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The Art and Science of Economic Explanation: Introduction to the Special Issue in Honor of Yoram Barzel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 November 2019

Rosolino A. Candela  and
Ennio E. Piano
Rosolino A. Candela*
Affiliation:
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Buchanan Hall D119, Fairfax, VA22030, USA.
Ennio E. Piano
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Finance, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN37132USA. Email: [email protected]
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected].
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Abstract

This introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Yoram Barzel provides an overview of his scholarship and a summary of the contributions to this special issue. Each contribution advances or elaborates upon major themes in Barzel's theoretical and applied work on property rights, transaction costs, and political economy. The contributions fall into three categories: an examination of the foundations and implications of the ‘Barzelian’ method for social scientific analysis; Barzel's economics of property rights and transaction costs to historical case studies; and advances to Barzel's theory of the state, which includes an analysis of the origins of democracy and the rule of law.

Keywords

H11K11N4P48Yoram BarzelProperty rightsTransaction costsPolitical Economy
Type
Introduction
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 16 , Special Issue 2: Honour of Yoram Barzel , April 2020 , pp. 119 - 126
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019

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