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Economic institutions: explanations for conformity and room for deviation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 October 2012

DAVID DEQUECH
DAVID DEQUECH*
Affiliation:
Institute of Economics, University of Campinas, São Paulo, Brazil
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Why do economic agents conform with existing institutions? Drawing on economics and organizational institutionalism, this article identifies existing explanations, extends or refines some of them, suggests new ones, classifies these various explanations, and integrates them into an organized framework. One set of explanations focuses on conformity out of habit. The other refers to more conscious thought and behavior and considers coordination and increasing returns to adoption, social sanctions, informational differences, uncertainty, legitimacy, naturality, and lack of power/resources to deviate.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 81 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2012

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