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Comparing theories of institutional change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 August 2009

CHRISTOPHER KINGSTON  and
GONZALO CABALLERO
CHRISTOPHER KINGSTON*
Affiliation:
Amherst College, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA
GONZALO CABALLERO
Affiliation:
University of Vigo, Vigo, Spain
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article compares a variety of theoretical approaches to conceptualizing institutional change. Our goal is neither to discover the ‘best’ theory, nor to attempt to build a new one. Rather, we wish to compare how the theories we consider agree or differ with respect to the causes, process, and outcomes of institutional change. Some of the theories we discuss emphasize the deliberate creation of institutions through the political process, while others emphasize the spontaneous emergence of institutions through evolutionary processes. Still others combine elements of evolution and design. We differentiate a variety of approaches to conceptualizing the interaction between formal and informal rules. We discuss recent theories based on the ‘Equilibrium View’ of institutions, and theories emphasizing the role of habit, learning, and bounded rationality. We also consider theoretical explanations for institutional inertia and path-dependence.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , August 2009 , pp. 151 - 180
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2009

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