A revised application of Ostrom's (Ostrom, 2007) Social-Ecological System (SES) framework to Hardin's ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin, G. (1968), Science, 162(3859): 1243–1248) demonstrates that its institutional structure is more complex than either Hardin or Ostrom had imagined. The ‘tragedy’ arises from several interacting resources and institutions. If the grass on the pasture was not subject to appropriation, the cattle were not privately owned, or property- and contract-enforcement institutions supporting market exchange were absent, then the ‘tragedy of the commons’ would not have arisen regardless of the open-access pasture. This paper highlights the utility of the SES framework and the care required to apply it precisely to specific social-ecological situations.

Little is known of why institutional transfers have been largely disappointing. Berkowitz et al. (2001) have argued that because of what they call the transplant effect, imported law lacks effectiveness unless there is an initial level of familiarity or the imported law is successfully adapted to local legal norms. Yet, history shows that institutional transfers are possible: Why have some countries been more successful than others in importing foreign institutions? The paper introduces a framework for the analysis of the transplant effect, which is based on institutional economics. In the second part, we investigate the case of Borno State in northeastern Nigerian where institutions transferred during colonial rule and upon independence have been largely ineffective. In the case of Borno, the lack of a European educated bureaucratic class, low commitment of the political leadership, generally low levels of education and urbanization contributed to the low effectiveness of imported institutions.

This paper adds to the growing empirical evidence on the importance of habits in governing human behavior, and sheds new light on individual inertia in relation to transportation behavior. An enriched perspective rooted in Veblenian evolutionary economics (VEE) is used to construct a theoretical framework in order to analyze the processes at play in the formation and reinforcement of habits. The empirical study explores more specifically the synchronic processes strengthening the car-using habit. In addition to underlining the shortcomings of a ‘decision theory’ perspective to address urban transportation behaviors, we find that synchronic habits can have a significant effect on behavioral inertia. Our results suggest the existence of positive feedback between the development of synchronic habits, qualitative perceptions of driving times, and reinforcement of the car-using habit. The paper points out also that the diachronic dimension of habits would constitute another promising domain for further research on behavioral inertia in transportation.

The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between economic growth and civil liberty across the globe in the long run. To fulfill this aim, we use an unbalanced panel of 149 countries for the period 1850–2010 with data on gross domestic product (GDP) from Maddison, and data on civil liberties from Polity IV. The dynamics of both variables are investigated. Once country and time effects are accounted for in a dynamic panel data model, our results show that movements toward higher levels of civil liberty are associated with higher economic growth rates. Therefore, we find that civil liberties are a relevant factor to explain economic growth. We perform some sensitivity tests that confirm the robustness of our results.

Do those who prefer economic freedom behave differently than those who prefer government intervention? Experiments of the Dictator and Trust games are studied. A survey elicits preference for private solutions to potential market failures. Trust and reciprocation are highest for those who score both high and low on the assessment. In the Dictator Game, there is a strong inverse relationship between one's preference for economic freedom and giving. Thus, the results can be interpreted as those with a strong preference for government intervention altruistically give, while those with a preference for economic freedom give primarily in response to wealth-generating investments.

People have rights to the degree that they are willing to claim them and are able to enforce them, either themselves or through a third-party enforcer. This economic theory of rights is based on the rights people actually do have and are able to exercise, not the rights they should have based on some normative criteria. Natural rights theories and contractual rights theories are examined and found to be ambiguous as to the actual rights they imply. Furthermore, there is no assurance that people will actually be able to exercise any natural rights or agreed-upon rights. People's actual ability to claim and enforce rights is based on the economic and political power they have, which in turn is based on their ability to provide benefits to others in exchange for others respecting the claimed rights, and in some cases being willing to use force to make others respect them.

Gas sector liberalization is based on opening networks to different players, so they become common pool resources. Different players using the same resources can give rise to “commons’ dilemmas”. To avoid them, rules must be established to constrain players’ use of the network. We build on the concept of common's pool resources to analyze the logic for and consequences of different institutional settings governing the use of gas pipelines. We show that rules based on regulation imply ex ante decisions that preclude players to choose the preferred output. This limitation may be removed by rules designed by market players. We also show that the mechanism to define the rules is based on the definition of network use property rights. The practical implications of our approach are stressed by comparing the US mechanism (negotiated rules) and the EU mechanism (regulated rules).