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Institutions really don't matter for development? A response to Chang

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2011

PHILIP KEEFER
PHILIP KEEFER*
Affiliation:
Development Research Group, The World Bank, Washington, DC, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, argues that the institutions and development literature is theoretically and empirically flawed, trapped by a failure to account for the contextual factors that influence the institutions that drive development. These judgments emerge from a lack of appreciation of the methodological standards of that literature and, especially, from a description of the institutions and development literature that few contributors to it would recognize. At the same time, despite the emphasis he gives to contextual factors, his critique ignores the role of politicians and the progress made in the institutions literature in understanding their incentives to pursue development.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 2011 , pp. 543 - 547
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2011

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