Liff, ‘Unambivalent Alignment: Japan's China Strategy, the US Alliance, and the “Hedging” Fallacy’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, 19: 3 (2019), p. 460; Koga, ‘The Concept of “Hedging” Revisited’, p. 635; Jürgen Haacke, ‘The Concept of Hedging and its Application to Southeast Asia: A Critique and a Proposal for a Modified Conceptual and Methodological Framework’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, 19: 3 (2019), p. 392; Cheng-Chwee Kuik, ‘How do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN States’ Alignment Behavior towards China’, Journal of Contemporary China, 25: 100 (2016), p. 500.
39 Korolev, ‘Shrinking Room for Hedging’, p. 423.
40 Matias Spektor, ‘In Defense of the Fence Sitters: What the West Gets Wrong about Hedging’, Foreign Affairs, 102: 3 (2023), p. 8.
41 Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott, ‘The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia–Pacific: Australia's Middle Power Moment?’, International Relations of the Asia–Pacific, 14: 2 (2014), pp. 215–37.
42 Hussein Kalout and Feliciano de Sá Guimarães, ‘Hedging Between the U.S. and China: Brazil Protecting Itself to Survive’, CEBRI-Journal, 1: 4 (2022), pp. 18–36.
43 Zha Wen, ‘Leader Security and Hedging in the Era of Great Power Rivalry: Responses of the Philippines and Singapore’, China International Strategy Review, 4: 2 (2022), p. 307; Victor D. Cha, ‘Collective Resilience: Deterring China's Weaponization of Economic Interdependence’, International Security, 48: 1 (2023), pp. 91–124; Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, p. 513.
44 Korolev, ‘Shrinking Room for Hedging’, p. 425.
45 Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, p. 499.
46 Martin Wight, ‘The Balance of Power’, in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 171–97, extract from p. 181.
47 Richard J. Cook, Maximilian Ohle and Zhaoying Han, ‘Geopolitical Kingmakers: South Korea and the Philippines as Linchpins amid the China–US Competition,’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 17: 4 (2024), p. 387.
48 James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves, ‘Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory’, in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O'Neil (eds.), Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 23–44; extract from Beeson and Higgott, ‘The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia-Pacific’, p. 215.
49 Gerstl, Hedging Strategies in Southeast Asia, p. 16.
50 He and Feng, After Hedging, p. 7; Gerstl, Hedging Strategies in Southeast Asia, p. 19.
51 Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, p. 499.
52 Korolev, ‘Shrinking Room for Hedging’, pp. 425–6.
53 Ann M. Murphy, ‘Great Power Rivalries, Domestic Politics and Southeast Asian Foreign Policy: Exploring the Linkages’, Asian Security, 13: 3 (2017), pp. 165–82.
54 Korolev, ‘Shrinking Room for Hedging’, p. 428.
55 Beeson and Higgott, ‘The Changing Architecture of Politics in the Asia–Pacific’, p. 223.
56 Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, p. 500.
57 Darren Lim and Zack Cooper, ‘Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia’, Security Studies, 24: 4 (2015), pp. 696–727.
58 Luiz A. M. Bandeira, As relações perigosas: Brasil–Estados Unidos (de Collor a Lula, 1990–2004) (Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2004).
59 American Enterprise Institute and The Heritage Foundation, ‘China Global Investment Tracker’: www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.
60 Tulio Cariello, Chinese Investment in Brazil: 2021, A Year of Recovery (Rio de Janeiro: China–Brazil Business Council, 2022).
61 Ammar A. Malik et al., Banking On the Belt and Road: Insights from a New Global Dataset of 13,427 Chinese Development Projects (Williamsburg, VA: AidData at William & Mary, 2021).
62 Oswaldo B. Junior, A parceria estratégica Sino-Brasileira: Origens, evolução e perspectivas (1993–2006) (Brasilia: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2010), pp. 271, 285.
63 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China (MOFA PRC), ‘Joint Communiqué between the People's Republic of China and the Federative Republic of Brazil on Further Strengthening China–Brazil Strategic Partnership’, 19 May 2009: www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367221.html.
64 Presidência da República (PR), ‘Pronunciamento do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, na sessão solene de posse no Congresso Nacional’, Discursos do Presidente da República (DPR), 1 Jan. 2003; Vigevani and Cepaluni, ‘Lula's Foreign Policy’, p. 1314.
65 PR, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República na reunião de Cúpula do Mercosul’, DPR, 18 June 2003; PR, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, durante a reunião extraordinária de chefes de Estado e de Governo da União Sul-Americana de Nações – Unasul’, DPR, 23 May 2008.
66 PR, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, reunião extraordinária – Unasul’, DPR, 23 May 2008; Maria H. T. de Almeida, Janina Onuli and Leandro P. Carneiro, ‘Brasil, as Américas e o mundo: opinião pública e política externa’, Instituto de Relações (FAPESP 2010/06356-3), Universidade de São Paulo, 2014; PR, Casa Civil, ‘Estratégia Nacional de Defesa’, Decree no. 6703, 18 Dec. 2008.
67 PR, ‘Declaração à imprensa do Presidente da República, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, em conjunto com o Presidente do Haiti, Boniface Alexandre’, DPR, 18 Aug. 2004.
68 General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA), ‘Statement by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, GA/10860, 23 Sept. 2009.
69 UNGA, ‘Statement by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 63rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, GA/10749, 23 Sept. 2008
70 Celso Amorim, ‘XV Fórum Nacional-BNDES’, Resenha de Política Exterior do Brasil, 30: 92 (2003), pp. 101–5, extract from p. 102; Daniel Flemes, ‘India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA) in the New Global Order: Interests, Strategies and Values of the Emerging Coalition’, International Studies, 46: 4 (2009), pp. 401–21.
71 Hirst and Pereira, ‘The Unsettled Nature of U.S.–Brazilian Relations’, p. 9.
72 PR, ‘O início da luta armada no Iraque’, DPR, 20 March 2003; Juan Forero, ‘Latin America's Political Compass Veers toward the Left’, The New York Times, 19 Jan. 2003: www.nytimes.com/2003/01/19/world/latin-america-s-political-compass-veers-toward-the-left.html.
73 Celso Amorin, ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy under President Lula (2003–2010): An Overview’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 53 (2010), p. 217
74 Fabiano Massonave, ‘Em discurso, Lula diz que Alca [FTAA] é “política de anexação” dos EUA’, Folha de São Paulo, 4 May 2022: www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/brasil/ult96u32127.shtml.
75 PR, ‘Estratégia Nacional de Defesa’, Anexo I.
76 PR, ‘Address of His Excellency Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in New York’, DPR, 16 March 2009.
77 General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA), ‘Statement by the President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, at the General Debate of the 64th Session of the United Nations General Assembly’, GA/10860, 23 Sept. 2009.
78 Zhongying Pang, ‘China and the Struggle over the Future of International Order’, in Hanns W. Maull (ed.), The Rise and Decline of the Post-Cold War International Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 238; PRC State Council, ‘China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean’, White Paper, 20 April 2009, updated 24 Nov. 2016: http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2016/11/24/content_281475499069158.htm; MOFA PRC, ‘China's Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean’, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, 21 July 2009: http://gy.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zggk/200907/t20090721_4326759.htm
79 MOFA PRC, ‘Joint Action Plan between the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil, 2010-2014’, Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 22 April 2010: http://lk.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgxw/201004/t20100422_1403174.htm.
80 Extract from PR, ‘Abertura da Sessão Plenária da VI Cúpula do BRICS - Fortaleza/CE’, DPR, 15 July 2014; see also BRICS, ‘VI BRICS Summit Fortaleza Declaration’, 15 July 2014: http://brics2022.mfa.gov.cn/eng/gyjzgj/ljldrhwcgwj/202202/t20220222_10644323.html.
81 International Monetary Fund, ‘Acceptances of the Proposed Amendment of the Articles of Agreement on Reform of the Executive Board and Consents to 2010 Quota Increase’, 24 April 2017: www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/consents.htm.
82 Xi Jinping's cooperation scheme ‘1+3+6’ stands for: 1 plan (CELAC's Cooperation Plan for 2015-2019), 3 driving forces (trade, investment, and financial cooperation), and 6 key fields of cooperation (energy, resources, infrastructure projects, manufacturing, scientific innovation, and technical innovation).
83 MOFA PRC, ‘Build a Community of Shared Destiny for Common Progress’, Keynote Speech by H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, China–Latin American and Caribbean Countries Leaders’ Meeting, Brasilia, 17 July 2014: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/zyjh/202405/t20240530_11340755.html.
84 Chien-Kai Chen, ‘China in Latin America Then and Now: A Systemic Constructivist Analysis of China's Foreign Policy’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 50: 2 (2021), pp. 111–36. The ‘One-China Principle’ refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC) being recognised as the sole legitimate entity governing China and all its territories, including Taiwan, which are inalienable. The rejection of this principle impedes a state from establishing political and economic relations with China, as in the case of Paraguay. See Steven M. Goldstein, ‘Understanding the One China Policy’, Brookings, 31 Aug. 2023: www.brookings.edu/articles/understanding-the-one-china-policy/.
85 MOFA PRC, ‘Wang Yi: The Belt and Road Initiative Becomes New Opportunity for China–Latin America Cooperation’, 18 Sept. 2017: www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/gjhdq_665435/3376_665447/panama/3515_665122/202406/t20240612_11425838.html; Andrew Scobell et al., ‘China's Grand Strategy: Trends, Trajectories, and Long-Term Competition’, RAND Corporation, RR-2798-A, 2020.
86 Adalmir A. Marquetti, Cecilia Hoff and Alessandro Miebach, ‘Profitability and Distribution: The Origin of the Brazilian Economic and Political Crisis’, Latin American Perspectives, 47: 1 (2019), pp. 115–33.
87 ‘O impeachment é uma saída institucional da crise’, O Globo, 19 March 2016: https://oglobo.globo.com/opiniao/o-impeachment-uma-saida-institucional-da-crise-18912997.
88 Oliver Stuenkel, ‘Brazil's Foreign Policy Isn't Dead. It's Just Hibernating’, Americas Quarterly, 9 Nov. 2017: www.americasquarterly.org/article/brazils-foreign-policy-isnt-dead-its-just-hibernating/.
89 PR, Mensagem ao Congresso Nacional, 2018 (Brasilia: Documentos do Presidente da República, 2018), p. 238.
90 José A. G. Albuquerque, ‘Business with China: The Three Elements of Brazil's Strategic Partnership with China’, in Leila da C. Ferreira and José A. G. Albuquerque (eds.), China and Brazil: Challenges and Opportunities (São Paulo: Annablume, 2013), pp. 68–90.
91 Both Lula and Rousseff's speeches had explicitly called on entrepreneur groups and the political elite to back Brasilia's rising power and regional leadership endeavours, particularly concerning the sponsorship of regional integration or political coordination with the Global South. Brazil's deeds were annually presented and justified to Congress. Such elements are found in presidential speeches on foreign policy for domestic and foreign audiences from 2003 to 2015: the Presidential Library and Foreign Ministry annals. See Biblioteca da Presidência da República: http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/presidencia/ex-presidentes/ and Ministério das Relações Exteriores: https://www.gov.br/mre/en/content-centers/speeches-articles-and-interviews/minister-of-foreign-affairs
92 Luis L. Schenoni et al., ‘Myths of Multipolarity: The Sources of Brazil's Foreign Policy Overstretch’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 18: 1 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/fpa/orab037.
93 Tullo Vigevani, Marcelo F. de Oliveira and Rodrigo Cintra, ‘Política externa no período FHC: a busca de autonomia pela integração’, Revista Tempo Social, 15 (2004), pp. 31–61.
94 Mateus Bilhar, Richard J. Cook and Han Zhaoying, ‘To “B” or not to “B”: The BRICS, Brazil and Bolsonaro’, Modern Diplomacy, 1 March 2022: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/03/01/to-b-or-not-to-b-the-brics-brazil-and-bolsonaro/.
95 Ernesto H. F. Araújo, A nova política externa brasileira: seleção de discursos, artigos e entrevistas do Ministro das Relações Exteriores (Brasilia: Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão, 2020); Monica Herz, ‘A Conservative Foreign Policy for Brazil’, Latin America Policy, 13: 2 (2022), pp. 376–88.
96 Guimarães and Oliveira e Silva, ‘Far-right Populism and Foreign Policy Identity’, pp. 352–7.
97 Oliver Stuenkel, ‘The Trump of the Tropics after Trump’, Foreign Policy, 9 Nov. 2020: https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/11/09/bolsonaro-trumpism-rally-base-biden-economy-partner/.
98 US Department of State, Office of Treaty Affairs, ‘Agreement on Technology Safeguards Associated with U.S. Participation in Launches from the Alcantara Space Center’, Series No. 19-1216.1, 18 March 2019. The US–Brazil Security Forum was launched in May 2018 ‘to facilitate stronger bilateral security cooperation’. See US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, ‘U.S.–Brazil Permanent Security Forum’, n.d.: https://br.usembassy.gov/our-relationship/u-s-brazil-permanent-security-forum/.
99 US Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, ‘Major Non-NATO Ally Status’, 23 May 2021: www.state.gov/major-non-nato-ally-status/.
100 US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, US Mission Brazil, ‘Fact Sheet: U.S. Actions on Venezuela’, 24 April 2019: https://br.usembassy.gov/western-hemisphere-fact-sheet-u-s-actions-on-venezuela/; Nan Tian and Diego L. da Silva, ‘The Crucial Role of the Military in the Venezuelan Crisis’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 2 April 2019: www.sipri.org/commentary/topical-backgrounder/2019/crucial-role-military-venezuelan-crisis.
101 Christopher Beddor, ‘Breakingviews – Brazil's Bolsonaro Gives China Electric Shock’, Reuters, 5 Nov. 2018: www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-election-breakingviews/breakingviews-brazils-bolsonaro-gives-china-electric-shockidUSKCN1NA07W.
102 Ernesto H. F. Araújo, ‘Trump e o Ocidente’, Cadernos de Política Exterior, 3: 6 (2017), pp. 323–57; Rhys Jenkins and Alexandre F. Barbosa, ‘Fear for Manufacturing? China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America’, The China Quarterly, 209 (2012), pp. 59–81.
103 Bilhar et al., ‘To “B” or not to “B”’.
104 G1, ‘“Estou num país capitalista”, diz Bolsonaro ao chegar à China’, O Globo, 24 Oct. 2019: https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2019/10/24/estou-num-pais-capitalista-diz-bolsonaro-ao-chegar-a-china.ghtml.
105 Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento, Secretaria de Relações Internacionais do Agronegócio, ‘Balança Comercial do Agronegócio’, Dec. 2018: https://udop.com.br/download/estatistica/agronegocio/dez18_nota_completa_balanca_comercial_mapa.pdf; OEC, ‘What Does Brazil Export to China and United States? (2010–2019)’, 2022: https://oec.world/en/visualize/tree_map/hs92/export/bra/chn.usa/show/2010.2011.2012.2013.2014.2015.2016.2017.2018.2019/.
106 Andrew Chatzky, ‘Will There Be Winners in the U.S.–China Trade War?’, Council on Foreign Relations, 5 June 2019: www.cfr.org/in-brief/will-there-be-winners-us-china-trade-war.
107 Richard Lapper, ‘Bolsonaro Took Aim at China. Then Reality Struck’, Americas Quarterly, 23 April 2019: www.americasquarterly.org/article/bolsonaro-took-aim-at-china-then-reality-struck/.
108 SIPRI, ‘Importer/Exporter TIV Tables’: https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php.
109 Here, the early Bolsonaro administration's self-identification as part of the West was centred on Trump's personal values and foreign policy. According to Benjamin Miller and Ziv Rubinovitz, despite being recognised as the leader of the LIO, Trump's ‘America First’ policy is dubbed illiberal and nationalistic as ‘it challenges in some major ways the pillars of the US-led international liberal order’. Therefore, Bolsonaro's interests resemble those of the Trump administration, including lack of interest for international agreements and institutions, economic nationalist solutions for untrustworthy trade partners, and sociopolitical identity elements in domestic policy. Benjamin Miller and Ziv Rubinovitz, Grand Strategy from Truman to Trump (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2020), extract from p. 228.
110 PR, ‘Discurso do Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, durante reunião com o Presidente da República Popular da China, Xi Jinping – Palácio Itamaraty’, 13 Nov. 2019.
111 Camila Zarur, ‘Sete momentos em que Ernesto Araújo atacou a China’, O Globo, 18 May 2021: https://oglobo.globo.com/politica/sete-momentos-em-que-ernesto-araujo-atacou-china-1-25023701.
112 Reuters, ‘Brazil, U.S. Sign Agreement to Develop Defense Technology’, 8 March 2020: www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-brazil-defense/brazil-us-sign-agreement-to-develop-defense-technology-idUSKBN20V0X7/.
113 PR, ‘Presidente da República, Jair Bolsonaro, participa da abertura da IX Cúpula das Américas, nos Estados Unidos’, 9 June 2022.
114 Joe Biden, ‘Remarks by President Biden at the Inaugural Ceremony of the Ninth Summit of the Americas’, The White House, 8 June 2022: www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2022/06/08/remarks-by-president-biden-at-the-inaugural-ceremony-of-the-ninth-summit-of-the-americas/.
115 Cook et al., ‘The Illusion of the China–US–Europe Strategic Triangle’, pp. 496–8.
116 Chen, ‘China in Latin America Then and Now’, p. 116; Thomas Legler, Mariano Turzi and Eduardo Tzili-Apango, ‘Advancing Autonomy? Chinese Influence on Regional Governance in Latin America’, in Raúl Bernal-Meza and Li Xing (eds.), China–Latin America Relations in the 21st Century: The Dual Complexities of Opportunities and Challenges (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), pp. 27–53; Yu, ‘China's Strategic Partnership with Latin America’, pp. 1064–5.
117 Laura Silver, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy, ‘Views on China’, Pew Research Center, 27 July 2023: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2023/07/27/views-of-china/; Wang, ‘The Missing Link in Sino–Latin American Relations’, p. 18.
118 Bas Hooijmaaijers, ‘China, the BRICS, and the Limitations of Reshaping Global Economic Governance’, The Pacific Review, 34: 1 (2021), pp. 29–55; Bruno Binetti, ‘Mercosur's Divisions Are Pushing It to a Breaking Point’, World Politics Review, 28 July 2021: www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/29838/mercosur-s-divisions-are-pushing-it-to-a-breaking-point; José A. Sanahuja and Francisco J. V. Escánez, ‘The Copenhagen School in South America: The (De)securitization of UNASUR (2008–2017)’, Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, 64: 2 (2021), pp. 1–20: https://doi.org/10.1590/0034-7329202100201.
119 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘OECD Takes First Step in Accession Discussions with Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Croatia, Peru and Romania’, Press Release, 25 Jan. 2022: www.oecd.org/newsroom/oecd-takes-first-step-in-accession-discussions-with-argentina-brazil-bulgaria-croatia-peru-and-romania.htm. Article 10 of the NATO treaty limits membership to European states: see NATO, ‘The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D.C. – 4 April 1949’: www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm.
120 Maria C. Fernandes, ‘Bolsonaro: nunca seremos 100% afinados com a China, mas na questão econômica estamos fortes’, O Globo, 25 Oct. 2019: https://oglobo.globo.com/economia/bolsonaro-nunca-seremos-100-afinados-com-china-mas-na-questao-economica-estamos-fortes-24042314.
121 ‘Leia a íntegra do discurso de Lula de lançamento da pré-candidatura’, Poder360, 7 May 2022: www.poder360.com.br/eleicoes/leia-a-integra-do-discurso-de-lula-ao-lancar-pre-candidatura/; André Biernath, ‘“O Brasil está de volta”: como foi primeiro discurso de Lula na COP27’, BBC, 16 Nov. 2022: www.bbc.com/portuguese/internacional-63648093.
122 Mateus Bilhar, ‘A Brazilian Approach at the G20: Building a Just World and a Sustainable Planet’, Modern Diplomacy, 3 Feb. 2024: https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/02/03/a-brazilian-approach-at-the-g20-building-a-just-world-and-a-sustainable-planet/.
123 MOFA PRC, ‘Xi Jinping Sends Congratulatory Message to President-elect Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil’, 31 Oct. 2022: www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/gjhdq_665435/3447_665449/3473_665008/3475_665012/202211/t20221101_10795079.html; Stephen Smith, ‘World Order with Chinese Characteristics: The Development of Chinese International Relations Theory and Implications for China's Foreign Policy’, unpubl. PhD diss., Carleton University, 2020.
124 PR, ‘Brazil's Lula Meets with Chinese Chancellor in Preparatory Meeting prior to Visit by the President of China’, 20 Jan. 2024: www.gov.br/planalto/en/latest-news/2024/01/brazil2019s-lula-meets-with-chinese-chancellor-in-preparatory-meeting-prior-to-visit-by-the-president-of-china.
125 US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, ‘Joint Statement Following the Meeting between President Biden and President Lula’, 10 Feb. 2023: https://br.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-following-the-meeting-between-president-biden-and-president-lula/; US Embassy and Consulates in Brazil, ‘Readout of Ambassador Tai's Meetings with Brazilian Government Officials’, 8 March 2023: https://br.usembassy.gov/readout-of-ambassador-tais-meetings-with-brazilian-government-officials.
126 US Senate, Foreign Relations Committee, ‘Full Committee Hearing: The Future of U.S.–Brazil Relations’, 15 March 2023: www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/the-future-of-us-brazil-relations-03-15-2023.
127 Javier Luque, ‘Chinese Foreign Direct Investment and Argentina: Unraveling the Path’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 24: 4 (2019), pp. 605–22; Francisco Urdinez, Jan Knoerich and Pedro F. Ribeiro, ‘Don't Cry for Me “Argenchina”: Unraveling Political Views of China through Legislative Debates in Argentina’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, 23: 2 (2018), pp. 235–56.