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Elinor Ostrom and the robust political economy of common-pool resources

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 August 2013

MARK PENNINGTON
MARK PENNINGTON*
Affiliation:
Political Economy, King's College, University of London, London, UK
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

This paper situates Elinor Ostrom's work on common-pool resource management in the tradition of ‘robust political economy’. Ostrom's analysis of bottom-up governance institutions is shown to recognise that such arrangements though imperfect are better placed to cope with bounded rationality and incentive compatibility problems in the management of smaller- and medium-scale common-pool resources. While Ostrom's work provides an analytical framework to explain the success of these arrangements, however, the paper argues that it lacks a robust account of when, if ever, top-down governance arrangements are to be preferred.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 4: Elinor Ostrom Memorial Issue , December 2013 , pp. 449 - 468
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2013 

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