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Interactive intentionality and norm formation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2018

Pietro Guarnieri
Pietro Guarnieri*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Management, University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The paper aims at complementing Searle's social ontology with an epistemology capable of illustrating institution formation. To this purpose, I discuss Searle's conception of constitutive rules and show that it requires the specifications of normative powers and purposes identifying status functions to be taken as given. However, such specifications arise from underlying normative commitments that may be various and possibly conflicting. Hence, in order to account for the formation of institutions, it is necessary to understand how status function declarations may emerge from alternative normative commitments. I make the hypothesis of “interactive intentionality,” as an interactive and deliberative mode of practical reasoning, to describe the processes of convergence on definite constitutive rules. These processes show how interactive intentionality may frame both commitment and enforcement, thus providing some insights to make rule-based and equilibrium-based accounts of institutions epistemologically commensurable.

Keywords

Status functionsconstitutive rulesdeliberationpractical reason
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 4 , August 2019 , pp. 579 - 593
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2018 

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