From the legal point of view, ‘person’ is not co-extensive with ‘human being’. Nor is it synonymous with ‘rational being’ or ‘responsible subject’. Much of the confusion surrounding the issue of the firm's legal personality is due to the tendency to address the matter with only these, all too often conflated, definitions of personhood in mind. On the contrary, when the term ‘person’ is defined in line with its original meaning as ‘mask’ worn in the legal drama, it is easy to see that it is only the capacity to attract legal relations that defines the legal person. This definition, that avoids the undesirable emotional associations and equivocations that often plague the debate, is important for a legally grounded view of the firm.

This paper is an analysis of the role reputation plays in the Deep Web using data from the Internet black-market site, The Silk Road. This encrypted online marketplace employed cryptocurrency and functioned over the Tor network. Utilizing a modeling technique, informed by trade auction theory, we investigate the effect of seller reputation. Analysis of the seller's reputation gives us insights into the factors that determine the prices of goods and services in this black marketplace. Data on cannabis listings is parsed from the Silk Road website and covers an 11-month time period, from November 2013 to October 2014. This data demonstrates that reputation acts as a sufficient self-enforcement mechanism to allow transactions. These findings exemplify the robustness of spontaneous order with respect to the Deep Web as an emergent marketplace.

Externalities are an important concept in economic theories of market failure, aiming to justify state regulation of the economy. This paper explores the concept of externalities from a philosophical perspective. It criticizes the utilitarian nature of economic analyses of externalities, showing how they cannot take into account values like freedom and justice. It then develops the analogy between the concept of externalities and the ‘harm principle’ in political philosophy. It argues that the harm principle points to the need for a theory of basic interests to judge when a harm is imposed. Similarly, externality analyses should use such a theory of basic interests as the basis for judgments about legitimate state intervention. This proposal is defended against objections, and illustrated with a case study of the US Supreme Court's ruling on the Affordable Care Act, which shows how the judicial reasoning implicitly interprets externalities in terms of basic interests.

This essay explores the trade-off between strong and weak intellectual property rights inside firms with reference to the importance of job termination. The probability of job termination has an effect on the relative profitability of different intellectual property rights regimes. Weak intellectual property rights may make it more attractive for skilled workers to join the firm, which will increase its profits while employing workers. However, when a job match is terminated the firm is left with the ownership of intellectual property only under a strong intellectual property rights regime. Based on the institutional complementarities approach we develop a simple model that analyses this trade-off, in which multiple organisational equilibria exist. We show that when intellectual property rights are taken into account, expectations such as increase in the skill and knowledge content of work are not inevitable in the knowledge economy.

Legal scholars, economists and other social scientist often refer to the idea that countries can be classified into a number of ‘legal families’ or ‘legal origins’. Yet, this research is unsatisfactory as regards the actual classifications of the legal systems of the world. It is the aim of this paper to fill this gap and to develop a more robust taxonomy of legal systems. This taxonomy is based on a new dataset of 156 countries that is subsequently analysed with tools of network analysis. Applying cluster optimisation, this paper finds that the world's legal systems can be divided into four clusters. It displays those clusters in a map, akin to the Inglehart–Welzel cultural map. It is suggested that those findings have important implications, not only for our understanding of the legal world, but also for the feasibility of legal transplants and harmonisation.

Can foreign aid help free the press? Aid may boost press freedom by incentivizing government to reduce media regulations and provide financial support for infrastructure. Alternatively, foreign aid may prevent press freedom by expanding the role of the state and promoting government over private enterprises. We contend that the magnitude of foreign aid's influence is conditional on the existence of democratic checks. Using panel data from 1994 to 2010, we find evidence suggesting that aid significantly increases press freedom in democracies but insignificantly relates to press freedom in autocracies. Collectively, the results suggest that a standard deviation increase in aid to a country at the mean level of democracy increases press freedom by approximately a 1/20th standard deviation. Overall, the findings suggest that donors should be cautious as most aid recipients are not democratic and aid leads to only relatively small marginal improvements in press freedom.

Several studies link development to institutions transplanted by European colonizers and here we extend this line of research to Asia. Japan imposed its system of well-defined property rights on some of its Asian colonies. In 1939, Japan began to register private land in its island colonies, an effort that was completed in Palau but interrupted elsewhere by World War II. Within Micronesia, robust economic development followed only in Palau where individual property rights were well defined. We show that well-defined property rights in Korea and Taiwan secured land taxation and enabled farmers to obtain bank loans for irrigation systems. Considering Japanese colonies, we use the presence or absence of a land survey as an instrument to identify the causal impact of new institutions. Our estimates show that property-defining institutions were important for economic development, results that are confirmed when using a similar approach with British Colonies in Asia.

In developing countries, lack of formal contract enforcement mechanisms is compensated by informal governance enforced through trust, kinship, reputation, etc. This paper focuses on one such setting in India's urban informal economy: the ‘day labour’ market for casual labour. We survey seven such markets in Navi Mumbai (a city on the outskirts of Mumbai), and find considerable incidence of contract enforcement problems in the form of employers reneging on wage payments to labourers. We find that payments to labourers with access to social networks and a record of work done are less likely to be reneged. Further, consistent with the literature on the limits of informal enforcement, we find that labourers in large markets, with greater linguistic and caste-based diversity, are more likely to be reneged. We argue that interventions aimed at facilitating access to formal mechanisms might help overcome some of the limitations with informal enforcement.

The Chettiar banking system evolved and functioned in the absence of a government sponsored central bank in 19th-century India. I find that the underlying common social institution of caste was crucial for the workings of the banking system and effectively acted as a club. Exclusion was achieved by restricting membership by birth and the practice of endogamy. These mechanisms created the necessary incentives to provide meaningful rules as well as their enforcement. I describe and analyze the privately provided self-regulatory mechanisms of clearinghouses, inter-bank lending and information sharing. The Chettiar banking system thus adds to existing instances of self-regulated banking as well as points to the economic underpinnings of caste as an institution.

We assess informal institutions of Protestants and Catholics by investigating their economic resilience in a natural experiment. The First World War constitutes an exogenous shock to living standards since the duration and intensity of the war exceeded all expectations. We assess the ability of Protestant and Catholic communities to cope with increasing food prices and wartime black markets. Literature based on Weber (1904, 1905) suggests that Protestants must be more resilient than their Catholic peers. Using individual height data on some 2,800 Germans to assess levels of malnutrition during the war, we find that living standards for both Protestants and Catholics declined; however, the decrease of Catholics’ height was disproportionately large. Our empirical analysis finds a large statistically significant difference between Protestants and Catholics for the 1915–19 birth cohort, and we argue that this height gap cannot be attributed to socioeconomic background and fertility alone.

Both political and economic institutions matter for economic growth and development, and are indissolubly connected: sustained economic growth requires far-reaching opening up of the economy and polity to wide participation. This review essay draws on three books which share this view of institutions, to develop an argument on which institutions matter most, and how and why they change. Like them, it uses history as laboratory. North et al. (2009) in Violence and Social Orders focus on Britain, France and the United States, in which change was generally progressive, to study such change from the medieval to the modern period. Jan van Zanden in The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution looks at Europe, 1000–1800, in particular the Netherlands and England, finding regressive as well as progressive change. Acemoglu and Robinson also examine both directions of change, in Why Nations Fail: they range widely in space, but little before the 16th century. All three offer powerful tools of analysis. All have implications for policy-makers in advanced societies who wish to promote the development of ‘inclusive’ institutions elsewhere. Two striking surprises emerge, and one prime mover – an institution with particular power to change others – the medieval Catholic church.