1 The law has been translated into English. Mann, Fred L. and Huerta, John, Text of Decree-Law No. 17716: Agrarian Reform Law (Lima: Iowa-Peru Mission Program Reports T-5, 1969).Google Scholar

2 Cotler, Julio, Crisis política y populismo militar en el Perú (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1969), p. 51.Google Scholar

3 “Lands owned by industrial processors of sugar cane are exempted from expropriation up to the amount indispensable for maintaining the efficient operation of the processing plants (Art. 38, 39 and 43).” Mann, Fred L., Huerta, John, Morrissey, Dennis, et al; Preliminary Analysis: Agrarian Reform Law No. 17716 (Lima: Iowa-Peru Mission Program Reports T-4, 1970), p. 109.Google Scholar

4 Ibid., pp. 62-63. During the second decade of this century usurpation of Indian lands reached scandalous levels. In a number of areas desperate peasants revolted. Although they were bloodily suppressed, they gave impetus to the creation of a new legal entity, the indigenous community. Once peasant communities were officially recognized as such, they obtained inalienable right to their land. For more detailed analysis of these events see Dew, Edward, Politics in the Altiplano (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1969), p. 29 Google Scholar. The present law reflects this earlier precedent.

5.

This table is expanded in Mann, et al, Preliminary Analysis, p. 57c.

6 Ibid., p. 42.

7 Lack of respect for labor laws has characterized landowners throughout Latin America. For an excellent discussion of this point see Barraclough, Solon L. and Domike, Arthur L., “Agrarian Structure in Seven Latin American Countries,” in Stravenhagen, Rodolfo, Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1970), pp. 74–78.Google Scholar

8 The entire process is summarized in detail in Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, pp. 461c. This is the normal procedure. Under certain circumstances land can be taken more rapidly. For example, peasant communities are entitled to allotment up to a prescribed minimum without awaiting such declaration (ibid., p. 43). Also, where there have been previously serious peasant-owner difficulties land can be taken prior to creation of a Zone (ibid, p. 42).

9 “The term is defined in the Law as: a restriction on the right of rural property imposed expressly and specifically for agrarian reform purposes, being applicable to all or any part of a holding, for its expropriation by the State and subsequent transfer to peasants duly qualified under the Law.” Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, p. 16.

10 Ibid., pp. 79-83. “If the bondholder supplies, in cash, one-half of the capital necessary to finance a duly qualified industrial enterprise, the State Developing Banks must accept bonds at 100% of their value for supplying the other one-half of such capital (Art. 181). A ‘duly qualified enterprise’ is not defined but apparently refers to those approved by the Industrial Bank.” Ibid., p. 83.

11 At no point is the family farm unit to be less than three hectares. It may be larger. Ibid., pp. 71a-72.

12 Ibid., pp. 66-72.

13 Exports of mineral products, largely dominated by foreign investors, accounted for over fifty-five percent. Exports of fish meal and related products, produced by domestic and foreign firms, contributed twenty-five percent. Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, Cuentas Nacionales del Perú: 1950-1965 (Lima: Banco Central de Reserva del Peru, 1966), pp. 48–49.Google Scholar

14 Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Departmento de Ciencias Sociales; La reforma agraria en dos complejos agro-industriales: Cayalti y Turnan (Lima; Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Departamento de Ciencias Sociales, 1970), pp. 15-23.

15 Specifically, the government had sent agents to “act as inspectors and approve or disapprove transactions.” The process of affectation did not begin until two months later. Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, p. 58.

16 Julio de la Piedra was a prominent senator in the APRA-Odriista Coalition which confronted Belaúnde.

17 Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, p. 8.

18 Ibid., p. 8.

19 Bourricaud, Francois, “Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy,” Studies in Comparative International Development, Volume II, No. 2, passim.Google Scholar

20 For example, the above seven families had investments in at least eleven different banks, credit agencies or insurance companies. Santisteban, Carlos Malpica, Los dueños del Perú (Lima: Ediciones Ensayos Sociales, 1968), pp. 71–106 passim.Google Scholar

21 This is in contrast to many Latin American countries where the two sectors, agriculture and financial, have developed separately. In some, for example Brazil, conflict between the sectors has been politically important. In Peru, however, the two have been united through much of this century. Only recently has there developed an independent urban class, based primarily on immigrant involvement in commerce and consumer oriented industry. As a result, the position of the oligarchy had probably been weakened somewhat.

22 Pedro Beltrán, director of La Prensa, one of Peru's two leading daily newspapers, was appointed prime minister in June 1959. At the same time he held the position of minister of the treasury. Pike, Fredrick B., The Modern History of Peru (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1967), p. 297.Google Scholar

23 Mann, et al., Preliminary Analysis, p. 46.

24 A number of points included here and throughout the paper come from persons in responsible positions who understandably would probably wish to remain anonymous. I hope that the reader will accept my belief that these sources are relatively reliable.

25 For a lengthy discussion of the relationship between the growth of the APRA and the syndical struggles on the estates, see Klaren, Peter, La formación de las haciendas azucareras y los orígenes del APRA (Lima: Moncloa-Campodonico, 1970).Google Scholar

26 This famous feud began with the abortive 1931 APRA uprising in Trujillo in which a number of officers were killed. The military responded with a wholesale slaughter of Apristas, and the APRA has never been forgiven. Fear of an APRA victory in the elections which were to have been held in 1969 is often quoted as a cause of the 1969 coup. For an easily readable although thoroughly biased account of the genesis of this feud, see Pike, The Modern History of Peru, Chapters 8, 9, and 10.

27 Pontificia Universidad Católica, La reforma agraria.

28 Ibid., pp. 45-49.

29 Unfortunately I do not have precise information on the numbers involved.

This account was first discussed with me by Apristas themselves. I later heard very similar arguments from other sources.

30 The committees were organized independently of the ministry of agriculture.

31 According to rumor, the choice of name was not entirely felicitous. Leftist militants rapidly became active in organization efforts, and there was danger that they might gain control of the committees. When the cabinet was confronted with this situation, it was decided to deemphasize and limit the range of the organizations. In Peru today such gossip is incessant and frequently inciting. Indeed, it is often the only source of information but it should always be taken with a grain of salt.

32 Several Apristas mentioned to me that harassment had increased following elections.

33 A number of estates were given over to the cooperatives to mark the first anniversary of the law. For example, workers received ownership of the estates of Cayaltí, Tumán, and Laredo. Title was given personally by the minister of agriculture, General Jorge Barandiarán Pagador, El Comercio (Lima), 25 June 1970, p. 4.

34 Oiga (Lima), No. 394, 8 October 1970, pp. 8-9.

35 Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 243–244.Google Scholar

36 Ministry of Agriculture, Perú: tierra sin patrones (Lima: Ministry of Agriculture, 1970), p. 7.Google Scholar

37 Tullis, LaMond F., Lord and Peasant in Peru: A Paradigm of Political and Social Change (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 67.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

38 Two of these actions, those of Luis de la Puente Uceda near Cuzco and of Héctor Béjar near Ayacucho, can properly be called guerrilla uprisings. However, the participation of peasants in either of these is questionable. At most, there was a minimum of peasant support. The third, the movement led by Hugo Blanco in the Valley of la Convención near Cuzco, was almost totally a peasant phenomenon. It was, however, principally syndicalist in nature and only assumed guerrilla aspects in response to police pressure. Three accounts of these movements, all of them interesting although sprinkled with liberal amounts of imagination are Gonzalo Añi Castillo, Historia secreta de las guerrillas (Lima: Ediciones Más Allá, 1967) Bejar, Héctor, Perú 1965: una experiencia guerrillera (Lima: Compodonico Ediciones, S.A., 1969)Google Scholar, and Vilanueva, Victor, Hugo Blanco y la rebelión campesina (Lima: Editorial Juan Mejía Baca, 1967).Google Scholar

39 Neira, Hugo, Los Andes: tierra o muerte (Santiago: Editorial ZYX, 1968), p. 138 Google Scholar, tells part of this story. Other details were related to me by various agrarian reform personnel in the department of Cuzco, August 1970.

40 Even the law gives some support to this political interpretation. It states that land in zones of earlier unrest can be affected prior to declaration of an Agrarian Reform Zone. Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, pp. 23-24.

41 Colorful pop-art posters advertising the reform have been prepared by the ministry of agriculture. One, for example, shows a peasant lady in indigenous dress, with an infant on her back, holding an axe, and proclaiming, “We are free. The Revolution is giving us land.” However, these seem to have had their widest circulation in Lima. The only copies I saw in the highlands were inside Agrarian Reform Offices.

42 Personal interviews with personnel of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Oficina Nacional de Cooperatives (ONDECOOP) connected with the Pampa de Anta project. Lima and Cuzco, August 1970. I was also under the impression that these programs were largely under civilian control.

43 Roca Wallparimachi, “Labor de los hacendados en la Pampa de Anta para crear resistencia a la aplicación de la reforma agraria,” report presented to the 39th Congress of Americanists, Lima, 8 August 1970.

44 Expreso (Lima), 22 August 1970, p. 16.

45 The law allows private parceling only with the approval of the Agrarian Reform Agency. Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, p. 126. Needless to say, many have undertaken to divide their lands without such permission. One bureaucrat complained to me that this activity was widespread in this area but that he lacked power to enforce the law. I have encountered numerous other examples, but I know no studies analyzing the exact extent of violation.

46 He alluded to this in his speech of 3 October 1970. Oiga (Lima), No. 394, 8 October 1970, pp. 8-9.

47 I cannot vouch for the truth of these. They should be taken with that grain of salt sprinkled on all rumors.

48 Numerous previous reforms have shown this. Two examples will suffice. (1) Pararin is a peasant community traditionally possessing highlands above the Pativilca Valley. In the early 1960s, however, the comuneros invaded valley lands and successfully established control over a fairly extensive area. They then requested aid from the Universidad Agraria to establish a cooperative. Immediately, however, discussion broke down over the issue of status and land distribution. Although a compromise was reached and a cooperative was established, bitter feelings remained. The cooperative has since broken apart. (Personal interview with César Benavides, Lima, August 1970.) (2) The village of Yanamarca bordering the Mantaro Valley struggled for years to obtain land titles. After the 1964 law it achieved success. Personnel from the ministry of agriculture then arrived and attempted to establish a cooperative. However, those opposing equal distribution soon withdrew. At various times this upper status faction attempted to gain control of the cooperative in elections, to intransigently oppose it, or to form their own cooperative. The process of redistribution was greatly hampered, and at one point the two factions, threatening to invade each other's lands, actually came to blows. Rodrigo Sánchez, Reforma agraria y cooperativa en Yanamarca (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1970).

49 Mann, et al; Preliminary Analysis, pp. 136-144.