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Challenges and growth: the development of the interdisciplinary field of institutional analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 December 2007

ELINOR OSTROM
ELINOR OSTROM*
Affiliation:
Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University; Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity, Arizona State University
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Abstract:

This article briefly describes some of the intellectual challenges during the last half-century to the traditional fields of economics and political science: the public choice approach, the tragedy of the commons debate, the ‘new’ institutional economics, and behavioral game theory. Then, the components of a basic institutional analysis framework are presented that provide a general method for analyzing public economies and diverse forms of collective action. Empirical research related to metropolitan public economies, common-pool resources, and behavioral game theory is summarized that has contributed to the field of institutional analysis. The last section concludes that the macro foundations of institutional analysis appear firmer than the micro foundations related to the model of the individual to be used and discusses this puzzle.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 3 , Issue 3 , December 2007 , pp. 239 - 264
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2007

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