¹ A general survey is provided by Frankman, Myron, ‘The Costs of Cooperation: Latin-American Wartime Exports to the United States’, paper given at the 46th Congress of Americanists, Amsterdam, 07 1988.Google Scholar

² Céspedes, Augusto, El Presidente Colgado (Buenos Aires, 1966), p. 35Google Scholar; El Dictador Suicida (La Paz, 1968), pp. 257–60.Google Scholar

³ Bedregal, Guillermo, Monopolios contra Países Pobres (Mexico, 1967), pp. 148–9.Google Scholar Fernando Baptista Gumucio provides the most detailed calculation and estimates the losses on tin sales to the USA at $670,315,000, Estrategia del Estaño (La Paz, 1966), table 23, p. 146.Google Scholar This would be around three times the actual amount paid! The arithmetic employed is misleading since it uses the frozen price for US consumers, rather than the higher price received by producers. According to this table Bolivia received more than the estimated market price when tin was especially scarce in 1942, and suffered the overwhelming bulk of her ‘losses’ in 1945 when prices were determined by post-war reconstruction policy.

⁴ Milward, Alan, War, Economy and Society, 1939–1945 (London, 1977).Google Scholar

⁵ Olson, M., Economics of the Wartime Shortage, A History of British Food Supplies in the Napoleonic Wars and World Wars I & II (Durham, 1963).Google Scholar This assumption was widely adopted in World War II and permitted the establishment of special Ministries of Economic Warfare.

⁶ Crespo, Alfonso, Los Aramayo de Chicas (Barcelona, 1981), p. 328Google Scholar; Walter Hermosa, V., Breve Historia de la Minería en Bolivia (La Paz, 1979), p. 141Google Scholar; Gómez-d'Angelo, W., ‘Mining in the Economic Development of Bolivia, 1900–1970’, unpubl. PhD diss., Vanderbilt University, 1973, p. 99Google Scholar; Dunkerley, James, Rebellion in the Veins (London, 1984), p. 11.Google Scholar

⁷ This research is based on records in the files of the Board of Trade (BT), Cabinet Office (CAB), Colonial Office (CO), Foreign Office (FO), and Treasury (T) preserved at the Public Record Office, Kew, and the files of the Bank of England (OV, EC). There are only two scholarly studies of the tin industry during the war and both give extensive attention to the UK: Fishman, Leo, ‘Wartime Control of Tin in Great Britain, 1939–41’, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 54, (1946)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ross, Kathryn, ‘Bolivia and the War Effort: An Economic History of 1939–45 in the Context of Allied Tin Procurement Policy’, unpubl. BPhil thesis, Oxford University, 1977.Google Scholar

⁸ In many ways the politics of tin during the Second World War ran parallel to those during the First. They are analysed by Contreras, Manuel, ‘Tin Mining in Bolivia, 1900–1925’, unpubl. MA diss., University of London, 1980Google Scholar, extensively revised as ‘La Mineria Estañífera Boliviana en la Primera Guerra Mundial’, in Minería y Economía en Bolivìa (La Paz, 1984).Google Scholar

⁹ Simón Patiño had become the dominant force in Bolivian mining in the 1920s, and his companies produced around 45% of all Bolivian tin. They were still ruled quite autocratically by their founder, in spite of the fact that he turned 80 in 1940. He spent most of the war at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, while his son Antenor was Bolivian Minister to London. The other major producers were Hochschild (23%) and Aramayo (7%).

¹⁰ An application of the theory of vertical integration is to be found in Hennart, Jean-François, ‘The Tin Industry’, in Casson, M. (ed.), Multinationals and World Trade (London, 1986).Google Scholar The first formal linkage had been established in World War I, and was expanded at intervals. In the consolidation of the smelting industry in 1929, Williams, Harvey became a subsidiary of Consolidated Tin Smelters (CTS),; 5% owned by Patiño.

¹¹ CTS owned 40% of Arnhem, and the remainder was held by Billiton, which in turn was represented on the board of CTS.

¹² Beals, Carleton, Pan America: A Program for the Western Hemisphere (New York, 1940), pp. 43–5, 48.Google Scholar

¹³ Hochschild was anxious to develop the Bolivian mining industry on the basis of low-grade ores, and led the movement to support a US smelter. The interests of Bolivian politicians are briefly discussed by Holland, E. J., ‘Historical Study of Bolivian Foreign Relations, 1935–1946’, unpubl. PhD diss., The American University, 1967, pp. 219–21, 308.Google Scholar

¹⁴ BT131/104, A. G. Charles, History of the Non-Ferrous Metals Control. BMC received an annual fee of £221,400 for managing NFMC, which was considered ‘very generous’. Cassington, John, A Metal Man's Wartime Diary (Eynsham, 1941), p. 90.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Lyttleton, Oliver, The Memoirs of Lord Chandos (London, 1962). p. 140.Google Scholar In October 1940 Lyttleton entered the Cabinet as President of the Board of Trade. Anglo-Oriental was the dominant force in Nigeria and Malaya.

¹⁶ Civilian consumption dropped 21% between 1939 and 1943. Milward, , War, Economy and Society, p. 90.Google Scholar Electrical and metal household goods declined by 82%, and motor vehicles by 95%. Hancock, W. K., British War Economy (London, 1949), p. 500.Google Scholar

¹⁷ T246/85, Minutes of Special Committee on Coordination of Research on Economy of Tin in the Tinplate Container Industry. Such economies allowed tin to replace aluminium in 1941, e.g. in milk bottle caps. CO852/625/1/19697/68, Burgess (NFMC) memo, 31 March 1944.

¹⁸ Raw materials requirements were wildly overstated and a general increase in all stocks took place between May 1940 and December 1941. Hancock, , British War Economy, p. 267.Google Scholar

¹⁹ In May 1941 stocks were reduced to 8 weeks' supply of metal and exports were then suspended. CAB115/116.

²⁰ This was also the case in Germany which suffered no serious problem until 1944. Medlicott, W. N., The Economic Blockade, vol. 1 (London, 1952), p. 526Google Scholar; vol. II (London, 1959), pp. 11, 451, 656. Those who were attempting to monitor the UK situation on the basis of stocks in public warehouses would have drawn a very different conclusion, since they were generally under 50% of the total supplies of metal available. Fishman is extremely critical of British policy, largely on the basis of such misleading data. ‘Wartime Control of Tin’, p. 423.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 430–2. Prices were fixed, but the LME still functioned to distribute stocks released at the rate of 25 tons per day. Tin was the only metal in which any trading was permitted on the LME.

²² For the first three months of the war this may have been as much as £250,000. While Bolivians could not benefit from speculation in New York, they would have suffered had destocking led to a price slump, dragging down the London market. Had Bolivia secured direct access to the US market, the speculation would have been much less.

²³ FO371/22717, Rawlins (La Paz) to FO, 28 Sept. 1939. Once the LME was functioning normally such discussion was suspended. Fynes-Clinton (La Paz) to FO, 17 Jan. 1940, reporting the sentiments of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ostria Gutiérrez, FO371/25226.

²⁴ Minerals Yearbook, 1939, pp. 681–2. In 1939 500 tons were imported; from September 1939 to May 1940 the total reached 4,000 tons. FO371/25227, Minutes of Meeting, 7 June 1940.

²⁵ EC4/128, Bank to Carr (Ministry of Supply), 27 Dec. 1939. Bewdley (Treasury) wrote to Bolton (Bank). ‘I am not inclined to take this threat…as an overriding consideration if there is any prospect of our getting the Bolivian tin without paying dollars or Swiss francs for it.’ 29 Dec. 1939.

²⁶ Ibid., Bewdley to Bolton, 1 Jan. 1940.

²⁷ Ibid., Bewdley to Cobbold (Bank), 2 Feb. 1940. The remainder was convertible on the free market.

²⁸ Ibid., Cobbold to Bewdley, 6 Jan. 1940.

²⁹ The Phelps Dodge smelter became operational in August 1940 and successfully treated low-grade concentrates. In 1940 the US produced a total of 1,746 tons of tin, of which only 510 was pig tin, Minerals Yearbook, 1940, p. 674.

³⁰ Ibid., Notes on Meeting between Pearce (CTS), A. Patiño, Burgess, Cobbold, and Bolton, 3 April 1940. The gold feature remains something of a puzzle. There must have been some advantage to the British since this was non-negotiable for them, yet it was inconvenient for the Bolivians who had to bear the transaction costs of shipping it from the Bank of Canada in Ottawa to New York, and converting it into dollars.

³¹ Ibid., Cobbold to Pearce, 10 April 1940; A. Patiño to Pearce, 19 April 1940.

³² The agreement was reached in June 1940 and permitted the acquisition of 75,000 tons in twelve months. Since far less was bought and far more needed, the agreement was renewed in 1941.

³³ 50 cents was comparatively high, 8% over the prices ruling from January to April. It should be noted that the premium included in this price was solely a result of the accumulation of the stockpile and was therefore temporary. Once the stockpile was complete, it was expected that the premium would disappear, and the New York price would fall below the London price. OV6/24;, Treasury to Phillimore, Dec. 1941.

³⁴ EC4/128, Meeting, Pearce, Antenor Patiño, Bewdley, Hall-Patch and Somervell, May 1940. The 50:50 ratio was available for those not prepared to sign ten-year contracts. The British refused to budge on the question of basis of pricing. Pearce to Antenor Patiño, 12 June 1940. The difference between f.o.b. and c.i.f. values of the concentrate with metal priced at £270/ton was £8/15/9 so 66% on c.i.f. would be equivalent to 70% on f.o.b. Sir John Campbell (CO/ITC) advised against going higher than 50:50, but found that the main problem was the better terms enjoyed by Aramayo. Minute 31 May 1940, CO852/384/18005.

³⁵ Lyttleton noted that a 10-year contract posed some problems since the gold obligation might become too onerous a price to pay to stop the US smelter. After some reflection it was realised that ‘if at any time we decide against imports of Bolivian tin ore, we can always use the import licensing agreement to stop them…’. Memo on Bolivian Tin, 9 July 1940, EC4/128. The contract therefore imposed an obligation to sell, without a reciprocal obligation to buy!

³⁶ Ibid., Meeting, 29 May 1940. Antenor Patiño accepted this agreement in a cable to Pearce, 20 June 1940.

³⁷ These connections were spelled out by Bewdley to Pearce and communicated by cable to Antenor Patiño, then at Biarritz, 5 June 1940, EC4/128.

³⁸ OV19/11, Phillimore (Bank/Treasury representative, La Paz) to Powell (Bank), 2 Jan. 1941.

³⁹ EC4/128, visit by Antenor Patiño to Cobbold, 23 May 1940. A request was also made for dollars with which to pay dividends to shareholders in Patiño Mines and Enterprises, but this was treated as the ‘most impudent request ever seen’. Powell memo, 30 Sept. 1940, OV19/9.

⁴⁰ OV19/15, Bank of England to Bank of Canada, 25 November 1943. The relationship between the agreement with the Patiños as International Enterprises, and the Patiños as sources of tin supply is evident in a memo to Powell, 26 Aug. 1940. OV19/9. The Patiños were allowed some conversion privileges on the dividends from the sterling assets remaining in International Enterprises. T231/65, Minutes, Treasury/Bank Committee, 7 Oct. 1941. However, they were not permitted to liquidate some of these assets to transfer funds to Bolivia to repay loans incurred to pay duties on the settlement of the Patiño estate. Ibid., 28 Oct. 1941.

⁴¹ By a Supreme Decree of 10 May 1940, the Bolivian Government changed the official exchange value of the boliviano from sterling to the US dollar. Benavides, Julio, Historia de la Moneda en Bolivia (La Paz, 1972), p. 184.Google Scholar

⁴² OV19/9, Ostria Gutiérrez to Fynes-Clinton, 1 August 1940, enclosing Resolution of Bolivian Government, 23 July 1940. FO371/29128/W66/66/53 provides full details of the contract. It fixed a standard smelting charge subject to variation in the price of the metal, and to the cost of labour and material inputs, thus guaranteeing what was considered to be a high level of profit, around £3/ton.

⁴³ ‘The Bolivian Government is being nasty [by refusing to accept £ in settlement of ⅓ of foreign exchange obligations] and aiming to obstruct the conclusion of our tin agreement.’ Nosworthy (Treasury) to Powell, 14 Aug. 1940, EC4/128. Acceptance of the sterling was considered by the Banco Central, if the Bank of England were prepared to convert to dollars, but this was naturally refused in the absence of a general payments agreement, Minutes of Treasury/Bank committee, 20 Aug. 1940, T231/64.

⁴⁴ OV19/9, Peñaranda (Bolivian Chargŕ d'Affaires) to Waterfield (Treasury), 7 Sept., Pearce to Waite, 7 Sept., Simón Patiño to Bank of London and South America, 9 Sept. 1940.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Waterfield to Peñaranda, 10 Sept. It was thought that this ‘concession would probably be effective in preventing the Bolivian Government from supporting movement in favour of American smelting scheme’. Waterfield to FO, 9 Sept. 1940, FO371/24169.

⁴⁶ OV6/247, Powell to Phillimore, 11 Sept. 1941. Patiño would have lost heavily as a result of this speculation, the difference between the free rate and the official rate. The problem was corrected in 1942 with the liquidation of the ITC Buffer Stock in sterling.

⁴⁷ Most contracts expired during 1940, but an important one with Abelli continued to early 1942, OV19/13, Gibbs to Nosworthy, 15 Jan. 1942. Aramayo ran into difficulties in getting his understanding of the terms of convertibility accepted after 18 July and broke his contract with Williams, Harvey. S. Patiño to Pearce, 15 Nov. 1940, FO371/25228. Hochschild attempted to get his current contract extended slightly. Phillimore to FO, 29 Nov. 1940.

⁴⁸ Phillips Bros indicated an interest in signing but since they were dealers they could not guarantee supplies for a ten-year period. Nosworthy to Powell, 13 Sept. 1940, FO371/25227 Fabulosa Mining Corporation also indicated its willingness. OV19/9, Casey to Rose van Cutsem, 9 Aug. 1940. Abelli contemplated continuing to ship to the UK after 1941, and Monserrat shipped small amounts of tin-bearing tealite throughout the war to Capper Pass.

⁴⁹ FO371/25228, Fynes-Clinton to FO, 24 Aug. 1940.

⁵⁰ Ibid., Lothian to FO, 2; Sept. 1940. The smelter could only be justified on economic or defence grounds against the contingency of the interruption of supply from South-East Asia. However, its high costs would not outweigh the costs of shipping Bolivian ores across the Atlantic and then back again as metal. The defence case was also weak, especially since the decision to start buying ores well in advance of the opening of the smelter meant a large increase in stocks of ore, and a corresponding decrease in metal. If defence considerations had been paramount in 1940, the better strategy would have been to reduce the extraordinary profligacy in the use of tin by US industry, and to enforce the prohibition on exports.

⁵¹ Editorial, , ‘U.S. Buys Bolivian Tin Ore’, Engineering and Mining Journal, vol. 141, no. 12 (12 1940), p. 31.Google Scholar

⁵² FO371/25228, Lothian to FO, 8 Oct. 1940. The concession included an agreement to transfer 6,000 tons should it be essential for British war requirements. All references to quantities are to the metal in the concentrate.

⁵³ The MRC heavily subsidised the smelter, and especially generous terms were offered for treating the medium and low-grade concentrates which constituted the bulk of the supplies. The smelter was eventually built in Texas by Billiton to apply the smelting technology used at Arnhem. Billiton supplied the necessary high-grade ores from the DEI, at low prices, presumably looking for access to the post-war US market.

⁵⁴ FO371/25228, Pearce to Lyttleton, 27 Sept. 1940.

⁵⁵ Ibid., Lyttleton to Keynes, 1 Oct. 1940.

⁵⁶ Patiño was publicly accused of being pro-Fascist, a tax-evader, holding Bolivia in feudal bondage, and the source of US tin problems. Kelly, Edsel, ‘The Battle for Tin’, The Nation (11 1940), pp. 473–4.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ OV19/11, Phillimore quoting Etchenique to Powell, 2 Jan. 1941.

⁵⁸ F0371/25228, Patiño to Pearce, 15 Nov. 1940.

⁵⁹ Ibid., FO to British Embassy, Washington, 19 Oct. 1940. The MRC offer contained a large subsidy; had this been removed the differential would have been around £22 in favour of the British

⁶⁰ OV19/11, Memo by Powell, 29 March 1941.

⁶¹ Ibid., Phillimore to Powell, 2 Jan. 1941.

⁶² OV6/245, Treasury to Phillimore, Jan. 1941 (folio 28h).

⁶³ Ibid., Phillimore to Bank, 19 and 20 Dec. 1940. This concession was extended to allow Bolivia to use sterling to cancel debts to Argentina. OV6/247, Argentina to La Paz, 28 Aug. 1941 and Argentina in turn used it to repatriate British-held securities. OV6/248, Phillimore to Bank, 9 Oct., FO to Buenos Aires, 24 Oct. 1941. The transferability of Bolivian sterling to third countries was an exception to the general principles governing exchange policy. Sayers, R. S., Financial Policy, 1939–1945 (London, 1956), p. 249.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ OV19/11, Phillimore memo, 11 Jan. 1941. Patiño imported food stuffs from Argentina and one of the companies paid taxes in Chile. Patiño also demanded that he be permitted to take advantage of the much lower insurance premiums payable in sterling to cover his gold claims, but this was denied, and he assumed the exchange risk himself. The 75% was considered very onerous by the Treasury, prompting much anxiety: ‘And yet brooding in the evenings I cannot succeed in producing any formula which would give a loophole to escape from this position…‘, Nosworthy to Powell, 2 Feb. 1941.

⁶⁵ OV6/246, Phillimore to Bank, 30 March 1941.

⁶⁶ OV19/12, Phillimore to Powell, 7 May 1941.

⁶⁷ Ibid., Nosworthy to Powell, 1 April; Board of Trade meeting, 3 April 1941.

⁶⁸ Ibid., Nosworthy to Somervell, 23 July 1941. The British first learned of this by reading the notice of the Annual Report of Patiño Mines & Enterprises, published in the Mining Journal! Patiño asked Pearce for a copy of the plans of Williams, Harvey, but this was refused.

⁶⁹ Japan occupied Malaya in December 1941, Singapore in early February 1942 and the Dutch East Indies later that month.

⁷⁰ The LME was suspended on 8 December 1941, following the Japanese occupation of Thailand.

⁷¹ OV19/13, Powell memo, 15 Dec. 1941.

⁷² OV6/248, Pearce to Patintilde;o, 31 Dec. 1941. The renegotiation of the contract conceded Patiño's claim to pay insurance premiums at the lower rate. Patiño did in fact ask for more than parity, for the equivalent of; 2 c/lb. It should be recalled that the other Bolivian producers selling direct to the USA were still receiving 1.5 cents less than the MRC buying price, so Patiño now receíved £8/6/9 more than they did.

⁷³ OV19/13, Fennelly (Ministry of Supply) to Archer (British Raw Materials Mission, Washington), 2 Jan. 1942. The USA now found the renewal of the agreement desirable since the ITC would be very helpful, should it become necessary to liquidate the stockpile.

⁷⁴ Ibid., Archer to Fennelly, 8 Jan. 1942.

⁷⁵ FO371/32592, Archer to Fennelly, 11 March 1942.

⁷⁶ OV19/13, Phillips (Treasury representative in Washington) to Waley (Treasury), 25 May 1942 with details of the Worcester report which recommended an increase of 7 cents, on the basis of detailed documentation of the increase in costs. Since much of the increase was attributable to an increase in wages and taxes, there was no such sympathy in UK official circles.

⁷⁷ FO371/32592, Treasury to Phillips, 3 April 1942.

⁷⁸ Ibid., La Paz to FO, 30 April 1942.

⁷⁹ OV19/13, Phillips to Treasury, 26 April 1942.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Powell memo, 28 April 1942.

⁸¹ FO371/32592, Treasury to Phillips, 29 April, Phillips to Treasury, 3 May, Treasury to Phillips, 6 May, Phillips to Treasury, 9 May 1942.

⁸² Ibid., Phillips to Treasury, 9 May, 18 May 1942. Final agreement was not reached until 29 June as a result of a dispute concerning its duration; here the Americans were unable to secure the longer term of two years that they had earlier insisted on, and instead had to settle for 18 months.

⁸³ OV19/14, S. Patiño to Pearce, 30 June 1942.

⁸⁴ Ibid., Treasury Meeting minutes, 20 July 1942. These costs were £27/4/- per ton from Antofagasta to Liverpool by comparison with £15/16/10 to Texas.

⁸⁵ Ibid., Hochschild to Nitze (US Bureau of Economic Warfare) 19 May 1943.

⁸⁶ Ibid., Archer to Fennelly, 16 Aug. 1943. In advocating a dual price policy, the Bolivian Government was supporting the marginal producers but at the expense of the taxes and foreign exchange it would have received on the higher prices otherwise paid to Patiño.

⁸⁷ Ibid., Treasury meeting, 9 Sept. 1943. A dual price policy would have been difficult to implement when Patiño ores were diverted to the USA.

⁸⁸ Ibid., Archer to Fennelly, 19 Sept. 1943.

⁸⁹ FO371/37821, to BRMM, 17 Oct. 1944.

⁹⁰ Ibid., from BRMM, 22 Oct. 1944.

⁹¹ Ibid., Chetwynd (BRMM) to Turner (Supply), 30 Oct. 1944. The final increase of 1.5 cents was in the form of a discount against the smelting charges, which preserved the fiction that a line could be drawn against Bolivian demands.

⁹² Hancock, , British War Economy, pp. 401–2.Google Scholar The Board met in Washington and the British delegate was the head of the British Raw Materials Mission, which was transferred from the Ministry of Supply to the Ministry of Production in July 1942. Some interesting comments, especially about the irrationality of the decision-making process among the CRMB staff, are in CAB102/194, Notes on the Operational Technique of the CRMB, 1942–5.

⁹³ Hurstfield, J., The Control of Raw Materials (London, 1953), pp. 297, 309.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ FO371/32592, BRMM to Supply, 31 March 1942. This conception is forcefully expressed in Ibid., p. 166.

⁹⁵ UK smelting capacity was 50,000 tons according to Supply to BRMM, 23 March 1942, Ibid., and that of the Congo 15,000 tons according to ITSG, Statistical Yearbook, 1949, p. 67.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Minerals Yearbook, 1942, p. 734. Capacity would have to be in excess of current supply to work off the accumulated 30,000 tons of stocks.

⁹⁷ CAB115/116, Portal (Supply) to Baillieu (CRMB) 20 Jan. The offer was repeated in Fennelly to Archer, 17 March 1962.

⁹⁸ Ibid., from BRMM, 22 Dec. 1942. By late 1942 shipping shortages made such diversion unfeasible. The public position was that the Texas smelter was particularly efficient in treating low-grade ores, and would therefore be a powerful force in the post-war market. Minerals Yearbook, 1942, p. 734. A technical description indicating some of the problems involved in treating Bolivian ores is provided by Henderson, Charles, ‘The Longhorn Tin Smelter’, Mining and Metallurgy, vol. 24 (1943).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ CAB115/116, from BRMM, 2 Aug. 1942.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., to BRMM, 5 Sept. 1942.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., to BRMM, 12 Aug. 1942.

¹⁰² Ibid., from BRMM, 16 Oct. 1942.

¹⁰³ Ibid., to Baillieu, 31 Oct. 1942. There was a shipping argument in favour of sending ores to the UK, as deadweight in cargoes of Peruvian cotton and flax.

¹⁰⁴ The Americans actually requested that low grade concentrates be shipped to Capper Pass. Ibid., from BRMM, 3 July 1943.

¹⁰⁵ OV19/14, to BRMM, 2 Aug. 1943. In mid-1943 the smelter was operating at 37% of capacity, with two years' stocks of ore.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., Archer to Fennelly, 13 Aug; FO371/33613, Mather-Jackson minute, 25 Aug. 1943.

¹⁰⁷ In December 1942 striking miners, attempting to secure a share of the wartime bonanza, were killed by the Bolivian army followed by more killings of demonstrators.

¹⁰⁸ International Labour Office, Labour Problems in Bolivia (Montreal, 1943).Google Scholar The commission contained both Bolivian and American members, and was chaired by Judge Calvert Magruder. The CIO representative wrote a second report which was more widely circulated, Kyne, Martin, Report to the Congress of Industrial Organizations on Labor Conditions in Bolivia (Washington, 1943).Google Scholar Hochschild wrote a long personal reply, 28 Aug. 1943, FO371/33610.

¹⁰⁹ FO371/33613, Carr memo, 19 Aug. 1943.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., Mather-Jackson minute, 31 Aug. Antenor Patiño in his capacity as Minister in London also addressed a formal diplomatic protest, 23 Aug. 1943. Since the Bolivian Government had guaranteed the contract, there were grounds for such an intervention on behalf of his private interests.

¹¹¹ Ibid., to BRMM, 13 Oct. 1943. One result of these arrangements was that the Ministry of Supply would be paid entirely in dollars, while Patino continued to be entitled to 75 % in gold. At this stage of the war there was an excess of dollars, and while it would have suited the British to pay entirely in dollars, Patiño preferred to hold sterling. The same arrangements, however, applied to the post-war diversion, netting Britain valuable dollars when they were again scarce.

¹¹² OV19/15, Powell memo, 28 Jan. 1944.

¹¹³ CAB102/193, History of the Combined Raw Materials Board, Ch IX, Table B4. This diversion did not receive the consent of Patiño. FO371/37821, S. Patiño to Pearce. 10 Oct. 1944.

¹¹⁴ By the end of 1944 it was evident that the Texas smelter could not become competitive. Minerals Yearbook, 1944, p. 719.

¹¹⁵ What lends credence to this claim is the fact that in marginal markets, such as Mexico and Argentina, far higher prices were paid, but for far smaller quantities.

¹¹⁶ An important but neglected study of the terms of trade of Bolivia is Swagler, Roger, ‘An Analysis of Variations in Alternative Terms-of-Trade Measures: A Case Study of Bolivia, 1925–1965’, unpubl. PhD diss., Ohio State University, 1971.Google Scholar It is important because it calculates such measures on the basis of actual import data. Between 1939 and 1944, estimates of barter terms of trade range from a deterioration of 10% (base-weight) to an improvement of 16% (current-weight) and of income terms of trade from an improvement of 22 to 72%, calculated from tables 13–16. Wilkie, James, The Bolivian Revolution and US Aid since 1952 (Los Angeles, 1969), p. 31Google Scholar, uses US export data as a proxy for imports, which, combined with the error noted in fn 3, results in a decline in the barter terms of trade by 30%!

¹¹⁷ CAB115/421, Latin American Memoranda and Notes, No. 105, March 1942, describes the large programme of public spending on roads and education undertaken as a result of good mineral prices. After 1943 this programme was reversed by Paz Estenssoro who built up the foreign exchange reserves. Klein, Herbert, Parties and Political Change in Bolivia, 1880–1952 (Cambridge, 1969), pp. 377–8.Google Scholar Limitations on the absorptive capacity of the Bolivian economy before the war are discussed by Manuel Contreras, ‘The Political Economy of Bolivian Fiscal Policy’, Journal of Latin American Studies, this issue.

¹¹⁸ FO371/25228, Butler minute, 3 Dec. 1940. Such conflict extended into the Patiño family, since father and son also distrusted each other. In commenting on all these personal conflicts, Butler also notes Powell's strong dislike of Pearce. Van den Broek was the head of Billiton.

¹¹⁹ There was a similar lack of role separation between Patiño the diplomat and Patiño the tin magnate. FO371/25227, Mather-Jackson minute, 2 July 1940.