1 A number of authors have expressed doubts about the capacity of several new democracies to overcome important obstacles to consolidation and civilian control. For an overview of conditions in South America as a whole, see Agüero, Felipe, ‘The Military and the Limits to Democratization in South America’, in Mainwaring, Scott et al. (eds.), The New Democracies in Latin America: Problems of Transition and Consolidation (Notre Dame, forthcoming)Google Scholar. In Brazil, Guillermo O'Donnell sees a gradual erosion of democratic practice as a result of harmful ‘institutional carryovers’ from the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. See O'Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Challenges to Democratization in Brazil’, World Policy, vol. 5 (Spring 1988), pp. 281–300Google Scholar. On obstacles to change in Peru, see Correa, Marcial Rubio, ‘The Armed Forces in Peruvian Politics’, in Varas, Augusto (ed.), Democracy Under Siege: New Military Power in Latin America (New York, 1989).Google Scholar

² On these strategies in the Brazilian case, see Pion-Berlin, David and Buchanan, Paul, ‘Civil—Military “Games” and Democratic Consolidation: A Comparative Analysis of Argentina, Brazil and Greece’, paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, September 1988, pp. 26–36.Google Scholar

³ The transitions to democracy have prompted scholars to focus on the logical prerequisites for civilian control. See Stepan, A., Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, 1987)Google Scholar; Welch, C. Jr, Civilian Control of the Military (New York, 1976)Google Scholar; Welch, C. Jr, No Farewell to Arms? (Boulder, 1987)Google Scholar; Fitch, J. Samuel, ‘Military Professionalism, National Security and Democracy: Lessons from the Latin American Experience’, Pacific Focus, vol. 6 (1989), pp. 99–147Google Scholar; Maniruzzaman, T., Military Withdrawal from Politics: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, 1987)Google Scholar; Goodman, L. W., et al. (eds.), The Military and Democracy: The Future of Civil—Military Relations in Latin America (Lexington, 1990)Google Scholar.

⁴ In their volume on Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, O'Donnell and Schmitter do consider tactical calculations in the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. The focus of my investigation, however, is on the tactics employed by civilians to subordinate the armed forces once the transition has been completed. See O'Donnell, G. and Schmitter, P. C., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore, 1986)Google Scholar; for a study that underlines the crucial importance of tactics in politics, see Ascher, W., Scheming for the Poor: The Politics of Redistribution in Latin America (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 303–20.Google Scholar

⁵ The Radicals were able to widen significantly their electoral base of support, thanks largely to Alfonsín's political ‘presence’. See Cavarozzi, Marcelo, ‘Political Cycles in Argentina Since 1955’, in O'Donnell, et al. (ed.), Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Latin America, p. 47.Google Scholar

⁶ On transition through collapse, see Danopoulos, Constantine, ‘From Military to Civilian Rule in Contemporary Greece’, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 10 (1984), pp. 229–50CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pion-Berlin, David, ‘The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina: 1976–1983’, Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs, vol. 27 (1985), pp. 55–76CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The effect of the Argentine transition on the balance of power between the armed forces and the new democratic leadership has been well documented. See Fontana, Andrés, ‘Fuerzas Armadas, Partidos Políticos y Transición a la Democracia en Argentina, 1981–1982’, Kellogg Institute Working Paper 28 (07 1984), pp. 29–32Google Scholar, and by the same author, ‘La Política Militar del Gobierno Constitucional Argentino’, CEDES (July 1987), p. 6.

⁷ See López, Ernesto, El Ultimo Levantamiento (Buenos Aires, 1988).Google Scholar

⁸ Although Samuel Huntington argued that the armed forces would have to become politically inert to safeguard their professional standards, other scholars contend that military professionals—particularly in the developing countries—remain politically active. See Abrahamsson, B., Military Professionalisation and Political Power (Beverly Hills, 1972)Google Scholar; and O'Donnell, Guillermo, ‘Modernisation and Military Coups: Theory, Comparisons and the Argentine Case’, in Lowenthal, Abraham and Fitch, J. Samuel (eds.), Armies and Politics in Latin America: Revised Edition (New York, 1986), pp. 133–96Google Scholar. Claude Welch acknowledges that civilians cannot entirely banish Third World military institutions from politics. Moreover, the dichotomy between military intervention and the Huntingtonian notion of civilian control ‘neglects a major area of interactions’, which he calls military ‘participation’ in politics: see No Farewell to Arms, p. 13.

⁹ See Huntington, S., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil—Military Relations (Cambridge, 1957), p. 84.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Needier, Martin, ‘Military Motivations in the Seizure of Power’, Latin American Research Review, vol. 10 (1975), pp. 63–79.Google Scholar

¹¹ A leading proponent of this view is J. Samuel Fitch. See his article, ‘Military Professionalism’, p. 140. Others who share this view are Pion-Berin, David, ‘Latin American National Security Doctrines: Hard- and Softline Themes’, Armed Forces and Society, vol. 15 (Spring 1989), pp. 411–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics; Welch, No Farewell to Arms; Agüero ‘The Military and the Limits to Democratization’.

¹² Stepan makes the strongest case for civil society, political society and the state to prove their expertise in defence-related areas. See Rethinking Military Politics, pp. 128–45; also see J. Samuel Fitch, ‘The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America’, Discussion Paper Prepared for the Plenary Session of the Inter-American Dialogue, 16–18 October 1987.

¹³ In this respect, there would be a reversal of the phenomena of professional intervention which O'Donnell accurately depicted during previous decades. Then, a heightened sense of professionalism spurred the military to intervene against democratically elected governments because of the close association between role expansion and guardianship over national security on the one hand, and institutional cohesion and advancement on the other. See O'Donnell, , ‘Modernization and Military Coups’, pp. 96–133.Google Scholar

¹⁴ On the importance of establishing boundaries between military and non-military functions, see Luckman, R., ‘A Comparative Typology of Civil—Military Relations’, Government and Opposition, vol. 6 (1971), pp. 5–35.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Classic studies of civil—military relations confirm that tactical blunders have been quite damaging to civilian authority. Argentine president Arturo Frondizi's (1958–62) refusal to suppress a military uprising and instead to negotiate with the rebel leader ‘…lowered his own prestige as constitutional commander-in-chief of the armed forces and invited further invasions of his own authority’, according to Potash, R., The Army and Politics in Argentina, 1945–1962 (Stanford, 1980), p. 317Google Scholar. Errors in tactical judgement on the part of Brazilian president João Goulart (1961–4) helped to crystallise putschist elements inside the military and hastened his own demise. See Stepan, A., The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, 1971)Google Scholar. Conversely, studies of older democratic orders have shown how political finesse has been used to prolong the lifespan of otherwise fragile governments. For example, Venezuelan president Rómulo Betancourt (1958–64) was able to strike a balance between firmness and conciliation in winning military respect for civilian authority. See Alexander, R., Rómulo Betancourt and the Transformation of Venezuela (New Brunswick, 1982), pp. 465–501.Google Scholar

¹⁶ The literature linking beliefs, cognition and political behaviour is rich. Two of the classic studies are George, Alexander, ‘The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 13 (06 1969), pp. 190–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Holsti, Ole, ‘The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 6 (1962), pp. 244–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁷ See Rouquié, A., ‘Demilitarization and the Institutionalization of Military-Dominated Politics in Latin America’, in Lowenthal, and Fitch, (eds.), Armies and Politics in Latin America, pp. 444–77.Google Scholar

¹⁸ On the relation between regime type and the distribution of power, see Agüero, Felipe, ‘The Assertion of Civilian Supremacy in Post-Authoritarian Contexts: Spain in Comparative Perspective’, PhD diss., Duke University, 1991Google Scholar; on the linkage between the performance of the previous regime and the distribution of power, see O'Donnell, and Schmitter, , Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, p. 20.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The best accounts of the Proceso's failures can be found in Waldmann, P. and Valdéz, E. G. (eds.), El Poder Militar en la Argentina: 1976–1981 (Buenos Aires, 1983)Google Scholar; Schvarzer, J., Martínez de Hoz: La Lógica Política de la Política Económica, Centro de Investigaciones Sociales Sobre el Estado y la Administración, Ensayos y Tesis 4 (Buenos Aires, 1983)Google Scholar; Smith, W. C., Authoritarianism and the Crisis of the Argentine Political Economy (Stanford, 1989), pp. 224–66.Google Scholar

²⁰ World Bank, Economic Memorandum on Argentina, Report No. 4979–AR (Washington, D.C., 1984), p. 398Google Scholar and appendix, pp. 33, 286.

²¹ The destruction of the industrial sector is detailed in Tokman, Victor, ‘Global Monetarism and Destruction of Industry’, CEPAL Review, vol. 33 (08. 1984), pp. 107–21.Google Scholar

²² Latin America Weekly Report, 28 June 1985, p. 10.

²³ This contrasts sharply with the Illia years, when from 1964 onwards, coup plotting against that Radical Party government had become a publicly discussed issue with virtually every political group from left to right participating.

²⁴ Latin America Weekly Report, 16 Aug. 1985, p. 10.

²⁵ Little, Walter, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Contemporary Argentina’, Government and Opposition, vol. 19 (Spring 1984), pp 207–24.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁶ DrAlfonsin, Raúl R., ‘Discurso Del Señor Presidente de la Nación Argentina en la Cena de Camaradería de las Fuerzas Armadas’, República Argentina, 5 07 1985, p. 17Google Scholar. Translation from the original Spanish is mine.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁸ The following are important and recent Argentine contributions to the ongoing debate over military reform: López, E. et al. (eds.), La Reforma Militar (Buenos Aires, 1985)Google Scholar; Orieta, R. O., Reforma Militar para la Defensa National (Buenos Aires, 1985)Google Scholar; Tcnl. (R) Cruces, N., Hacia Otro Ejército Posible: Invitación al Debate Sobre Aspectos Intimos de la Profesión Militar (Buenos Aires, 1988).Google Scholar

²⁹ On general defence expenditures, see Gargiulo, Gerardo R., ‘Gasto Militar y Política de Defensa’, Desarrollo Económico, vol. 28 (04–06 1988), p. 96CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Clarín, 4 November 1984, pp. 6–7. Of the three forces, the army suffered the most drastic reductions. This gives weight to the idea that the Alfonsín administration had followed a deliberate strategy of weakening the army vis-à-vis the navy and air force.

³⁰ Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Latin America (FBIS—LAT), 16 April 1985, p. B2.

³¹ FBIS—LAT, 2 Oct. 1985, pp. B2—B3; Latin America Weekly Report, 25 Oct. 1985, p. 1.

³² FBIS—LAT, 16 April 1985, p. B3.

³³ For example, left untouched was the army's intelligence battallion 601, an agency with over 2,000 employees (including many who were implicated in human rights abuses), and one that was answerable neither to the government nor to the rest of the military. See The New York Times, 3 Nov. 1985, p. 3. The difficulties in adjusting officers to new and cooperative interservice patterns of behaviour were revealed to me by Julio De'orve, Director of Logistical Affairs in the Alfonsín Defence Ministry. Interview with author, Buenos Aires, July, 1986.

³⁴ Gargiulo, , ‘Gasto Militar’, p. 90.Google Scholar

³⁵ Joint Publication Research Service—Latin America (JPRS—LAT), 2 May 1986, p. 10.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

³⁷ General Heriberto Auel, interview with the author, Buenos Aires, 31 July 1989.

³⁸ Interview with General Heriberto Auel, Cronista Comercial, 18 June 1989, p. 4.

³⁹ Bimestre, 2 Aug. 1984, p. 80; FBIS—LAT, 4 Dec. 1984, P. B3, La Voz, 16 April 1985, P. 4.

⁴⁰ See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance (1983–4), p. 104; (1987–8), p. 179.

⁴¹ FBIS—LAT, 16 April 1985, p. B2; FBIS—LAT, 31 Dec. 1984, p. B4.

⁴² A detailed explanation of Alfonsín's economic policies and Plan Austral in particular can be found in Smith, William C., ‘Democracy, Distributional Conflicts and Macroeconomic Policymaking in Argentina (1983–1989)’, in Malloy, James and Gamarra, Eduardo (eds.), Latin American and Caribbean Contemporary Record, vol. 8 (New York, forthcoming), p. 9.Google Scholar

⁴³ On presidential popularity, see La Nación Semanal, 2 Sept. 1985, p. 4. Other polls from Latin America Weekly Report, 16 Aug. 1985, p. 10.

⁴⁴ Gary Wynia has shown how Argentine civilian and military governments alike have enforced their own political isolation by formulating and implementing economic policies unilaterally, without adequate consultation with the interest groups to be affected. See Wynia, G., Argentina in the Post War Era: Politics and Economic Policy Making in a Divided Society (Albuquerque, 1987).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A modified article of the Code of Military Justice enabled the Federal Appellate Court to take over the cases from the Military Court if it could be shown that there were unjustifiable delays in the proceedings. See Igounet, O. and Igounet, O., Código de Justicia Militar (Buenos Aires, 1985), p. 432Google Scholar. Still, a year had passed before the cases were transferred, costing the Alfonsín government valuable time in its efforts to reduce tensions with the armed forces. See Robert Potash, ‘Alfonsín and the Argentine Military’, paper presented at the XV International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association, December, 1989.

⁴⁶ La Nación Edición Internacional, 23 June 1986, p. 5.

⁴⁷ According to Osiel, Mark, this was the cornerstone of the Alfonsín judicial strategy. See his article, ‘The Making of the Human Rights Policy in Argentina: The Impact of Ideas and Interests on a Legal Conflict’, journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 18 (1986), p. 149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ See article 514 as amended by law 23,049, in Igounet, and Igounet, , El Código de Justitia Militar, pp. 158, 432.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ On excesses being regularised acts of repression conducted daily by the armed forces, see Comisión Nacional Sobre la Desaparición de Personas, Nunca Más (Buenos Aires, 1986), p. 481.Google Scholar Also see Igounet, and Igounet, , Código de Justicia Militar, pp. 159–65.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ I am grateful to Ernesto López for his insights on this point. For further explanation of this and other components of the government's legal strategy, see his book El Ultimo Levantamiento, pp. 49–54.

⁵¹ Juan Gauna, the Secretary of Defence under Alfonsín, admitted that it was a tactical error on his government's part not to have pressed for the termination of the trials shortly after the sentencing of the ex-comandautes, in December 1985. Interview with author, Buenos Aires, 15 August 1989.

⁵² The New York Times, 18 Feb. 1984, p. 3.

⁵³ It is well known that the Argentine armed forces are divided institutions. But in recent years, important horizontal cleavages of an ideological and professional character, cutting across hierarchical lines of authority, have emerged to supplant vertical cleavages between officers of similar rank. Opposition to Alfonsín's policies has come mainly from a group of junior officers in the army. On recent cleavage patterns within the military, see Ernesto López, El Ultimo Levantamiento.

⁵⁴ Clarín Weekly, 2; May 1987, p. 1. Accounts of the military uprisings can be found in various issues of ha Nación and Clarin between 17 and 20 April 1987. The speed with which Alfonsín made his concessions coupled with the fact that the new law went beyond earlier versions of obediencia debida by extending an amnesty for all junior officers—whether or not they had committed excesses (torture, executions, etc.) and to more senior officers who were not key decision-makers in the ‘Dirty War’—reinforced the view that the government had emerged in a weaker position.

⁵⁵ See Fontana, Andrés, ‘La Política Militar’, p. 26–7.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ See Congreso de la Nación, Dirección de Información Parlamentaria, ‘Ley de Defensa National No. 16,970’, 1970, pp. 1–6.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ República Argentina, Boletin Oficial, Ist section, 5 05 1988, p. 4Google Scholar. My translation.

⁵⁸ Comparisons with Spain and Venezuela are quite appropriate. Defence ministry officials from Argentina conferred with their Spanish counterparts in 1984 on the development of their own laws. And Venezuela is often noted as a model of civilian control for Latin America. See ‘Ley Orgánica de España 6/1980’, Boletín Oficial del Estado, no. 165, 10 07 1980, p. 33Google Scholar; ‘Ley Orgánica de Seguridad y Defensa de Venezuela’, Gaceta Oficial, no. 1899, 26 08. 1976, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Both the Spanish and Venezuelan Defence laws joined defence and security concerns.

⁶⁰ See Fitch, J., ‘Military Professionalism’, p. 140.Google Scholar

⁶¹ See ‘Ley Orgánica de Seguridad y Defensa de Venezuela’, ch. 2, art. 7, p. 2.

⁶² See Clarín, ‘Interés Radical por la Ley de Defensa’, 29 July 1986, p. 2.

⁶³ Destino Histórico, vol. 3 (02. 1987), p. 41.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ La Nación, 28 Aug. 1986, p. 1.; definition of aggression provided by Navy Chief of Staff Almirante Ramón Arosa, La Razón, 15 08. 1986, p. 10.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Informador Público, 27 Jan. 1989, pp. 3, 5, and various issues of La Nación during the last week of January 1989.

⁶⁶ See Decree 327/89, ‘Seguridad Interior’, in República Argentina, Boletín Oficial, section 1, 16 03 1989, p. 2Google Scholar. In Argentina, the main security forces are the Gendarmería Nacional, which is a kind of national guard/border control unit, and the Prefectura Naval, the Naval Prefecture.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ José Manuel Ugarte, a legislative aide to the Comisión de Defensa in the Cámara de Diputados who drafted much of the Radical Party defence law, said he was pleasantly surprised at the outcome. Interview with author, Buenos Aires, 26 August 1989.