¹ By democratic civilian control over the military I mean the capacity of the duly constituted authorities (executive, legislative, judiciary) to limit and modify the armed forces' behaviour. Civilian control over the military, in this sense, means the capability of these democratic authorities to impose upon the armed forces their political will, either by disciplinary steps or through institutional arrangements, consequently curbing autonomous military power. In communist countries there is civilian control over the military through the communist party, but since this control is not democratic it is not considered here.

² See Welch, Claude, No Farewell to Arms? Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America (Boulder, 1987), p. 2Google Scholar.

³ Tutelage is an intermediary situation between democracy and dictatorship: The military neither repeatedly obeys civilian commands, as in a consolidated democracy, nor totally disregards civilian rulers, as in a military dictatorship. In other words, authoritarian enclaves persist within the state apparatus allowing the military to continue behaving with some autonomy.

⁴ Spain has experienced a long pattern of military intervention and a weak democratic tradition. In its last 190 years, Spain has witnessed about thirty pronunciamientos, an average of one coup every five years.

⁶ This article assumes that there are two transitions. First, from an authoritarian government to a democratically elected government that may or may not open the way to the second transition: from a democratically elected government to a democratic regime. Spain completed both transitions and controlled the military. Argentina and Brazil only completed the first one, and therefore have not controlled the military.

⁶ Raúl Alfonsfn suffered three coup attempts while the present incumbent, Carlos Menem, has already experienced one.

⁷ Recently the Brazilian media reported that the army was about to buy new uniforms without fulfilling the correct bureaucratic procedures in a transaction worth about $80 million. Rumours spread that the Minister of the Army, General Carlos Tinoco, was in a shaky position in the cabinet. He then publicly warned that unlike his civilian fellows, military ministers are not easily ousted. ‘Tinoco diz que militares não são “fritados”,’ Foiba de São Paulo, 31 Oct. 1991.

⁸ In 1988, on the eve of the Congress Constituent voting on both José Sarney's five-year mandate and on presidentialism, the military threatened intervention, both if Sarney's mandate were shortened, and if parliamentarianism were approved. Thereafter, for the first time since the Constituinte's inception all 559 constituents turned up to vote and they thereupon approved presidentialism and an extension to Sarney's tenure.

⁹ On 26 June 1991, the Brazilian Congress rejected Provisional Act 296 that granted a 20 % wage increase. The Ministries of the Army and the Air Force (but not the Navy) decided to go ahead and disregard Congress. Caught by surprise, President Collor asked the Chief of the Armed Forces Staff about the veracity of the report about his Ministers' decision. The President was informed that the Ministers argued that they had either to raise wages or to put up with insubordination in the barracks. Both the President and Congress decided to ignore this insubordination. Zaverucha, Jorge ‘Do Mito da Supremacia Civil à Realidade: Collor e os Militares,’ Cadernos de Conjuntura do IUPERJ, no. 44 (Sept. 1991), p. 25Google Scholar.

¹⁰ Lack of a consolidated pattern of civil–military relations should not be confused with lack of explicit military intervention. Although Venezuela has not suffered from a military coup for more than thirty years, the military has recovered part of its scope for autonomous behaviour. According to Aguero, ‘the military has managed to remain somewhat protected from outside public control by developing, with the compliance of party elites, a buffer zone that deters the prompt investigation of irregularities, excesses in the use of force, or outright corruption’. Felipe Aguero, ‘The Military and Democracy in Venezuela’, in Goodman, L., Mendelson, J. and Rial, J. (eds.), The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil-Military Relations in Latin America (Lexington, 1990), pp. 267–70Google Scholar. Once it is recognised that Venezuela is not a consolidated democracy, the 1992 February coup attempt should not surprise us.

¹¹ In Brazil, however, the 1988 Constitution bowed to the military's interests. Nowadays, most political parties no longer discuss the role of the armed forces in Brazilian society. Therefore, not many new proposals stemming from Brazilian political parties should be expected at the constitutional review of 1993, despite the fact that the 1988 Constitution left the authoritarian military apparatus almost intact.

¹² In Brazil, the military still enjoys a privileged jurisdiction even for common crimes. Recently in a small city in the state of São Paulo, a girl eleven years old was raped by four civil policemen and one military policeman. Parallel investigations are being held by both police forces, and if the indicted are found guilty they will be judged under two different legislations: civil and military. Souza, José Amado de Faria, ‘Um crime, duas penas’, VEJA, 15 01 1992Google Scholar.

¹³ For example, whereas in Argentina the National Security Law (NSL) was abolished, it effectively persists in Brazil. Today, in theory, crimes against national security should go before the civil jurisdiction rather than being brought for trial before military courts. The 1988 constitutional article 109-IV asserts that federal judges have the authority to both prosecute and judge political crimes. However, in practice, given that there is no legislation that deals with political crimes in Brazil, the National Security Law is still the one that regulates political crimes.

¹⁴ In July 1991, Congress vetoed a wage increase for the military that had been proposed by the executive. Collor's response typifies the tutelage game. He had two alternatives: either (a) to support the Congress decision and eradicate some of the military's autonomous power; or (b) to ally with the military against Congress. Collor preferred the second option.

¹⁵ This very important law was approved without any major discussion in Congress.

¹⁶ The Brazilian transition resembles the Chilean one. A good account on how President Patricio Aylwin's government survives on sufferance from the military can be found in Loveman, Brian, ‘?Misión Cumplida? Civil Military Relations and the Chilean Political Transition’, Journal of Interamerkan Studies and World Affairs, vol. 33, no. 3 (1991), pp. 35–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Besides item no. 8 all others were suggested by Stepan, Alfred, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, 1988), pp. 94–7Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Ynfante, Jesus, El Ejército de Franco y de Juan Carlos (Madrid, 1976), p. 24Google Scholar.

¹⁹ Fernández, Carlos, Los Militares en la Transición Politica (Barcelona, 1982), p. 190Google Scholar.

²⁰ de Defensa, Ministerio, Memória de la Legislatura (1982–1986) (Madrid, 1986), p. 75Google Scholar. Article 8 states that ‘the mission of the armed forces, as constituted by the army, the navy and the air force is to guarantee Spanish sovereignty and independence, the defence of its territorial integrity and the constitutional order’.

²¹ Ibid., p. 77.

²² Ibid.

²³ The following eleven intelligence agencies still persist in contemporary Argentina: CNI, SIDE, Ministry of the Economy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Religion, Ministry of the Interior, Joint Chiefs of Staff, SIFA (air force), SIN (navy), SIE (army), Navy Prefecture and National Gendarmerie.

²⁴ For example, the army's intelligence unit, Battalion 601, was left untouched and, consequently, continues to behave autonomously vis-à-vis not only the government but also the rest of the military. Pion-Berlin, David, ‘Between Confrontation and Accommodation: Military and Government Policy in Democratic Argentina’, Journal of Latin American Studies, no. 6 (1992), p. 556Google Scholar.

²⁵ Botto, Mercedes, ‘Gobierno y Parlamento: Processo de Toma de Decisiones sobra la Política Militar en la Transitión Democrática Argentina (1983/89)’ unpubl. article, CEDES (Buenos Aires), 1989, p. 51Google Scholar.

²⁶ Veja, 25 July 1990.

²⁷ Evelin, Guilherme, ‘Projeto restringe a espionagem’, O Estado de Sāo Paulo, 1 12. 1991Google Scholar.

²⁸ Vianna, Francisco, ‘O general de capuz’, Senhor, 16 05 1990Google Scholar.

²⁹ Congress approved Collor's budget arguing that it was unauditable since it was ‘codified’. Rather than demanding transparency from the executive, the legislation gave up its right to control intelligence activities. Rosa, Mario, ‘Governo tem conta secreta de US$65; milhôes’, Jornal do Brasil, 4 08. 1991Google Scholar.

³⁰ Veja, 19 June 1991.

³¹ Dias, Etevaldo, ‘Congresso deve fiscalizar lado secreto do governo’, Jornal do Brasil, 5 08 1991Google Scholar.

³² The Army, the Navy and the Air Forces are working in parallel projects aiming to obtain enriched uranium. The Army wants to enrich uranium using graphite, the Air Force is trying lasers, and the Navy is using centrifuges. Veja, 25 Sept. 1991.

³³ ‘Deputado Quer Comissâo Para Fiscalizar Verba Secreta’, Jornal do Brasil, 8 Aug. 1991.

³⁴ Prime Minister Calvo Sotelo (1981–2) led the first Spanish government since 1939 not to include a single military officer. His practice has been followed by Felipe Gonzalez.

³⁵ Neither Raúl Alfonsín nor Carlos Menem has allowed a military presence in their cabinets.

³⁶ By Sept. 1992 Collar had already changed all the members of his original cabinet except the three military ministers.

³⁷ Gutiérrez Mellado was a liberal who was helping Suárez to establish civilian control over the military. Not surprisingly his appointment was not well received by Francoist officers.

³⁸ Brazilian Congress, Comissão da Organização Eleitoral Partidária e Garantia das Instituições, Subcomissão de Defesa do Estado, da Sociedade e de Sua Segurança, Report, 11 May 1987, p. 29.

³⁹ In January 1992 Fiúza became Collor's new Minister of Social Action.

⁴⁰ For juridical differences see Villalón, Pedro, Estados Excepcionales y Suspensión de Garantías (Madrid, 1984), pp. 107–18Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Throughout Alfonsín's tenure and even now, the Senate has been perceived as being much more sensitive to military viewpoints than the Lower Chamber.

⁴² Blanck, Julio, ‘Proyecto de Control Parlamentario,’ Clarín, 27 11 3 12 1989Google Scholar (international edition).

⁴³ Veja, 19 June 1991.

⁴⁴ The Spanish for grey is gris. Therefore, some Spaniards called the Armed Police the ‘Gristapo’.

⁴⁵ Hudson, Robert C., ‘Democracy and the Spanish Police Forces’, The Police Journal, no. 59 (1975). P. 56Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 58.

⁴⁸ This explains why Serra granted the right of unionisation to the police forces, but not to the Guards.

⁴⁹ For example, on 19 June 1985, the Senate approved 175 out of the 178 promotions proposed in the army and navy's lists. D'Alessandri, Colonel Francisco, Durand, Lieutenant Colonel Julio Cesar and Pertusion, Captain Roberto were vetoed, La Nación, 20 06 1985Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ The most recent case was the promotion of General José Luiz Lopes da Silva, the officer who, on 9 October 1988, led thirteen hundred soldiers from the army and military police in storming the Volta Redonda steel mill to crush a legal strike. Three workers were killed. Zaverucha, Jorge, ‘A Promoção’, O Estado de São Paulo, 20 05 1992Google Scholar.

⁵¹ It is worth remembering that during the Mondoa Pact of October 1977, the government and all political parties represented in the Parliament agreed, among other things, to reform the code of military justice. Aguero, Felipe, ‘The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: Spain in Comparative Perspective’, unpubl. PhD diss., Duke University, 1991, p. 186Google Scholar.

⁵² de Defensa, Ministerio, Memória de la Legislatura (1982–1986) (Madrid, 1986), p. 279Google Scholar.

⁵³ The law established that common crimes committed by the military in the past would be reviewed by military courts, but the government had the right to appeal. That right was soon activated. Given that the military courts were taking too much time to bring the military to trial, the government transferred these cases to a civil court.

⁵⁴ The Minister of the Army, General Leonidas Pires Gonçalves, honoured four military policemen, who jointly with army tanks took part in the raid, with one of the highest military distinctions, the peacemaker medal. Jornal da Tarde, 21 Feb. 1989.

⁵⁵ Zaverucha, Jorge, ‘Civil-Military Relations During the Process of Transition: Spain, Argentina and Brazil’, unpubl. PhD diss., Univ. of Chicago, 1991, p. 254Google Scholar.

⁵⁶ Indeed, ten military men were sent for trial by a military tribunal, rather than by a civilian one.

⁵⁷ This refers to the Mansfield Doctrine that was used against rioters in October 1831 in Bristol, England. The doctrine stated that soldiers could be used in civil disorders, but only if they were used as civilians. That is to say, if a military person's actions in the course of a riot had exceeded the powers with which he was invested, he might be punished not by a court-martial but upon an indictment in a civilian court. The idea is to avoid the impression that the commencement of the riots had precipitated a military government or that any part of the laws of the Constitution had been suspended or dispensed with. Engdhal, David, ‘Soldiers, Riots and Revolution: The Law and History of Military Troops in Civil Disorders’, Iowa Law Review, vol. 57, no. 1 1971). PP. 33–5Google Scholar.

⁵⁸ The majority of the army's troops remain stationed close to urban centres, rather than at the Brazilian borders. For instance, the Vila Militar, one of the biggest garrisons in the Southern Cone, is located in Rio de Janeiro where there is no space for tank manoeuvres.

⁵⁹ During the Franco era, areas of military participation included the control of the merchant marine, meteorological agencies and civil aviation. Aguero, Felipe, ‘The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: Spain in Comparative Perspective’, unpubl. PhD diss., Duke University, 1991, p. 119Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ The 1988 Brazilian Constitution neglected this issue; therefore, there is not a clear differentiation between civil and military activities in space.

⁶¹ This situation constitutes an incentive to clientelistic practice. The São Paulo Airline, VASP, which is in competition with two other Brazilian airlines to obtain new international routes, depends o n Ministry of Air Force approval. In May 1991, VASP decided to assist its patron. On air force salary slips the following was printed: ‘the retired and inactive are receiving their salary payment receipts, at home, courtesy of VASP’. Folba de São Paulo, 13 June 1991; O Estado de São Paulo, 13 June 1991.

⁶² Collor's Minister of Economy was fighting against tax evasion, and considered asking the navy to furnish a list of yacht owners.