Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-ndw9j Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-18T22:56:50.270Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Judicial versus ‘natural’ selection of legal rules with an application to accident law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 October 2011

THOMAS J. MICELI
THOMAS J. MICELI*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

Law and economics scholars argue that the common law evolves toward efficiency. Invisible-hand theories suggest that the law is primarily driven by a selection process whereby inefficient laws are litigated more frequently than efficient laws, and hence are more likely to be overturned. However, the preferences of judges also necessarily affect legal change. This paper models the interaction of these two forces to evaluate the efficiency claim, and then applies the conclusions to the evolution of accident law in the United States beginning in the 19th century. Specifically, it attributes the persistence of negligence to its efficiency properties, despite its having been initially selected by judges for a different reason. The paper relates legal evolution to biological evolution by employing the concepts of natural and artificial selection, and the more recent concept of exaptation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , June 2012 , pp. 143 - 159
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adelstein, R. (1981), ‘Institutional Function and Evolution in the Criminal Process’, Northwestern University Law Review, 76: 1–99.Google Scholar
Brown, J. P. (1973), ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’, Journal of Legal Studies, 2 (2): 323–349.Google Scholar
Commons, J. R. (1924), Legal Foundations of Capitalism, New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Cooter, R. and Kornhauser, L. (1980), ‘Can Litigation Improve the Law Without the Help of Judges?’, Journal of Legal Studies, 9 (1): 139–163.Google Scholar
Cooter, R. and Rubinfeld, D. (1989), ‘An Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, Journal of Economic Literature, 27 (3): 1067–1097.Google Scholar
Darwin, C. (1936 [1872]), The Origin of Species, New York: Modern Library.Google Scholar
Epstein, R. (1980), Modern Products Liability Law, Westport, CT: Quorum Books.Google Scholar
Gennaioli, N. and Shleifer, A. (2007)a, ‘The Evolution of Common Law’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 (1): 43–68.Google Scholar
Gennaioli, N. and Shleifer, A. (2007)b, ‘Overruling and Instability of Law’, Journal of Comparative Economics, 35 (2): 309–328.Google Scholar
Glaeser, E. and Shleifer, A. (2003), ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State’, Journal of Economic Literature, 41 (2): 401–425.Google Scholar
Goodman, J. C. (1978), ‘An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, 7 (2): 393–406.Google Scholar
Gould, S. J. (2002), The Structure of Evolutionary Theory, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.Google Scholar
Gould, S. J. and Vrba, E. S. (1982), ‘Exaptation – a Missing Term in the Science of Form’, Paleobiology, 8 (1): 4–15.Google Scholar
Hadfield, G. K. (1992), ‘Bias in the Evolution of Legal Rules’, Georgetown Law Journal, 80 (3): 583–616.Google Scholar
Hodgson, G. M. (2003), ‘John R. Commons and the Foundations of Institutional Economics’, Journal of Economic Issues, 37 (3): 547–576.Google Scholar
Holmes, O. W. (1963 [1881]), The Common Law, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company.Google Scholar
Horwitz, M. (1992a), The Transformation of American Law, 1780–1860, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Horwitz, M. (1992b), The Transformation of American Law, 1870–1960, New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Keeton, W. P., Dobbs, D. B., Keeton, R. E., and Owen, D. G. (1984), Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 5th edn, St Paul, MN: West Publishing Company.Google Scholar
Landes, W. M. (1971), ‘An Economic Analysis of the Courts’, Journal of Law and Economics, 14 (1): 61–107.Google Scholar
Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1976), ‘Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2): 249–307.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1985), ‘A Positive Economic Theory of Products Liability’, Journal of Legal Studies, 14 (3): 535–567.Google Scholar
Landes, W. M. and Posner, R. A. (1987), The Economic Structure of Tort Law, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miceli, T. J. (2009), ‘Legal Change: Selective Litigation, Judicial Bias, and Precedent’, Journal of Legal Studies, 38 (1): 157–168.Google Scholar
Miceli, T. J. (2010), ‘Legal Change and the Social Value of Lawsuits’, International Review of Law and Economics, 30 (3): 203–208.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Miceli, T. J. and Cosgel, M. M. (1994), ‘Reputation and Judicial Decision-Making’, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 23 (1): 31–51.Google Scholar
Posner, R. (1972), ‘A Theory of Negligence’, Journal of Legal Studies, 1 (1): 29–96.Google Scholar
Posner, R. (1983), The Economics of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Posner, R. (2003), Economic Analysis of Law, 6th edn, New York: Aspen Law and Business.Google Scholar
Priest, G. L. (1977), ‘The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules’, Journal of Legal Studies, 6 (1): 65–82.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Priest, G. L. (1988), ‘Products Liability Law and the Accident Rate’, in Litan, R. and Winston, C. (eds.), Litigation: Perspectives and Policy, Washington, DC: Brookings.Google Scholar
Rubin, P. H. (1977), ‘Why is the Common Law Efficient?’, Journal of Legal Studies, 6 (1): 51–63.Google Scholar
Shavell, S. M. (2004), Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Terrebonne, R. P. (1981), ‘A Strictly Evolutionary Model of Common Law’, Journal of Legal Studies, 10 (2): 397–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Viscusi, W. K. (1991), Reforming Products Liability, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Whitman, D. G. (2000), ‘Evolution of the Common Law and the Emergence of Compromise’, Journal of Legal Studies, 29 (2): 753–781.CrossRefGoogle Scholar