¹ World Bank, Argentina: Reforms for Price Stability and Growth (Washington B.C., 1990), p. 185.Google Scholar

² ibid.

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¹⁰ Olson, Mancur, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge, 1971) and The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, 1982).Google Scholar

¹¹ Olson, , The Rise and Decline of Nations, p. 34.Google Scholar

¹² ibid., 29.

¹³ ibid., p. 27.

¹⁴ ibid, p. 74.

¹⁵ de Palomino, , Tradición y poder, p. 20.Google Scholar The charter of the association was signed by 66 individuals of whom 15 were Britons, and two Italians; see de Imaz, José Luis, Los Que Mandan, p. 98.Google Scholar

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¹⁷ ‘[The] agro-industrialists naturally adopted a middle position between the agrarian liberal free traders and the industrial protectionists. They argued that it was necessary to make a distinction between “natural” and “artificial” industry. Natural industries were those which used mostly local raw materials. They included wine, sugar, flour, meat, meat by-products, leather, edible oils, dairy products, lumber, furniture, tobacco, alcohol, beer, non-alcoholic beverages. Besides using local material, such industries needed very little sophisticated machinery, hence their costs were low and their prices competitive enough to meet the standards of the law of comparative advantage. By contrast, artificial industry required much expensive imported machinery, a great deal of imported fuel, and even imported raw materials. Most heavy industry, including iron and steel, machine building, chemicals, automobiles, electrical equipment, and rubber fell into this category. The agro-industrialists joined with the estancieros in considering such industries unsustainable for Argentina and unworthy of protection. By contrast, some temporary protection might be justified for natural industries, in order to give them a starting push.’ Lewis, Paul, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, NC, 1990), p. 82.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Palomino, , Tradición y poder, p. 30.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Internal elections were usually a formality as agreements were set up early to present a single list that members would vote on. The instance of an ‘alternative’ second list first appeared in 1908, and again in 1926 when breeders and fatteners (closely linked to foreign meatpackers and shipping companies) battled for the association's control, eventually resulting in the victory of the latter. Subsequently, only on three other occasions did the SRA experience internal squabbles, but such events were related to political crises affecting the whole country. Between 1954 and 1955, disagreements arose over whether to opt for an all-out confrontation or a conciliatory stance with regard to Perón. In 1962, members were divided on whether the association should take a position regarding the conflict between the azules and colorados, rival military factions. Finally, in 1972, dissension arose as a result of the debacle of the military regime and President Lanusse's decision to lift the proscription against Peronism. ibid., pp. 21 and 65.

²⁰ Therefore, at least until 1930, contrary to the common belief which regarded the UCR as mainly representative of the urban middle class, many aristocrats as well were involved in that party's structure. We do not have data on how many aristocrats joined the SRA, but it is reasonable to speculate that many did. Between 1916 and 1930, one president (Alvear), one vice-president, and ten ministers came from the SRA's ranks. Within this time span, five out of nine presidents, and 38% of the ministers came from the Rural Society. Smith, Peter, Politics and Beef in Argentina, pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

²¹ De Palomino, , Tradición y poder, p. 71.Google Scholar

²² ibid., pp. 71–72.

²³ A clear indication of the SRA's constant pursuit of ‘political’ connections rests on the fact that the president and vice-president of the republic, the presidents of the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, the ministers or secretaries of agriculture, provincial governors, and the mayor of Buenos Aites were all granted ex officio honorary membership of the association upon taking office. ibid., pp. 28–9.

²⁴ Olson, , The Rise and Decline of Nations, p. 41.Google Scholar

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²⁷ Waisman, Carlos, Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences (Princeton, 1987), p. 53.Google Scholar

²⁸ Scobie, James, Argentina: A City and a Nation (New York, 1964), pp. 112–135Google Scholar; Rock, David, Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín (Berkeley, 1987), pp. 131–133, 140–143.Google Scholar

²⁹ Taylor, Carl, Rural Life in Argentina (Baton Rouge, 1948), p. 195Google Scholar; Lewis, , The Crisis, p. 22.Google Scholar

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³¹ ibid., p. 24.

³² Such legislation forbade: ‘…clauses in tenant contracts restricting what could be planted and to whom it could be sold. The law also required owners to indemnify tenants for all improvements and forbade the seizure of tenants' tools and animals to pay off a debt. These results were tightened further in 1932, and in 1940 Congress aided tenants suffering from the Great Depression by making it extremely difficult for owners to evict them.’ Lewis, , The Crisis, p. 23.Google Scholar

³³ ibid.

³⁴ The Concordancia technically started with the administration of President Augustín Justo in 1932 and was supported early on by conservatives, Independent Socialists, and Anti-personalist Radicals. See Smith, Peter, Argentina and the Failure of Democracy (Madison, 1974), p. 37.Google Scholar

³⁵ In fact, Buenos Aires agreed to: (a) reduce import tariffs to pre-1931 levels on about 350 British products; (b) have 85% of beef exports transported through British-owned shipping companies; (c) grant important concessions to British-owned railways and tramways companies operating in Argentina; and (d) have Argentina export profits in pounds be used to buy British goods. Rock, , Argentina 1516–1987, p. 224.Google Scholar

³⁶ Potash, Robert, The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1928–1945, (Stanford, 1969), p. 83.Google Scholar See also Floria, Carlos and Belsunce, César García, Historia politica de la Argentina contempor´nea, 1880–1983) (Buenos Aires, 1988), p. 126Google Scholar; and Prebisch, Raúl, ‘Argentine Economic Policies since the 1930s: Recollections’, in The Political Economy of Argentina, 1880–1946, ed. Di Tella, Guido and Platt, D. C. M. (New York, 1986), pp. 142–143.Google Scholar

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³⁸ Similar provisions were made for beef exports. Until the early 1930s, foreign meatpackers had exercised a clear hegemony in terms of price setting through oligopolistic practices which were willingly accepted by cattlemen as long as business was thriving. Legislative attempts to change this state of affairs in 1923 met with little success, but the sharp drop in sales ensuing from the depression exacerbated relations between the two groups. At the end of 1933, the government sponsored in Congress a reform law, based on a proposal drafted in 1931 by the SRA, which established a National Meat Board composed of nine directors (of whom two were SRA nominees). The Board imposed a mandate on foreign importers that they register with it in order to carry out trade and that they comply with a control price mechanism explicitly aimed at guaranteeing a fixed income for livestock producers. The Board also organised a government-subsidised stockraisers' cooperative, under the name of Corporation of Argentine Meat Producers (Corporation Argentina de Productores de Carne – CAP), to manage up to 11% of beef exports to the United Kingdom within the provisions of the Roca-Runciman treaty. The Corporation's stated goal was to create a channel for Argentine producers to sell their products directly to foreign customers, thus bypassing the exporters' cartel and consequently avoiding part of their profits being taken away by the exporters' mediation. Gravil, Roger, ‘State Intervention in Argentina's Export Trade between the Wars’, Journal of Latin American Studies vol. 2, no. 2 (1970), pp. 157–164.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ ibid., p. 159.

⁴⁰ Rock, , Argentina, 1516–1987, pp. 239–240Google Scholar; Di Tella, Guido, ‘Economic Controversies in Argentina from the 1920s to the 1940s’, in Tella, Di and Platt, , The Political Economy of Argentina, pp. 128–129.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Llach, Juan, ‘El Plan Pinedo de 1940: su significado histórico y los onígenes de la economía política del peronismo’, Desarrollo Económico, vol. 23, no. 92 (1984), pp. 529–530.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴² Wynia, , Argentina in the Postwar Era, p. 31.Google Scholar

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⁴⁴ ibid.

⁴⁵ Concomitantly, the presence of SRA's members in the last two administrations of the Concordancia regime diminished steadily.

⁴⁶ Lewis, , The Crisis, p. 153.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ ibid., p. 142. See also Baily, SamuelLabor, Nationalism, and Politics in Argentina (New Brunswick, 1967), p. 77.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Lewis, , The Crisis, p. 148.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cúneo, Dardo, Comportamiento y crisis, pp. 155–158, 174–178Google Scholar; Donghi, Tulio Halperín, Argentina la democracia de masas (Buenos Aires, 1972), p. 535Google Scholar; Luna, Félix, El 45: Crónica de un año decisivo (Buenos Aires, 1975)Google Scholar; Potash, Robert, The Army & Politics in Argentina, 1941–1962 (Stanford, 1980), pp. 15–46.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Waisman, , Reversal of Development, p. 175.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Wynia, , Argentina in the Postwar Era, p. 49Google Scholar; Rock, , Argentina, 1516–1987, p. 274.Google Scholar

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⁵³ Besides, it is said that the Army would not have allowed expropriation of land because most generals aspired to land owning status after retirement; some were also married to daughters of SRA members.

⁵⁴ Newton, Jorge, Historia de la SRA (Buenos Aires, 1966).Google Scholar

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⁵⁷ For the debate arising from these contending views see de Palomino, , Poder y tradición, p. 24.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Nonetheless, pampean producers, especially fatteners, remained firmly in control of the Rural Society.

⁵⁹ Olson, , The Rise and Decline of Nations, p. 47.Google Scholar

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⁶³ SRA members were most numerous during the administrations of the Argentine Revolution (1966–73) and, conversely, were absent from the third Peronist administration (1973–6). The large number of the Rural Society's members during the Frondizi and Guido administrations has been explained by de Palomino as stemming from the strong military influence upon those two presidents, in particular the latter. What she seems to imply is that some of the SRA's members were closely linked with high ranking officers at the time. Thus, within this context, the armed forces viewed the participation of the SRA's affiliates in government as an assurance that ‘sound’ policies would be pursued. de Palomino also noted that 49 SRA members occupied 94 official positions during the 1956–83 period. In other words, 37% of such members served as public officials in more than one government while 40% occupied more than one post. Niosi, who analysed the behaviour of Argentine entrepreneurs between 1955 and 1969, came to the conclusion that SRA members played a decisive role during the first phase of the authoritarian governments, while later being replaced by industrial entrepreneurs, de Palomino did not find clear cut evidence for Niosi's hypothesis, but agreed that SRA's members could be found consistently in positions related to the rural sector such as minister, secretary, or undersecretary of agriculture both at the national level and at the provincial level (most notably the Buenos Aires province) during authoritarian periods. Furthermore, SRA leaders were quite involved, not only in agricultural posts, but in banking as well, which should not be a surprise because some of them owned or were shareholders of large financial companies. What all this data seems to suggest is that, at least as far as the SRA is concerned, after 1943 the participation of its members in official posts decreased over time. It also indicates that such participation was greatest after governments emerging from military coups were set up or when the armed forces had either a veto power or controlled the governmental machinery (Frondizi and Guido). de Palomino, , Tradición y poder, pp. 74–76.Google Scholar

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⁶⁷ ibid., p. 10–11.

⁶⁸ Nogueira, Martínez, ‘Las organizaciones corporativas’, p. 3.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ ibid., pp. 4–5.

⁷⁰ Olson, , The Rise and Decline of Nations, p. 44.Google Scholar

⁷¹ de Palomino, Mirta, ‘El Agro', p. 6.Google Scholar

⁷² ibid., p. 8.

⁷³ World Bank, Argentina, p. 186.Google Scholar

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⁷⁵ All three did not actually join the strike. The first sympathised with the motivations but thought that striking was too strong an action. The CGT made similar remarks.

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