¹ The Resistance is the name generally given by Peronists to the opposition to the military government that followed the overthrow of Perón in 1955. The forms of resistance varied, ranging from individual terrorism, through organised opposition in the unions, to attempted military risings. It continued throughout the government of Frondizi, although it became increasingly centred on youth and student sectors as the large union battalions reached agreement on a modus vivendi with Frondizi. For those who participated actively in the Resistance — and they were mainly rank and file workers — it was a time of repression, imprisonment and torture, and throughout the following decade and even now, almost 20 years after, it has continued to be a dominant reference point in Peronist political culture.Google Scholar

² Integracionismo was the dominant concept behind the political strategy of Frondizi. It referred to the hope of integrating the Peronist working class, mainly through its trade unions, into the social and political structure of the country through a judicious policy of concessions and promises. Specifically it was aimed at the union leaders who, in return for concessions such as the Law of Professional Association, would play their part by holding the workers in line and gradually, but surely, loosen the ties with Perón. It was considered by some sectors of that dominant political group to be a far more subtle and modern strategy for dealing with Peronism than the outright repression of the Aramburu government.Google Scholar

³ The linea dura was the name given to those unions which completely rejected Frondizi's overtures. It was centred mainly on the Textile Workers Union, the Telephone Workers, Health Workers and Rubber Workers, and many of the union branches in the interior. Its leading figure was the Textile Workers' leader, Andrés Framini.Google Scholar

⁴ Augusto Vandor was the leader of the Metalworkers Union and the dominant Peronist union figure throughout the 1960s. His growing power and his contacts and negotiations with governments and army were considered a real threat to Perón's control of his movement. He was killed in July 1969.

⁵ The 62 Organisations was the name given to the organisation of Peronist unions within the General Confederation of Labour. They were the original number of unions under Peronist control after the failed CGT congress of 1957. The number no longer bore any relevance to the actual number of Peronist unions. When Perón moved against the power of Vandor in 1965, those unions loyal to him set up a rival organisation 62 de pie junto a Perón, leaving the original set-up in Vandor's hands. It was an extremely heterogeneous organisation with little other than loyalty to Perón and opposition to Vandor to Sustain it. It took in the extreme right of Peronist unionism, led by José Alonso, and the old linea dura unions, as well as a sizeable middle sector, who were not prepared to appear to challenge Perón. The fact that in the linea dora unions, the left re-emerged to unite with the right and simply on the basis of loyalty to Perón emphasizes my description of them as an essentially ‘reflex’ tendency. The 62 Organisaciones de pie disappeared after the military coup of June 1966 and after Perón's quarrel with Vandor had been patched up. The right under Alonso were to be leading figures in the collaborationist wing of Peronist unions under the government of Onganía.Google Scholar

⁶ Cantón, Dario, Elecciones y parsidos politicos en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, Siglo Veintiuno, 1973), p. 237.Google Scholar

⁷ For a full statement of the programme of Huerto Grande and for much else of interest on left Peronism see ‘Peronism: El Exilio (1955–1973)’, Cuadernos de Marcha, No. 71, Montevideo, 1973.Google Scholar

⁸ The Declaration of Tucumán was drawn up by the founding conference of the 62 Organizaciones de pie junto a Perón. For text see Cuadernos de Marcha, op. cit.Google Scholar

⁹ The literal translation is, of course, national socialism, but it would give totally the wrong impression to the English speaking reader with its explicit Nazi connotations. Socialismo nacional represents for the Peronist left an adaptation of the international principles cf socialism to the national peculiarities of Argentina. It has an evident connection with Perón's concept of the Third Position between U.S. capitalism and Soviet Communism, although most of the Peronist left, apart from the most traditional Sectors, criticize this concept and simply regard their socialism as an independent Argentine application of traditional socialist principles. The national emphasis also stems from their conception of the first stage of the transformation process of Argentine society being the anti-imperialist, national liberation of the country, which will lay the basis for a future socialism.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Combailcios was the name given to those unions who consistently opposed the military governments between 1966 and 1973.Google Scholar

¹¹ Evidently the problem of specifying why certain Peronist unions adopted ‘combative’ stances and why others opted for compromise and greater moderation becomes relevant here. To deal with the question adequately would be far beyond the scope of this paper. Suffice it to say that there is no simple correlation between, for example, the economic fortunes of an economic sector a particular union operated in and the political attitudes which that union adopted. Thus, to take one example, the attempt to explain the moderate, conciliationist attitude adopted by some Peronist unions by their position in the most advanced, high salary areas of industry – a type of ‘aristocracy of labour’ theory in fact – is not borne out by empirical investigation. Conversely, there were many unions representing the more crisisridden sections of the Argentine economy that were not to be found amongst the Peronist left. Factors such as the ideology of particular union leaders have to be taken into account, This question will be the subject of a future article.

¹² The Gran Acuerdo Nacional was the name given to the rapprochement between the political parties, including Peronism, and the armed forces which formed the basis of the process leading to free elections in 1973.Google Scholar

¹³ Interview in Panorama, 28 March 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Quoted in Avanzada Socialista, 1 March 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁵ El programa de los gremios combativos, Jan. 1972.Google Scholar See El Combativo, No. 1, Nov. 1972.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Perón-Cooke Correspondencia, II (Buenos Aires, June 1973), 189. Cooke himself had been Péron's chief personal representative in Argentina from 1956 until 1959, after which he lived in exile from Argentina, spending much of the early 1960s in Cuba, where he fought in the Cuban militia at the Bay of Pigs. He returned to Argentina in the mid-1960s and died in 1968. His correspondence with Perón is an invaluable source for any study of post-1955 Peronism, though it also accurately charts the growing isolation of the extreme left of the movement from the early 1960s onwards. Perón's letters become increasingly less informative as Cooke moves further to the left.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁹ See Cristianismo y Reuolución (Buenos Aires, Nos. 2–3, Oct.–Nov. 1966), pp. 14–15.Google Scholar Also to be found in Cuadernos de Marcha, loc. cit., pp. 18–20.Google Scholar

²⁰ See letter of Cooke's A los compañeros reuolucionarios de la carne, Agrupación ‘Blanca y Negro’ de Rosario (1965), in mimeo. Pamphlet in the author's files.Google Scholar

²¹ Cristianismo y Revolución, loc. cit., p. 15.Google Scholar

²² The influence of Cooke's Cuban esperiences is evident here. After an initial hostility to the Cuban Revolution, due mainly to their identification of it with the anti-Peronist left in Argentina, and also to the lack of definition of the Cubans themselves in the early years, the Peronist left was to become increasingly influenced by the Cuban experience — thanks in no small measure to Cooke himself. Indeed, it was under Cooke's overall guidance that the setting up of the first Peronist foco was attempted in 1960 – the Uturuncu guerrilla in the far north of the country.Google Scholar See Perón-Cooke Correspondencia, II, 372–3. It would appear that contact between Cuba and the extreme left of Peronism continued throughout the 1960s and that the Cubans provided training for some of the guerrilla groups that sprang up in the early 1970s.Google Scholar

²³ The Cordobazo refers to the general strike and near insurrection in the city of Córdoba in 1969. It marked a decisive turning point for the military government and the beginning of the return to traditional politics.Google Scholar

²⁴ The clasista groups were those non-Peronist Marxist groups that appeared in the wake of the Cordobao, rejecting what they considered the bourgeois nationalist emphasis of Peronism and emphasising the primacy of the class struggle in the factories. Their strongest base was in the SITRAM-SITRAC Unions in the Fiat plants in Córdoba.Google Scholar

²⁵ Interview with Ongaro, Rairnundo, Extra, Feb. 1970, No. 55. Ongaro was the leader of the Buenos Aires printworkers and head of the CGT de los Argenhinos. Although not strictly within the Revolutionary Peronist current he was far closer to them than to the combativos as witness his continued mobilization of his union on wage issues during the governments of both General Perón and his widow. He was, until very recently, in prison for precisely this. Certainly the view expressed in this interview was that of Revolutionary Peronism.Google Scholar

²⁶ One should distinguish between the groups in that they came from different backgrounds. The FAR were mainly composed originally of independent marxists who had split from various traditional left parties in the early, mid-1960s and moved towards Peronism. The FAP were very closely tied to Revolutionary Peronism and can basically be considered as the armed expression of Peronismo de Base. The Montoneros came largely from a third world Catholic background — some even from the far right of catholic nationalism. The FAR and Montoneros united in one organization after March 1973.Google Scholar

²⁷ En lucha, Organo del Movimiento Revolucionario 17 de Octubre, No. 13, Dec. 1973.Google Scholar

²⁸ Literally meaning generational transference/transfusion, the concept implied the injection of new blood into the movement which would mature into the future leadership.

²⁹ See, for instance, the letters exchanged between Perón and the montoneros after they had killed Aramburu in Feb. 1971, published in La Causa Peronista, No. 9, 3 Sept. 1974. In reply to their affirmation that the electoral struggle could be no more than a tactic to harass the enemy, Perón stated, ‘Concerning the electoral option, I don't believe in it either’.Google Scholar

³⁰ Most observers of the Peronist election campaign of March 1973 commented on the weight and importance of the youth sectors of the movement in mobilising support for Héctor Cámpora. Both in terms of mass rallies and in terms of the general tone and emphasis of the campaign, they seemed to have a greater influence within the movement than the union leadership — who had in any case opposed the original choice of Cámpora as candidate.

³¹ La Nacion, 25 June 1973.Google Scholar

³² Despite the Peronist left's claim that the handing over of the presidency to Perón represented the fulfilment of the natural wishes of the people and that the process was only spoiled by the ‘ambition of four madmen’ (El Descamisado, No. 9, 17 July 1973), in fact, the replacement of Cámpora had all the hallmarks of a well-timed coup by the Peronist right. However, it should also be noted that despite the undoubted liberalisation in matters of human rights that took place during Cámpora's presidency, there was nothing in is past record to justify the faith placed in him by the Montoneros and JP, and the euphoria that surroundcd his brief stay in office and his transformation in left Peronist language into el Tio had a distinct air of unreality about it. What he did have in common with the Peronist left was an absolute personal loyalty to Perón.Google Scholar

³³ For the full text, see La Opinión, 2 Oct. 1973.Google Scholar

³⁴ ERP, Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo, a guerrilla group of Trotskyist origin who had refused to lay down their arms with the accession of Peronism to the government. They had maintained that the new government was just a continuation of the old system under a different guise. The attack against the army at the Azul barracks was their first major action against the Peronist government.Google Scholar

³⁵ El Mundo, 3 March, 1974.Google Scholar

³⁶ En Lucha, No. 16, June 1974.Google Scholar

³⁷ The talk, given by Mario Firmenich, and transcribed, is in mimeo form.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 16. The whole document is extremely interesting as an example of the militarization of political concepts and shows the deep influence a guerrilla training has on the guerrilla leader turned politician. Firmenich, for example, quotes with approval Clausewitz: ‘Nobody can have a political ambition that is greater than their military power’.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

⁴¹ La Jucia, Organo de la Juventud Trabajadora Peronista, No. 1, Feb. 1974.Google Scholar

⁴² This occurred with the ‘reserved document’ which despite all signs to the contrary El Descamisado refused to believe existed. See El Descamisado, No. 21, 9 Oct. 1973.Google Scholar

⁴³ The fantasy about el cerco that was cutting Perón off from his people first surfaced after the events of Ezeiza;Google Scholar see El Descamisado, No. 6, 26 June 1973. In Firmenich's talk op. cit. he denounces the infantilism of this analysis, but as late as April 1974 it reappears in the semiofficial organ of the JP and montoncros as an explanation for the consistent failure of the much-hoped-for dialogue between Leader and people to take place, El Peronista, 19 Apr. 1974.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ It should, of course, be borne in mind that the acceptance of the need to stay in the movement at any cost and the resultant cost of this in terms of swallowing unpalatable measures was an extremely contradictory process which became progressively more difficult to accomplish. At times the strain was evident publicly. After Perón's speech of February 1974, advising all those who advocated socialismo nacional to get out of Peronism and join a socialist party, Dardo Cabo, the editor of El Descamisado responded with what was the nearest thing to a direct attack on Perón from within the movement. ‘Why didn't they tell us before when we were fighting Lanusse that we ought to join another party? Nobody has the right to throw us out, nobody can now just bid us farewell l’ El Dcscamisado, No. 39, 12 Feb. 1974. However, to appreciate the near schizophrenia involved, it should also be borne in mind that this was the same Dardo Cabo who six months earlier had been telling his readers that although they might disagree with some of Perón's tactics, they must always accept them since at the end of the day Aqui manda Perón, El Descamisado, No. 26, 13 Nov. 1973.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Exactly how military this could be can be seen from Firmenich's reply to a questioner who asked him what they could offer the union bureaucracy by way of a bargain ‘We can promise not to kill them’. Firmenich, op. cit., p. 21.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ See Carri, Roberto, Sindicatos y Poder (Buenos Aires, Editorial Sudestada, 1967)Google Scholar and Gazzera, Miguel, Nosotros los dirt genies, in Gazzera, Miguel and Ceresole, Norberto, Peronismo: Autocritica y Perspectivas (Buenos Aires, Descartes, 1970).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ E. J. Hobsbawm has emphasised the effect of the ‘practicalities’ inherent in day to day trade union practice on the ‘spontaneous’ labour militant in Britain. ‘Trends in the British Labour Movement’, Labouring Men (London, 1964), pp. 339 et seq. There is also much else of interest in the essay by comparison with the Argentina case. For example, Hobsbawm's description of the political-union itinerary of Ernest Bevin is very relevant for an understanding of the course taken by many former militant Peronist Labour leaders — in terms of the logic it represented, if not of the exact details of political allegiance.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ The list of main figures behind Peronismo Auténtico reads like a Who's Who of the Peronist left since 1955 — with the exception of the Revolutionary Peronism current. It also includes many figures who have in the past been strongly criticised by the left. The movement was officially proscribed in Jan. 1976.Google Scholar