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Introduction to the symposium on the empirics of judicial institutions

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 September 2018

ALAIN MARCIANO  and
GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO
ALAIN MARCIANO
Affiliation:
MRE and University of Montpellier, Montpellier, France
GIOVANNI B. RAMELLO*
Affiliation:
Università del Piemonte Orientale, Alessandria, Italy
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The article provides an overview on the emergence of dispute resolution institutions in society and market, their pivotal role and their impact on the human activities. It introduces then recent researches conducted by a pool of scholars in order to advance the understanding of modern judicial institutions which represent the aims of this journal issue.

Type
Symposium on the Empirics of Judicial Institutions
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 1 , February 2019 , pp. 73 - 80
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2018 

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