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Re-feudalizing democracy: an approach to authoritarian populism taken from institutional economics
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 June 2019
Abstract
Research on populism has gained importance in the light of the recent global populist surge. Political scientists have become concerned with the problem of authoritarian populism, examining how illiberal, anti-pluralist populist parties have degraded liberal democracies. Economic research on recent forms of populism, although also growing, lack a comprehensive conceptual approach. This paper reduces this gap by conceptualizing authoritarian populism in terms of political transaction costs, arguing that its primary function is to vertically integrate political exchange under conditions of general franchise. If successful, authoritarian populist regimes internalize a large share of political transaction costs inherent in decentralized democratic political exchange. This entails a degraded version of democracy, eliminating a significant part of substantial electoral choice. Through weakening impersonal collective political contracting, authoritarian populists bring back private political contracting as a dominant political coordination mechanism, effectively re-feudalizing democracy.
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- Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2019
Footnotes
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the departmental seminar of Central European University's Department of Political Science (Budapest) in 2017 and at the Kornai'90 conference at Corvinus University of Budapest in 2018. Comments by seminar and conference participants, especially by András Bozóki, Zsolt Enyedi, Geoffrey Hodgson and Andrea Szalavetz, are gratefully acknowledged. Anikó Bakonyi, Rogers Brubaker, György Petőcz, András Simonovits and the anonymous reviewers also provided a useful critique, and helped improve the text.
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