Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-94fs2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T05:39:49.020Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Trust in judicial institutions: an empirical approach

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2012

LUDIVINE ROUSSEY  and
BRUNO DEFFAINS
LUDIVINE ROUSSEY*
Affiliation:
EconomiX, University Paris Ouest Nanterre La Défense, 92000 Nanterre, France
BRUNO DEFFAINS*
Affiliation:
Department of Law and Economics, Sorbonne University, Paris, France, and European Business School, Wiesbaden, Germany
*
*Email: [email protected]
**Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

This paper investigates the relationship between judicial resources and individuals’ trust in the justice system. We argue that the justice budget is likely to have a positive and significant impact on individuals’ trust in justice, thanks to its role as a signal when individuals face uncertainty regarding the judicial environment. We test this hypothesis empirically using three different budget-related variables: the justice budget per incoming case, the number of magistrates and the intensity of legal aid. Across our three regressions, we find a positive and significant correlation between judicial resources and individuals’ declared trust in the justice system. This positive relationship is robust to the introduction of socio-demographic, cultural, institutional and economic control variables. We finally offer empirical support to the intuition that the effect of the justice budget on trust in justice is likely to be greater when individuals are more satisfied with the level of democracy in their country.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , September 2012 , pp. 351 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2012

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The authors would like to thank the members of the CEPEJ working group on the evaluation of judicial systems for kindly providing data and fruitful interactions. We are grateful to Eve Caroli for her very constructive comments. We also thank Eshien Chong for his enthusiastic help and Henri Fraisse, Céline Bignebat, Claudine Desrieux, Claude Parthenay, Massimo D'Antoni and three anonymous referees of the journal for their valuable suggestions. Of course, all errors remain ours.

References

Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2001), ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91 (5): 1369–1401.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., and Robinson, J. A. (2005), ‘Institutions as a Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth’, in Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. N. (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, vol. 1A, Amsterdam: Elsevier, 386–472.Google Scholar
Aghion, P., Algan, Y., Cahuc, P., and Shleifer, A. (2010), ‘Regulation and Distrust’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125 (3): 1051–1099.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bargues, C. and Ferey, S. (2002), ‘Les référents de l'image publique de la justice’, In Breen, E. (ed.), Evaluer la justice, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Bisin, A., Topa, G., and Verdier, T. (2004), ‘Cooperation as a Transmitted Cultural Trait’, Rationality and Society, 16 (4): 477–507.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2000), ‘A Model of Cultural Transmission, Voting and Political Ideology’, European Journal of Political Economy, 16 (1): 5–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bisin, A. and Verdier, T. (2001), ‘The Economics of Cultural Transmission and the Dynamics of Preferences’, Journal of Economic Theory, 97: 289–319.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dari-Mattiacci, G. and Deffains, B. (2007), ‘Uncertainty of Law and the Legal Process’, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 163 (4): 627–656.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dari-Mattiacci, G., Deffains, B., and Lovat, B. (2011), ‘The Dynamic of the Legal System’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 79 (1–2): 95–107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Deffains, B. and Roussey, L. (forthcoming), ‘The Multiplier of Public Expenditure on Justice: The Case of Rental Litigation’, Review of Law and Economics.Google Scholar
Denzau, A. T. and North, D. C. (1994), ‘Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Institutions’, Kyklos, 47 (1): 3–31.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Djankov, S., Hart, O., McLiesh, C., and Shleifer, A. (2008), ‘Debt Enforcement Around the World’, Journal of Political Economy, 116 (6): 1105–1149.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2003), ‘Courts’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118 (2): 453–517.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (2004), European Judicial Systems 2002: Facts and Figures on the Basis of a Survey Conducted in 40 State Members of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.Google Scholar
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (2006), European Judicial Systems: Edition 2006 (2004 Data), Strasbourg: Council of Europe.Google Scholar
European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) (2008), European Judicial Systems: Edition 2008 (Data 2006): Efficiency and Quality of Justice, Strasbourg: Council of Europe.Google Scholar
European Values Study (EVS) (2010a), European Values Study 2008, 4th wave, Integrated Dataset. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4800 Data File Version 2.0.0 (2010-11-30), doi:10.4232/1.10188, (available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.4232/1.10188).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
European Values Study (EVS), GESIS (2010b), EVS 2008 Method Report. GESIS-Technical Reports 2010/17, (available at: http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/)Google Scholar
François, B. (2003), ‘Les justiciables et la justice à travers les sondages d'opinion’, in Cadiet, L. and Richier, L. (eds.), Réforme de la justice, réforme de l'Etat, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.Google Scholar
Friedman, D. and Wittman, D. (2007), ‘Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 23 (1): 98–126.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Glaeser, E. L. and Shleifer, A. (2004), ‘Do Institutions Cause Growth?’, Journal of Economic Growth, 9 (3): 271–303.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2004), ‘The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development’, American Economic Review, 94 (3): 526–556.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., and Zingales, L. (2006), ‘Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20 (2): 23–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hadfield, G. (2008), ‘The Levers of Legal Design: Institutional Determinants of the Quality of Law’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 36 (1), 43–73.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hadfield, G. (forthcoming), ‘The Dynamic Quality of Law: The Role of Judicial Incentives and Legal Human Capital in the Adaptation of Law’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.Google Scholar
Hayek, F. A. (1952), The Sensory Order, London: Routledge & Paul Kegan.Google Scholar
Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995), ‘Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures’, Economics and Politics, 7 (3): 207–227.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2006), ‘What Works in Securities Laws?’, Journal of Finance, 61 (1): 1–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2008), ‘The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins’, Journal of Economic Literature, 46 (2): 285–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997), ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 52 (3): 1131–1150.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1998), ‘Law and Finance’, Journal of Political Economy, 106 (6): 1113–1155.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
North, D. C. (2005), Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton: Princeton University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pham, C. (2002), ‘La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, fil directeur pour la recherche de normes de qualité de la justice’, in Breen, E. (ed.), Evaluer la justice, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 197–219.Google Scholar
Priest, G. L. and Klein, B. (1984), ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, Journal of Legal Studies, 13 (1): 1–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Putnam, R. (1993), Making Democracy Work, Princeton: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Tabellini, G. (2008), ‘The Scope of Cooperation: Values and Incentives’, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (3): 905–950.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tabellini, G. (2010), ‘Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe’, Journal of the European Economic Association, 8 (4): 677–716.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Zak, P. J. and Knack, S. (2001), ‘Trust and Growth’, Economic Journal, 111 (470): 295–321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar