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The “Latin-American Bloc” in the United Nations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Extract

Much has been heard in the postwar years about “Hemispheric Solidarity.” In popular belief, this concept not only has concerned matters of security for the Western Hemisphere but frequently has been extended to cover practically all of the international relations of the American states. Particularly, there has been the widespread assumption that the Latin-American states form a bloc in the United Nations — and, incidentally, a bloc of twenty votes in the pocket of the United States.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 1961

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References

1 A check of the voting in recent years indicated that Latin-American voting patterns became sufficiently crystallized during the first ten years to justify basing an analysis on that period. For a general account of the role of the Latin-American states in the United Nations see Houston, John A., Latin America in the United Nations, (N. Y.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1956 Google Scholar).

2 Personal interview with the permanent representative of a Latin-American state to the United Nations, United Nations Headquarters, New York, Nov. 23, 1954. For obvious reasons, it is necessary that the delegates interviewed in the course of this investigation remain anonymous.

3 For the example of this exception, see U. N. Economic and Social Council, Third Session, Official Records, 21st Meeting (Oct. 3, 1946), pp. 152-54.

4 U. N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Ad Hoc Political Committee, Official Records, 60th Meeting (Nov. 28, 1950), pp. 388-89.

5 U. N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary, Official Records, 304th Meeting (Nov. 4, 1950), p. 381.

6 For an indication of the extent of this unity and coherence during the ten-year period, see U. N. Security Council, Tenth Year, Official Records, 695th Meeting (Mar. 29, 1955), p. 22.

7 U. N. Security Council, Second Year, Official Records, No. 68, 173rd Meeting (Aug. 1, 1947), pp. 1700-1703; U. N. Security Council, Fourth Year, Official Records, No. 9, 406th Meeting (Jan. 28, 1949), pp. 21-23.

8 U. N. Security Council, Third Year, Official Records, No. 73, 303rd Meeting (May 24, 1948), p. 26.

9 For a reflection of this outlook, see U. N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, First Committee, Official Records, 353rd Meeting (Oct. 4, 1950), pp. 58-60.

10 U. N. Security Council, Ninth Year, Official Records, 675th Meeting (June 20, 1954), p. 37; ibid., 676th Meeting (June 25, 1954), p. 34.

11 U. N. General Assembly, Seventh Session, Second Committee, Official Records, 222nd Meeting (Nov. 29, 1952), p. 195.

12 U. N. General Assembly, Sixth Session, Second Committee, Official Records, 166th Meeting (Dec. 13, 1951), p. 139. In the plenary meeting of the General Assembly, Mexico and Peru joined the supporters of the draft resolution; and lone Brazil, forsaking the opposition, abstained. The same session, Plenary, Official Records, 360th Meeting (Jan. 12, 1952), p. 338.

13 As was frequently true in other subject areas, when a proposal was sponsored by a member of the Soviet bloc, the largest group of Latin-American Members customarily joined the United States in opposition to it. The construction of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights absorbed much of the attention of the Third Committee and the Plenary Meetings of the Third Session of the General Assembly.

14 However, a large group of Latin-American Members and the United States stood together in the rejection of an acknowledgement, proposed by the Soviet Union, that implementation of the Covenant would fall entirely within the domestic jurisdiction of states. For a final vote, see U. N. General Assembly, Fifth Session, Plenary, Official Records, 317th Meeting (Dec. 4, 1950), p. 563.

15 The last vote during this period, which finally recorded the United States standing with the majority, can be found in U. N. General Assembly, Eighth Session, Plenary, Official Records, 457th Meeting (Nov. 11, 1953), p. 288. It should be noted that the United States was one of the first opponents of firm action to dispel its doubts on the “domestic jurisdiction” element and accept General Assembly competence to consider the question.

16 As an example of the many votes recorded on this matter, see U. N. General Assembly, Tenth Session, Plenary, Official Records, 551st Meeting (Dec. 6, 1955), pp. 404-405.

17 The position of the Latin-American states favoring Italy in this matter of the disposal of the former Italian colonies, at variance with the prevalent Latin American position on dependent areas in general, can be accounted for by the large Italian component in the population of several Latin-American countries, especially Argentina; at least, such was the explanation given by numerous Latin-American delegates to the United Nations, interviewed by the writer in New York, November 22-27, 1954.

18 Except, of course, when the entire membership of the United Nations voted together in a unanimous decision, or when all of the Members except a very few (for example, the Soviet bloc) voted together

19 The United States identified itself with eleven of the thirteen positions in the second pattern but with none of the ninteen positions in the first pattern.

20 The record does not indicate that the voting of Guatemala became notably more similar to that of the United States after the revolution of 1954. During the ten-year period covered by this study, Mexico served only one term — a one-year term (1946) — on the Security Council, while Brazil was elected for three full two-year terms, and Colombia served two full terms. Superficially one would be inclined to conclude that Mexico was being punished by the United States for its independence and Brazil and Colombia rewarded for their comparative conformance. However, interviews with delegates in a position to know have indicated that such was not the case. Several delegates told the writer that Mexico preferred to serve on such bodies as the Economic and Social Council and the Trusteeship Council, where it could do effective work in pursuance of policies cherished by it, than to flounder in what many of them considered to be the futility of the Security Council. This explanation was corroborated later by the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations (letter from Ambassador Rafael de la Colina to the writer, dated March 16, 1955). On the other hand, partly because of its conception of itself as a Big Power, Brazil desired to serve on the Security Council. The other Latin-American states were willing to concede to Brazil this service. (Interviews with Latin-American delegates, New York, November 22-27, 1954.) Such an explanation of Brazil's attitude is at least plausible in view of Brazil's earlier picture of itself in relation to the Council of the League of Nations.

21 Personal interview with a delegate from a Latin-American state, United Nations Headquarters, New York, Nov. 25, 1954.

22 Personal interview with the chief delegate from a Latin-American state, New York, Nov. 27, 1954.

23 Interview at United Nations Headquarters, New York, Nov. 27, 1954.

24 The same must be said of Guatemala. As indicated in footnote 19, the overthrow of the “pro-Soviet” Guatemalan government during the summer of 1954 did not produce significant changes in Guatemalan voting in the United Nations