² See Mayorga, Gustavo Gutiérrez, ‘Historia del Movimiento Obrero en Nicaragua (1900–1977). In Historia del Movimiento Obrero en America Latina, vol. 2 (Mexico, 1985), pp. 196–252Google Scholar and ‘El Reformismo Artesanal en el Movimiento Obrero Nicaragüense (1931–1960)’, Revista del Pensamiento Centroamericano 159, April–June 1978, pp. 2–21Google Scholar; Carlos, Pérez B. and Guevara, Onefre, El Movimiento Obrero en Nicaragua (Managua, 1981)Google Scholar; Manuel, Ortega H. and Delgado V., J. Salomón, ‘Orígenes y Consolidación de la Dictadura Militar Somocista’ (1934–1956), in Apuntes de Historia de Nicaragua, tomo, I Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua (Managua, 1982), pp. 166–93Google Scholar; Teoría y Práctica Revolucionarias en Nicaragua, pp. 40–64. Also see the important theoretical work of Chamorro, Amalia, Algunos Rasgos Hegemónicos del Somocismo; INIES (Managua, 1983).Google Scholar Chamorro's work draws similar conclusions as the present article in opposition to the other articles.

³ Gutiérrez M., op. cit., p. 2.

⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁵ Based on 1940 census as reported in ‘Economic Situation of Central America’, Sept., 1945, U.S. Department of Commerce and Boletín de Estadística, 1945, Directión General de Estadística (DGE). It is worth enumerating Somoza's direct contribution to the concentration of, if not the development of, capital. According to Jaime Wheelock, in Imperialismo y Dictadura, by 1945 Somoza owned 51 cattle ranches, 46 coffee plantations (mostly expropriated from Germans), 2 sugar mills, an airline, with flights to the mines, a gold mine, a milk plant, the daily newspaper, Novedades, as well as 3 factories mentioned above. He also grossed $175,000 annually in U.S. mining kickbacks.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ La Prensa, 10–20 Feb., 1936; U.S. State Department report, 81700/8369.

⁸ Ibid., 817/8380.

⁹ Pérez-Guevara, op. cit.

¹⁰ I examine the Chinandegan ‘Obreristas’ in detail in ‘Estabamos Principiando’, Estudios sobre el movimimento obrero en el Departamento de Chinandega, Nicaragua’; Cuadernos de Historia, 286, Universidad Nacional, Heredia, Costa Rica. In the conclusion of this article I summarize the principal points of the Chinandegan study.

¹¹ For more details about the 1937–43 period see my article ‘Amigos Peligrosos, Enemigos Mortales: Somoza y el movimiento obrero, 1944–1946’, Revista de Historia, Heredia, Costa Rica, Nov. 1986.

¹² U.S. State Department, 817.00B/47, 12 Oct. 1943, Tribuna Obrera, 17 Oct. 1943; See Archivo Presidencial, AGN, no. 335;. On 4 Feb. 1947, he said the following about Lombardo's visit: ‘Como fui informado continuó dando instrucciones a algunos líderes obreros de Nicaragua con quienes el sostuvo conferencias privadas durante su corta permanencia en el país.’ Somoza mentioned Nov. 1943 as the date of the visit.

¹³ Pérez-Guevara, op. cit., p. 25; La Flecha, 28 Sept. 1944.

¹⁴ Pérez-Guevara, op. cit., p. 11.

¹⁵ There are clear regional distinctions in the PSN. The Masaya branch was composed primarily of artisans, shop owners and intellectuals. See 817.00B-8 to 51 for FBI reports on PSN activists.

¹⁶ La Nueva Prensa, 23 May 1944; There is another interpretation of the expression ‘me equivoqué’. In May 1944, after the postponement of the Congress a group of union leaders went to ‘La Fundadora’ to negotiate with Somoza. According to Domingo Ramírez, a veteran Liberal/Obrerista leader from Chinandega, Somoza was initially quite cold to the delegation and called them ‘Communists’. Momentarily the unionists could not respond. Only the Socialist Augusto Lorio and Ramírez had the ‘valor’ to correct Somoza's false impression.

Then Somoza made his ‘I made a mistake’ statement. (Source: unedited manuscript by D. Ramírez and interviews with him in March, 1984). Whatever the veracity of Ramírez's version, it does not affect the above analysis. Somoza knew that Lorio and others present were PSN militants (and that the PSN was at least formally the Nicaraguan Communist Party). It is likely, however, that Somoza made the apology in the context that Ramírez describes.

¹⁷ U.S. State Department, 817.00B/51. In other speeches Somoza emphasized the ‘Nazi-fascist’ character of the opposition. See U.S. State Department, 817/9062–6, 16 June 1944.

¹⁸ U.S. State, 817.00B/51; La Nueva Prensa, 28 May 1944.

¹⁹ See La Flecha and La Nueva Prensa, 26 July, 4 July 1944.

²⁰ Blandón, Miguel, Entre Sandino y Fonseca Amador (Managua, 1980).Google Scholar

²¹ U.S. State, 817.00, 3 July 1944; Blandon, op. cit.

²² U.S. State, 817.00/836; Cordero, Carlos Pasos y Manuel, Nicaragua Bajo el régimén de Somoza (San Salvador, 1944), p. 5Google Scholar; U.S. State, 817.00/8757, 6 March 1940.

²³ U.S. State, 8/7/836, pp. 8–9; 817.00/8753.1, 12 June 1947. In 1940 Somoza tried to force ISA to sell the plantation for 7 million cordobas (less than U.S. $2 million). The stockholders wanted at least three million dollars.

²⁴ For more details, see ‘Estabamos Principiando’, op. cit.

²⁵ Nueva Prensa, 4 July 1944.

²⁶ Blandón op. cit., pp. 21–24; Amador, op. cit., p. 13, on PSN–PLI talks see Lorio, Juan, Unión Nacional en Nicaragua (Guatemala City, 1946)Google Scholar; interview with Turcios, October, 1983; The evidence about an internal division in the PSN is far from conclusive. My hypothesis, in part, is based on the testimonies of two leaders who emphasized the participation of Socialist workers and students in the June–July anti-Somoza demonstrations, without, however, underlying the obvious divergence of these demonstrators from the official party line. It is also possible that both informants were confused about the dates, since the student movement erupted once again in June–July 1946, when the PSN did support the movement. Chronological errors are quite common in oral history, especially when two events appear similar. Nevertheless, in addition to the evidence mentioned in the text, several other documents support the contention of an informal division in the PSN over the Somoza issue. (1) An FBI report, dated, 12 Oct. 1943 mentions the existence of ‘several Communist groups’. The ‘intellectual group’ appears to have affiliated with the PLI, in 1944, I suppose in response to PSN support for Somoza (U.S. State Department, 817.00B/47). (2) In May 1944, one PSN leader denounced ‘ultra-leftists’ who did not understand the PSN policy towards Somoza. (3) In October 1944, the student leader Centeno Zapata rejoined the PSN after having left it, ‘por la influencia de las calumnias’ (Unidad, 15 Oct. 1944). (4) In March 1945, PSN leader Segura, Hernández, in Hacia Donde Vamos (Managua, 1945)Google Scholar, denounced ‘ultra-leftist elements’ inside and outside of the party. (5) In El Movimiento Obrero en Nicaragua by Guevara, Onofre and Carlos, Pérez B. (Managua, 1985)Google Scholar, which appeared after the research and writing of this article, the authors support my contention from a very distinct angle. They argue convincingly that Juan Lorio and Hernández Segura took the decision to promulgate the pro-Somoza founding party manifesto, without consulting the rest of the Central Committee or the party rank-and-file. Two weeks later other party leaders formally condemned that decision.

²⁷ U.S. State, 817.00B/51.

²⁸ La Flecha, 26 August 1944.

²⁹ See Memorias del Ministerio de Trabajo, 1957–9; 1963–9, 1970. For 1948 figure see Ignacio A. Gutiérrez; Sindicalismo, doctoral thesis UNAN-León, 1949. The repression of 1948 was a concentrated effort to eliminate the PSN. Two years later PSN militants regrouped, only to be jailed again in 1951–2.

³⁰ Voz Obrera, 28 July 194;.

³¹ Anuario Estadístico, op. cit., 1942–5.

³² See Labour Code, Gaceta Nacional, 2 Feb. 1945, Title VI, chapter 3, where planting and harvesting are defined as in the ‘collective interest’. Labour opposed this clause, which did involve the betrayal of June 1944's promise. Later amendments further obstructed labour organizing in the field, by requiring 60% literates in any peasant union.

³³ Memorias del Ministerio de Trabajo y Agricultura (Managua, 1944), p. 128.Google Scholar

³⁴ La Flecha, 25 Aug. 1944.

³⁵ La Nueva Prensa, 21 Nov. 1944; Unidad, 19 Nov. 1944; Carreteras, 29 Oct. 1944.

³⁶ Memorias del Ministerio de Agricultura y Trabajo, 1944, p. 134.

³⁷ Unidad, 3 Sept. 1944; Unidad, 3, 10 Sept. 1944; La Nueva Prensa, 1 Oct. 1944.

³⁸ La Flecha, 28 Sept. 1944; La Nueva Prensa, 1 Oct. 1944; Memorias, 1944, p. 133. Apparently the regime had already passed an 8-hour law, before the Labour Code went into effect. Curiously the union demanded the 8-hour day only for skilled workers. Operatives were not included since they ‘voluntarily’ worked two shifts and presumably earned C3.40–C5.0 daily. A 40% salary increase might then permit them to work the single shift. Male workers earned C4 daily.

³⁹ La Nueva Prensa, 1 Oct. 1944.

⁴⁰ Nveva Prensa, 20–23 Oct. 1944; Unidad, 26 Oct. 1944.

⁴¹ Flecha, 26 Aug. 1944; 19 Sept. 1944.

⁴² Ibid., 10–13 Dec. 1944.

⁴³ Nueva Prensa, 12–13 Dec. 1944; La Flecha, 12–13 Dec. 1944.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Nueva Prensa, 13 Dec. 1944; La Flecha, 13 Dec. 1944; Nueva Prensa, La Flecha, 14 Dec. 1944; La Flecha, Nueva Prensa, 14 Dec. 1944; U.S. State Department, 817.5045, 14 Dec. 1944.

⁴⁶ Letter, Liga Motorista to Somoza G., 22 Jan. 1945, in Somoza archives, file 47; La Flecha, 23 Feb. 1945.

⁴⁷ Unidad, 7 Nov. 1944.

⁴⁸ Nueva Prensa, 20 Nov. 1944; La Flecha, 2 Jan. 1945, 9 Jan. 194;. The pro-PSN labour militants insisted that their unions were, indeed, independent of the PSN. Whatever the merits of their argument, the Somocista attack against them strengthened, as it were, their ‘syndicalist deviation’, to the point where they could plausibly and somewhat successfully counter-attack against the Somocista unionists charging them with injecting politics into unions.

⁴⁹ Nueva Prensa, 22 Nov. 1944.

⁵⁰ The obstruction involved both the denial of access to state channels as well as efforts to sabotage the formation of a democratic national labour federation, which would be dominated by the Left.

⁵¹ See Barahona, Amaru, ‘La era dinástica hasta el pacto Somoza–Agüero (1937–1971)’, in Economía y Sociedad en la Constructión del Estado en Nicaragua, Lanuza, Alberto et al. (San José, 1983), pp. 225–38.Google Scholar The following example illustrates Somoza's perspicacious approach to the growth of the labour movement, when it only indirectly affected his economic interests. During the second week of January, 1945, several hundred woodcutters in the Atlantic Coast region near Puerto Cabezas struck against the U.S. logging firm ‘Nolan’. The unionized loggers, who received C4 daily wages for 10-hour work days in the most inhospitable jungle area of the country, demanded a 60% salary increase. Nolan refused to meet with the union delegates and fired the 3 leaders. Local labour leaders in Puerto Cabezas declared a general solidarity strike in sympathy with the loggers' struggle. Standard Fruit Company dock workers and airline mechanics joined the movement. On 15 January, President Somoza received a direct appeal from the loggers' union. Somoza called Nolan and COCTN leaders to a meeting. On 22 January the Somocista Novedades triumphantly announced a union victory. In fact, the Puerto Cabezas workers' movement extracted a 50% salary increase from the U.S. firm (connected financially to Anastasio I). However, to obtain the victory, the workers had to sacrifice the jobs of the 3 union leaders. It is important to realize that the Puerto Cabezas union leaders were not pro-PSN, and thus (by the rules of the game), were pro-COCTN. Once again, Somoza granted (or in this case forced) important concessions to a militant workers' movement while at the same time repressed its leadership. Somoza's actions consolidated his ‘workers' leader’ image among the people of the Puerto Cabezas region (Miskito Indians, to a large extent). A 50% wage increase meant minimal survival conditions, while the jobs of three militants obviously paled in comparison. By 1946, a vigorous union movement would include 970 Puerto Cabezas workers out of a town population of 3,000. Sources: Novedades, 14, 16 Jan. 1945; Voz Obrera, 20 Jan. 1945; U.S. State Department, 817.504/2–2245; Novedades, 22 Jan. 1945; U.S. State Department, 817.00.

⁵² La Flecha, 14 Mar. 1945.

⁵³ Telegrams from match workers, printers and tailors' union secretary generals to Somoza G., Somoza Correspondence, Archivo General de la Nación, file 48, 13 Mar. 1945.

⁵⁴ Telegram from Somoza to Julio Medrano, printers' union leader, Ibid., 21 Mar. 1945.

⁵⁵ Carreteras, 18 Mar. 1945.

⁵⁶ The regime continually repressed Somocista cement-worker leaders who agitated for wage demands. One COCTN leader commented on that repression, Se ve que el Código no sirve para nada'. Also see Voz Obrera, 31 May 1945; La Flecha, 3–6 July and 6 Sept. 1945 and Letter from Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Cementera to Somoza, 28 Aug. 1945.

⁵⁷ La Nueva Prensa, 10 Apr. 1945.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 12 Apr. 1945; 15 Apr. 1945; Voz Obrera, 13 Apr. 1945; 20 July 1945. Novedades, 11, 15 Apr. 1945. Letter from El Sindicato de la Mina La Luz to Inspector de Trabajo, Somoza Archives, 8 June 1945.

⁵⁹ Sindicato de trabajadores de la India a Somoza (telegram), in Somoza Archives, file 48, 29 May 1945.

⁶⁰ See Carreteras (1945) for evolution of R. González' position; Nueva Prensa, 21 July 1945; La Flecha, 3 Sept. 1945.

⁶¹ La Nueva Prensa, 28 June 1945, 24 July 1945, 29 May 1945; Voz Obrera, 9 June 1945. Interview with FTM and miner organizer, P. Turcios, Managua, 1983.

⁶² Voz Obrera, 18 Aug. 1945; Le Nueva Prensa, 18–25 Aug. 1945; Novedades, interview with Antonio Hernández, Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1983.

⁶³ La Flecha, 2 May 1945; Novedades, 2 May 194;; La Nueva Prensa, 2 May 1945, Voz Obrera, 4 May 1945.

⁶⁴ La Flecha, 2 May 1945.

⁶⁵ Interviews with P. Turcios and Antonio Hernández Torres, 1983.

⁶⁶ La Flecha, Novedades, 2 May 1945.

⁶⁷ Somoza unleashed a far more encompassing repression against the left-wing of the labour movement in 1948, prior to concluding a pact with the Conservative Party. Then the National Guard arrested over 100 labour militants, whereas in 1945, Somoza only decapitated the national leadership, arresting and exiling less than 10 party members.

⁶⁸ Nueva Prensa, 3, 12 Feb. 1946; U.S. State Department, 817.00, 31 Oct. 1946. Approximately 50% of the union membership belonged to the Federatión de Trabajadores de Managua (FTM).

⁶⁹ Roberto González, despite his loss of influence in the labour movement, organized a pro-Somocista political party, the Partido Obrero Democrático which supported the Liberal candidate, while agitating for (1) social security; (2) price controls; (3) state support for unionization; (4) agrarian reform (La Flecha, 23 Sept. 1946). While it is impossible as yet to estimate the POD strength (possibly miniscule), it is significant that key party militants broke with Somoza over his golpe de estado against Argüello in May 1947, U.S. State, 817.00, 18 June 1947.

⁷⁰ Somoza's National Defence chief gave the 1,200 member estimate, U.S. State, 817.00, 31 Oct. 1946. The FBI reported on PSN meetings in Managua of over a thousand persons, and gave estimates of ‘thousands’ of PSN members. U.S. State, 817.00B, 31 Oct. 1946.

⁷¹ See U.S. State, 817.00B, 4 Dec. 1946; 817.00B, 6 Dec. 1947. A partial list of programmatic demands: (1) national control of natural resources; (2) agrarian reform; (3) state-aided industrialization; (4) price controls; (5) political and economic rights for the working class. Guevara, and Pérez, in El Movimiento Obrero en Nicaragua (Managua, 1985), pp. 172–74Google Scholar, argue that Aguado was under the influence of ‘his Godfathers in the Embassy [U.S.]’, and for that reason they did not reach a formal agreement. Although they offer no evidence, it is possible, given their documented worry about the PSN, that the State Department may have influenced Aguado. Nevertheless it strikes me that the above authors underestimate the importance of Aguado's declarations given that in the midst of the Cold War, he was ready to incorporate the PSN, usually considered as ‘communist’, into the post-Somoza political system. It is quite possible that the State Department was willing to legitimate the fraudulent elections of February 1947, precisely because it feared an Aguado regime which promised to be ‘soft on Communism’.

⁷² Diario Nicaraguense, 22 Nov. 1946.

⁷³ La Flecha, 27 Nov. 1946.

⁷⁴ Ibid., 21 Nov. 1946.

⁷⁵ The precise relation between Somoza and Pasos during this strike is still unclear. The important points are that: (a) Somoza shifted his position, (b) The strike ended in an unfavourable compromise for labour – 20 militants were not rehired, (c) The PLI's refusal to expel Pasos, despite his armed assault against the workers led directly to the PSN rupture, (d) In May 1947, Pasos and Conservative leaders backed Somoza's golpe against the 3-week-old unexpectedly progressive Argüello government, backed by the PSN and many PLI militants.

I want to emphasize that other PLI leaders did give support to the strikers. Symptoms of the break with the PSN came on 23 November, after Pasos' shots, but before the strike ended. On that date, PSN leaders instructed its membership not to participate in an opposition demonstration. One month later, the PSN opted for electoral abstention. Such a move was clearly the result of the strong Conservative anti-communist attacks. The PSN blamed the Opposition leaders in Managua for not allowing for Socialist participation, contrasting this attitude with the local leadership in León and Chinandega.

⁷⁶ ‘Estabamos Principiando’, op. cit., I develop these studies in my dissertation entitled, ‘Nuestro Jefe Se Llama Necesidad’: A study of Labour and Peasant Movements in Chinandega, Nicaragua (1912–1979).

⁷⁷ I argue that Somoza's alliance with labour was an integral part of a populist strategy. There is little doubt that the Peronist model inspired Somoza significantly. However, it is necessary to elucidate the specific conditions in Nicaragua which precluded the realization of a Peronista-type programme. Among many factors, the relatively small and geographically dispersed Nicaraguan working class simply was not comparable to the Argentinian case. Moreover, unlike the Peronistas, the Somoza group itself, already in the 1940s, represented an important fraction of capital. Finally, Nicaragua is geographically very close to the U.S., and in order to gain independence, as the Nicaraguan people well know, a different kind of political leadership than the Somocista was necessary.

One little-known story about Somoza is illustrative of the depth of his populistic-nationalistic will. In 1947, after he overthrew the Argüegime and crushed violent PSN and student resistance, he faced the problems of governmental bankruptcy and lack of diplomatic recognition from the U.S. and nearly all Latin American countries. He contacted the Argentinian government about getting a loan. Once the Argentines turned him down Somoza began to increase the volume of his anti-communist crusade, culminating in the January 1948, massive arrests of PSN militants. Months later, the U.S. rewarded him with diplomatic recognition. The Somocista unionists, however, maintained an alliance with the Argentine Peronistas.