¹ Cf. Freyre, Gilberto, The Masters and the Slaves (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1956)Google Scholar; Tannenbaum, Frank, Slave and Citizen (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947)Google Scholar. For the application of this view to Puerto Rico, see Soler, Luís M. Díaz, Historia de la esclavitud negra en Puerto Rico (Río Piedras, Editorial Universitaria, 1970).Google Scholar

² Scarano, op. cit., pp. 70, 72. Evidence of widespread slave resistance to these conditions is provided by Baralt, Guillermo A., Esclavos rebeldes: conspiraciones y sublevaciones de esclavos en Puerto Rico, 1795–1873 (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huaracán, 1981).Google Scholar

³ Scarano, op. cit., pp. 44 ff.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 101 ff., 205.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 65, 133 ff., 142–3.

⁶ Ibid., pp. xxii, 29, 33, 72, 102, 120.

⁷ ‘Most contemporaries believed,…, that the trouble with jornaleros was not so much the difficulty in persuading them to work, but their high cost and notorious absenteeism. The cost factor reflected the scarcity of supply, as only the prospect of very high wages could lure peasants away from their subsistence plots, even temporarily, for the demanding work of cane harvesting. Even if population growth may have progressively lowered the cost of free workers, however, there remained the serious problems of irregularity in work attendance and resistance to the intensity of sugar labor. These were critical difficulties in a production process that required uninterrupted labor to avoid grave losses of raw materials and lowered sugar yields’. Ibid., p. 33. Much the same point is made by Rodney with regard to the differences between free African ex-slaves and unfree indentured labourers working on the sugar plantations of Guyana in the 1840s. Rodney, Walter, A History of the Guyanese Working People, 1881–1905 (London, Heinemann, 1981), pp. 39–40.Google Scholar

⁸ Scarano, op. cit., p. xxiv. The concept ‘decline’ is anyway somewhat misleading when applied in this manner; despite the decrease in the number of sugar producing units from 1,500 in the late 1830s to 550 in 1870, the fact that output continued to rise until the latter date suggests that those plantations which survived beyond 1850 remained economically viable. See Mattei, Andres Ramos, ‘The Growth of the Puerto Rican Sugar Industry under American Domination: 1899–1910’, in Albert, Bill and Graves, Adrian (eds.), Crisis and Change in the International Sugar Economy 1860–1914 (Norwich, ISC Press, 1984).Google Scholar

⁹ Scarano, op. cit., p. 34. For references to the replacement of slavery by free labour, cf. pp. xxii, xxiv, 119.

¹⁰ Scarano, Francisco, ‘Slavery and Free Labour in the Puerto Rican Sugar Economy: 1815–1873’, in Rubin, Vera and Tuden, Arthur (eds.), Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies (New York, The New York Academy of Sciences, 1977), pp. 559–60.Google Scholar The way in which indebtedness to the estate store was used as a bonding mechanism on the sugar-producing Hacienda Mercedita in Ponce during the 1880s is described by Mattei, Andres Ramos, La Hacienda Azucarera: su crecimiento y crisis en Puerto Rico (siglo XIX) (San Juan, Centro de Estudios de la Realidad Puertorriqueña, 1981), pp. 101–3.Google Scholar

¹¹ It would have been surprising indeed had planters favoured the development of a free labour market in a context of labour scarcity after the ending of the slave trade, particularly given the economic importance to sugar production of an unfree workforce plus the fact that at a later date planters strongly resisted slave emancipation – both points which Scarano himself emphasizes.

¹² ‘It is difficult to sort out the free from coerced labourers [after 1846] and this difficulty spells a serious problem for Puerto Rican historiography. The distinction in Puerto Rico between “slave” and “free” was not a very sharp one, not because slaves were treated well but because non-slaves were treated badly.’ James W. Wessman, ‘Sugar and Demography: Population Dynamics in the Spanish Antillies during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in Albert and Graves, op. cit., p. 100. This is reflected in the views expressed by fieldwork informants in both sugarcane and coffee growing areas, for whom slavery was synonymous with labour-service tenancy at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. Cf. Mintz, Sidney W., ‘Cañamelar: The Subculture of a Rural Sugar Plantation Proletariat’, in Steward, Julian (ed.), The People of Puerto Rico (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1956), p. 348Google Scholar; Bergad, op. cit., p. 61.

¹³ Although Bergad covers the period 1760–1900, the main focus of the book is on the years 1850–97.

¹⁴ Bergad, Laird W., ‘Coffee and Rural Proletarianization in Puerto Rico, 1840–1898’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 15, 1 (05 1983), pp. 83–100CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Brass, Tom, ‘Coffee and Rural Proletarianization: A Comment on Bergad’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 16, 1 (05 1984), pp. 143–52CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Bergad, Laird W., ‘On Comparative History: A Reply to Tom Brass’, Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 16, 1 (05 1984), pp. 153–156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, pp. 154–5.

¹⁶ Nieboer, H. J., Slavery as an Industrial System (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 190Google Scholar);Domar, Evsey, ‘The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 30, no. 1 (03 1970), pp. 18–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ Orlando Patterson, ‘The Structural Origins of Slavery: A Critique of the Nieboer–Domar Hypothesis from a Comparative Perspective’, in Rubin and Tuden, op. cit., pp. 12–34. Bergad himself perceptively recognizes the substance of this critique when he writes: ‘The confusing element is that labour availability is not determined solely by demography. An extremely populated zone may be classified by the commercial farmers of the area as lacking available laborers.’ Bergad, , Coffee and Growth, p. 63.Google Scholar Unfortunately this caveat is subsequently disregarded.

¹⁸ Marla, Sarma, Bonded Labour in India (New Delhi, Biblia Impex Private Ltd, 1981).Google Scholar

¹⁹ For references to the abundant labour supply during this period, see Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, p. 155; and Coffee and Growth, pp. 157 (footnote 33), 175. For contrasting assessments of the labour supply in the same period, see Bergad, op cit., pp. 193, 201.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 176, 200.

²¹ For example, by calculating the number of working days per annum required for the cultivation of given quantities of staple and cash crops (coffee, sugar), and matching this with information on supplies of labour-power available locally and in other regions of Puerto Rico at different times in the agricultural cycle. This in turn would have to take account of additional variables, such as the ratio of productive to unproductive inhabitants in particular regions.

²² Ibid., p. 176. See also Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, p. 154.

²³ Bergad, Coffee and Growth, pp. 64, 219, and ‘On Comparative History’, p. 154.

²⁴ Bergad, Coffee and Growth, pp. 65–66, 91, 103.

²⁵ In 1830 5.8 % of land in Puerto Rico was cultivated; by 1897 this had increased to only 14.3%. Rivera, Angel G. Quintero, ‘Background to the Emergence of Imperialist Capitalism in Puerto Rico’, in López, Adalberto and Petras, James (eds.), Puerto Rico and Puerto Ricans: Studies in History and Society (New York, Halstead Press, 1974), p. 93.Google Scholar

²⁶ In contrast to the extensive documentation on landholding generated by the 1849 jornalero law, little information concerning rental contracts exists from the 1860s onwards. This, Bergad admits, ‘probably reflected the return of the Lares renting population to their traditional roles as agregados with informal oral arrangements’. Similarly, although by the end of the nineteenth century most ‘landless’ labourers were classified as jornaleros, Bergad agrees that ‘there is no way to determine how many may have been resident peones with unsufruct rights’. Bergad, op cit., pp. 121, 199. By disregarding the limits which the sources impose on his case, Bergad underestimates access to (and thus availability of) land and consequently overestimates the extent of proletarianization. Even as late as the 1940s, most rural smallholdings in the coffee growing area of Manicaboa were not listed in the island register of property. Eric R. Wolf, ‘San José: Subcultures of a “Traditional” Coffee Municipality’, in Steward, op. cit., p. 203.

²⁷ Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, p. 155.

²⁸ ‘…the emancipation law contained an important element of flexibility allowing [ex-slaves] to secure more favorable arrangements…this privilege was utilized effectively by ex-slaves to improve working conditions and increase salaries. It is clear that they were well informed concerning terms of the law….’ Bergad, Coffee and Growth, p. 1, 28.

²⁹ The wages index (W.I.) for the 1830s–1890 indicates the scale of the increases which took place towards the end of the century. 1830s, 60 (pesos), 100 (W.I.); 1840s, 60, 100; 1850s, 60, 100; 1860s, 60, 100; 1870s, 84, 140; 1880s, 150, 250; 1890s, 365, 608. Source: Bergad, Coffee and Growth, pp. 127, 128, 130, 201.

³⁰ Comparative indices for increases in wages and the market price for coffee are as follows: 1870s, 100 (Wages Index), 100 (Coffee Price Index); 1880s, 179, 106; 1890s, 435, 170, Source: Wages index calculated from Bergad, op. cit., pp. 128, 130, 201, and the coffee price index from Tables 3.3_legacy1 and 4.1, pp. 103, 171.

³¹ Capital accumulation in such a context is made possible by keeping wages low and yet being able to retain labour-power. This can only be done by coercing workers to stay, despite the low wage and possibilities of higher remuneration (in cash, kind, or land) elsewhere. For the uncertain nature of coffee cultivation in Puerto Rico, see Wolf, op. cit., pp. 179–80.

³² Only those debts entered in notarial records are revealed by Bergad's kind of archival research. By contrast, written agreements (and notes of oral agreements) between employer and worker involving the cancellation of cash debts with labour-service are found not in public archives but in the personal records and accounts maintained by hacendados and/or peasant proprietors. This was the case with regard to data on bonded labour which I obtained during fieldwork in Peru in 1974–5, none of which was available in official archives or notarial records. This information was contained in notebooks belonging to a rich peasant, in which were entered extensive details concerning sums of money advanced by him to poor peasants inhabiting the same locality and/or to migrant labourers. Also recorded was the extent of indebtedness on different dates, together with the days on which these individuals – plus their domestic kin – worked for him (for example, ajuste Julian Huallpataipe el 16 mayo 1973 quedando el saldo deudor de S/.190; me vino 3 de marzo l dia plantacion de cafe…ajuste el 9 octubre de 1973 me debe S/.1000 como adelanto para el trabajo le di a Pancho Lopa, vino el 21 noviembre trabajar Pancho Lopa, su mujer l dia y su chiquita, etc.). In short, details concerning the operation of the debt bondage mechanism. This underlines the fact that although certain sources may contain no reference to debt relations and labour-service payments, this in itself does not constitute proof that they do not exist.

³³ Bergad, op. cit., p. 121.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 193 (footnote 109).

³⁵ Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, p. 155.

³⁶ ‘Like the use of capital and land, the patterns of labor utilization during the coffee boom were intensified and consolidated rather than structurally altered.’ Bergad, Coffee and Growth, p. 193.

³⁷ In his reply to my critique, Bergad states that ‘From the 1840s through the 1860s [unfree labour was] found in Puerto Rico's highland coffee zones’, a view which contrasts with that expressed in his book, where he indicates that debt bondage was just beginning in the 1860s. Cf. Bergad, ‘On Comparative History’, p. 154, and Coffee and Growth, pp. 66, 123–4.

³⁸ ‘To ensure a steady supply of labor, the legal and political authorities enforced strict vagrancy laws. Until July of 1873, an insular statute required every able-bodied adult, who owned no property beyond the labour of his arms, to find employment for wages, and it ensured compliance through a system of work books and inspections. After 1873, some of these rules continued formally or informally on the municipal level.’ (emphasis added) Wolf, op. cit., p. 193. ‘In the year that the compulsory three-year contracts for ex-slaves ended in Puerto Rico (1876), the Ponce Agricultural Society petitioned the government to permit the introduction of Chinese contract laborers for agricultural labor. The Society also asked that every male laborer between the ages of 15 and 45 be required to hire out his services for three months of the year.’ Mintz, op. cit., p. 334. See also Scarano, Sugar and Slavery, p. 34, and ‘Slavery and Free Labor’, pp. 558–9.

³⁹ For the presence of labour contractors during the 1885–97 period, see Bergad, op. cit., p. 200.

⁴⁰ Bergad, ‘Rural Proletarianization’, pp. 98–9, and Coffee and Growth, p. 198.

⁴¹ Bergad confesses to a ‘nagging’ doubt about the implications of this aspect of agrarian relations for his general thesis. ‘Rural Proletarianization’, p. 98.

⁴² For similar reasons, the tienda de raya developed into an important instrument of landlord control in Mexico during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, when the incidence of debt peonage increased rapidly as not only landless acasillados but also seasonal migrant workers became more dependent on the estate store for their subsistence. Katz, Friedrich, ‘Labor Conditions on Haciendas in Porfirian Mexico: Some Trends and Tendencies’, Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 54, 1 (02 1974), p. 20CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The constraints placed on labour mobility as a consequence of the unfreedom inherent in this form of indebtedness emerge clearly from Katz's analysis, and although Bergad refers to the latter in footnote 112 on page 64 of his book, he nevertheless fails to note either the parallels with or the implications for his study of coffee production in Puerto Rico.

⁴³ See, for example, Quintero Rivera, op. cit., p. 99; Wolf, op. cit., pp. 193–4, 235; Robert A. Manners, ‘Tabara: Subcultures of a Tobacco and Mixed Crops Municipality’, in Steward, op. cit., pp. 114–15; Mintz op. cit., pp. 334, 369–70; Ortiz, Carlos Buitrago, The Development of Agrarian-Commercial Capitalism in Puerto Rico: Some Aspects of the Growth of the Coffee Hacienda System, 1857–98, Paper presented at the Symposium on ‘Landlord and Peasant in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (Cambridge 1972), pp. 15–16Google Scholar; and Picó, Fernando, Amargo café (los pequeños y medianos caficultores de Utuado en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX) (Río Piedras, Ediciones Huaracán, 1981), pp. 82–4.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Wolf, op. cit., p. 194. The extent of worker indebtedness is indicated by an estimate that on the coffee-growing Hacienda Castañer during the 1870s annual expenditure by a labouring family on necessary purchases at the estate store exceeded income by some 50%. That workers regarded this as an exploitative arrangement is suggested by the fact that in the late 1890s they burned the Casteñer store account books in which debts were recorded. Hernández, Luís E. Díaz, Castañer: una hacienda cafetalera en Puerto Rico (1868–1930), (Ponce, Academia de Artes, Historia y Arqueología de Puerto Rico, 1981), pp. 39–45.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Wolf, op. cit., p. 194.