¹ Socrates recurs to the question of the activities proper to different ages at 236C8–9, where he professes to fear Menexenus' ridicule ἄν σοι δὀξω πρεσβύτης ὣν ἔτι παίʒειν (in delivering Aspasia's speech). This remark bears a complex relation to Socrates' words at 234a–b. Menexenus, Socrates implies there, is too young to exercise authority over his elders; but this is not due to an as yet imperfect mastery of rhetoric, a pursuit which, as is suggested at 236c, is appropriate, if to any age, to Menexenus' rather than Socrates'. Rather, Menexenus is not yet fit to command because this would call for abilities other than a young man's skill in rhetoric.

² See Arist. Rhet. 1418a34–37 (= Diels-Kranz 82.B17) on Gorgias' practice: εἱ γἀρ Άχιλλέα λέγει Πηλέα ἐπαινεῖ, εἷτα Αỉακόν, εῑτα τὸν θεόν. See also Rhet. ad Al. 35, especially the remarks on inferring the merit of one generation from that of another: ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἄδηλον εῖναι πᾶσιν, ὄτι τούς ὲξ ẚγαθῶν γενομένους εỉκός ἐστι τοῖς προγόνοις ὁμοιοῦσθαι (1440b37–39); καὶ δῆλον, ὡς οῖ γε τούτων πρόγονοι σπουδαῑοί τινες ἧσαν. οὐ γἁρ εỉκὸς φαμῆναι τοὑς τοιοὑτους καλοὑς ἥ ἀγαθοὐς εῖναι ἐκ μοχθηρῶν προγεγονότας (1441a3–5); Arist. Rhet. 1367b30–32: τἀ δὲ κύκλῳ εỉς πἰστιν, οῖον εủγένεια καὶ παιδεία. εỈκὸς γὰρ ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὔτω τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἷναι. (Though see Rhet. ad Al. 1441a8–10 for a possible reversal of the τόπος.)

³ Méridier, L., in the Budé edition of the Menexenus (Paris 1949)Google Scholar, translates ἑπιμελητήν ss ‘un gardien’, and notes that Plato is appsrently ignoring the technical distinction between ἐπιμελητης and ἅρχων (83–4, n.7). I would suggest that this is a deliberate adaptation on Plato's part of a technical term, the better to suggest his own views on the nature of political authority and the qualifications necessary for it. Έπιμεληταῖς is used of the Guardians at Republic 424b4; and its uses in Plato tend generally to suggest expert care. See, e.g., Laws 766a5-b1 on the qualifications necessary for an ἐπιμελητήςconcerned with παίδων τροφή; and note Politicus 276, where ruling is agreed to be an instance of ἐπιμέλεια rather than τροφή.

⁴ Compare the use of the τόπος in the Charmides, Lysis and Meno. At Charmides 157cd—8b, Socrates' exploitation of it is complex. He begins, at 157d9-e4, by using the idea of inherited excellence to deflate Critias' exaggerated praise of Charmides—it is only natural that the boy should excel. The idea is given a new direction at 158a–b, however, in the contrast between the physical characteristics which Charmides can be seen to have inherited and the more important question of σωφροσύνη, which he cannot be seen to have inherited and which, it is suggested, is a matter not of inheritance but of personal responsibility. (Note the contrasting forms of address ῷ φίλε παῖ Γλαυκῶνος and ῷ φίλε χαρμίδη, contributing to this distinction between inherited characteristics and personal character.) In addition, the eulogy of Charmides' family is clearly ironic, and would be recognisable as such even were we not told that the family surpassed in τῇ λεγομέυῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ. Compare Meno 90a–b, where Anytus' personal inadequacy is underlined by Socrates' recommendation of him on the basis of his father's qualities (especially pointed in the context of Socrates' doubts as to the ability of fathers to transmit their excellence to their sons). Anthemion's qualities are themselves largely a matter of reputation (δοκῶν, 90a6); while the fact that the first characteristic mentioned is his wealth (90a2) hardly suggests serious praise. Socrates is thus able to exploit the τόπος not only to underline the importance of personal qualities and responsibility, but to comment on the values of those whom he affects to extol. Contrast Hippothales' uncritical use of praise of Lysis' ancestors at Lysis 205b–d, with Socrates' comments 205d–6b. Ctesippus mskes a criticism complementary to Socrates': not only does Hippothales concentrate upon Lysis' ancestors rather than the boy himself, but he hss nothing to say which is unique to himself, the encomiast, either (205b7–c2).

In the Menexenus, Socrates' use of the τόπος to call its implications into question is complemented, within Aspasia's speech itself, by the exhortation to rely on one's own ἀρετή rather than one's ancestors' reputation (247a–c), following the extreme praise of the ancestors in the preceding section.

⁵ Loraux, N., ‘Socrate contrepoison de l'oraison funèbre’, L'Antiquité Classique xliii (1974) 172–211CrossRefGoogle Scholar, notes that although only Socrates speaks, the funeral oration, and the rhetorical tradition which it represents, are in the position of an interlocutor (172); representation is equivalent to refutation. Compare the Euthydemus, where the representation of the two sophists is sufficient condemnation, with no need for elenctic refutation.

⁶ Clavaud, R., Le Ménexène de Platon et la rhétorique de son temps (Paris 1980)Google Scholar, argues that the characteristics and deficiencies illustrated in the Menexenus should be understood as those of rhetoric in general, not just of ἐπιτἁφιοι.

⁷ See the extended discussion of this characteristic of the funeral oration in Loraux, N., L'Invention d'Athènes: histoire de l'oration funèbre dans la ‘cite classique’ (Paris 1981)Google Scholar, hereafter Invention. Loraux discusses the funeral oration as a product of democracy, part of a ceremony designed to embody democratic principles, with a culogy of democracy as the heart around which it is organised (64), She recognises the importance of this for the Menexenus: ‘s'il choisi pour cible l'aoration funèbre, c'est que dans les épiraphoioi la cité se reconnaît telle qu'elle veut être [317]… c'est d'abord de politique qu'il est ici question [319]’.

Note how, in Thucydides, the choice of the orator to deliver the ἐπιταάφιος is made to mirror the working of democracy as described by Pericles: the choice falls on a speaker ὄς ἄυ γνώμῃ τε δοκῇ μὴ ἀξὐνετος εἷναι καὶ ἀξιὠσει προήκῃ (ii 34.6); cf. 37.1, especially κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀξίωσιν … εὐδοκιμεῖ.

⁸ See, e.g., Kahn, C. H., ‘Plato's funeral oration: the motive of the Menexenus’ C. Phil. lviii (1963) 220–34CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Berndt, T., De ironia Menexeni Platonici (Münster 1881) 3–4Google Scholar, for collections of parallels. In addition to parallels within the speech, note Socrates' identification, at 234C4, of one of the faults of ἐπιτάφοι—praise is given to a man otherwise φαῦλος, on the grounds of his death in battle. Of the extant funeral speeches, only that in Thucydides shares this admission with Plato (ii 42.3); contrast, e.g., the denial at Demosthenes lx 3 that the dead men's ἀνδρεία was their only virtue; also Gorgias' ἑπιτάφιος (Diels-Kranz 82.B6).

⁹ This view differs in emphasis from that of Kahn (n. 8), in taking the Peace of Antalcidas less as a major stimulus to the composition of the dialogue than as an example chosen to illustrate a more general concern.

¹⁰ Cf. Kahn (n. 8) 226: ‘the irony is designed to nudge the Athenian reader out of his complacent self-admiration, to put him in a more critical state of mind, by offering him a glimpse of Socratic ἀρετή; in other words, by asking him (indirectly) to consider for a moment what the true excellence is which really fits men to rule’.

¹¹ Compare the exhaustive knowledge of rhetorical terms shown by Socrates rather than Phaedrus at Phaedrus 266d–7e, 269a.

¹² Cf. Clavaud (n. 6) 110: ‘Mis dans la bouche d'un autre personnage, ses propos se remarqueraient moins. Dans la sienne—et précisément parce que nous le connaissons bien par ailleurs—ils étonnent par le contraste que nous établissons entre son caractère et ses paroles.’

¹³ This denial of responsibility, contrasting as it does with Socrates' usual demand that his interlocutors should state their own opinions, is among the reasons for doubting interpretations which represent the speech as a serious Platonic idealisation of Athens. See Loraux (n. 5) 200 on its implications.

The contrast with Socrates' usual procedure is again brought to our attention at 236d1–2, in his consenting to repeat the speech to Menexenus ἐπειδή γε μόνω ἐσμἐν, which recalls the usual Socratic insistence on individual argument but is here applied to the delivery of a supposedly public speech.

¹⁴ Clavaud (n. 6) 109 notes that the effect of distancing is heightened by Socrates' change of tone on resuming the conversation at the end of the speech.

¹⁵ Stern, H. S., ‘Plato's funeral oration’, The New Scholasticism xlviii (1974) 503–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar, notes the appropriateness of Aspasia as the author of a speech illustrating Plato's view of rhetoric as an instrument of seduction and κολακεία (506); cf. Berndt (n. 8) 20.

Given the concern with the requirements for a state's well-being which I am claiming is central to the Menexenus, it is significant that of the two, it is Diotima who is said to have secured at least a postponement of disaster for Athens.

¹⁶ Loraux Invention ch. 5 discusses the agonistic character of ἐπιτάφιοι for which see especially Lysias ii 2.

¹⁷ The passivity of the pupils in Gorgianic teaching is suggested by the formulation of Gorgias 449e4–5, λέγειν γε ποιεῑ δυνατούς. The scholiast, glossing this as ἀντί τοῦ διδάσκειν δύναται, offers a version from which, in contrast, the suggestion of passivity is absent.

¹⁸ Kennedy, G., The art of persuasion in Greece (Princeton 1963) 161Google Scholar, compares the speech to ‘the common type of the sophistic specimen speech’. This comparison, however, with its implications as to the manner of teaching and thought involved, would seem to cast doubt on his theory that the speech is presented as an ideal model. (Kennedy supposes that Plato need not object to the unscientific teaching of rhetoric given that he ‘regards oratory as a knack rather than an art’; but this character of rhetoric is used as a reproach against it in the Gorgias, and the methods of teaching which it implies are thereby discredited.)

On the implications of Socrates' memorising Aspasia's speech, compare Loraux (n. 5) 200, Clavaud (n. 6) ch. 4; and compare the play on Phaedrus' attempts to memorise Lysias' speech (Phaedrus 228).

¹⁹ Cf. Clavaud (n. 6); Berndt (n. 8).

²⁰ Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his criticism of the opening sentence (Demosthenes 24), ignores this effect double antithesis. His comment that the second section the sentence is unnecessary, however (1029.15), if directed against Aspasia rather than Plato, would capture the point that what is illustrated is a concern for form not guided by the necessities of content. (This charge is made against Plato himself at 1032.8–9.) Compare Dionysius' analysis of the antitheses at 236ei– 3–5 (Demosthenes 26); these are, significantly, given as examples of Plato's use of τὰ θεατρικὰ τὰ Γοργίεια (1033.6-8). Dionysius' criticisms, in other words, identify the faults which Plato illustrates, although supposing that they should be attributed in a straight-forward way to Plato rather than seeing them as committed deliberately and for the purpose of illustration.

On the form and style of speech, compare Méridier 3) 66–71; Clavaud (n. 6) ch. 7; Berndt (n. 8).

²¹ Compare Symposium 198–9, especially 198d8–e2, an equivalent juxtaposition of καλῶς ἐπαινεἵν with an allegation of indifference to truth. (In the context of the Symposium the ascription of beauty is of course especially ironic.) See also Rhet. ad. Al. 1425b37, the definition of encomium as προαιρέσεων καί πράξεων καί λόγων ἐνδόξων αύξησις καί μή προσηκόντων συνοικείωσις.

²² Cf. Loraux (n. 5) 174–5, 195–202.

²³ For detailed discussion of correspondences between the speech and the funeral speeches of Thucydides, Lysias, Demosthenes and Hyperides, and of the relation of these to the use of commonplaces in funeral orations, see Henderson, M. M., ‘Plato's Menexenus and the distortion of history’, Acta Classica xviii (1975) 25–46Google Scholar; Méridier (n. 3) 57–9; Clavaud (n. 6) 168–75. Ziolkowski, J. E., Thucydides and the tradition of funeral speeches at Athens (Salem, Arno Press 1981)Google Scholar, identifies thirtynine commonplaces of ἔπαινος, and compares the frequency of their occurrence in the different speeches (see the tables on pp. 95, 134–6). See also Arist. Rhet. 1396a12–14, Dionysius of Halicarnassus Demosthenes 28 (1039.20–1040.3), on stock themes in encomia of Athens, all of which occur in Aspasia's speech.

²⁴ Loraux Invention 469 n. 282 notes the significance for this pejorative tone of συγκολλᾶν (see σνγκολλῶσα, 236b6) as a term used in comedy. Muecke, F., ‘A portrait of the artist as a young woman’, CQ n.s. xxxii (1982) 41–55CrossRefGoogle Scholar, argues that comic use of craft metaphors applied to composition drew on the language of literary criticism (44–6); Plato's use of such language would in this case be the more pointed. With σνγκολλῶσα here may perhaps be compared Demosthenes lx 12, συνάψαι τὸν λόγον.

²⁵ Contrast Thucydides ii 36.4, where reluctance μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εỉδόσι is a reason to avoid expansive treatment of earlier history. Loraux (n. 5) 179 compares with the Menexenus the proportion of Lysias' Epitaphios assigned to earlier and more recent history, explaining this in terms of the ‘déplacement’ by which what is ostensibly praise of the dead men becomes praise of the city. See also the more extensive treatment of this idea in Invention, attributing the indifference of έπιτάφιοι to particular circumstances to their character as πολιτικοί λόγοι.

The exordium of Lysias' Epitaphios (ii 2) tends towards the impression that it is the same group of men 12) finds it necessary to explain that his praise of earlier generations does not spring from ἀπορία over what to say about the present war dead.

²⁶ Note the impression of generalised praise given by the repeated καί at 235a2–5.

²⁷ See Henderson (n. 23), Kahn (n. 8), Méridier (n. 3) 59–64, Clavaud (n. 6) ch. 5, for detailed analysis of the treatment and distortion of history.

²⁸ In support of the view that Plato is here again taking to extremes a feature of funeral speeches in general, compare Lysias ii 48 with Menexenus 242a; see also the generalising eulogistic passage replacing a more detailed narrative of the Peloponnesian War at 54–7. Compare also, perhaps, the emphasis on defence rather than aggression at Thucydides ii 36.4, in contrast with the starkness of ii 63.

²⁹ With the inclusion of the Egyptian campaign in the list of successes, contrast Thucydides ii 41.5, μνημεῑα κακῶν τε κἀγαθῶν. Pericles claims that Athenian failures as well as successes may be worthy of renown; Aspasia converts them into triumphs.

³⁰ This bears an ironic relation to the praise of self-sufficiency, advocated for individuals at 247a–c, 247e–8a. The self-sufficiency attributed to Athens and Athenians by Pericles (Thucydides ii 36.3, 41.4–2) is extended to the provision of their own defeat. Compare and contrast also Lysias' treatment of the theme of

³¹ Cf. Loraux Invention 140–1.

³² Cf. Kahn, C. H., ‘Drama and dialectic in Plato's Gorgias’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy i (1983) 95–5Google Scholar, on the inconsistent elements in popular morality exploited in the refutation of Polus.

³³ Contrast, e.g., Kahn (n. 8), Kennedy (n. 18), von Loewenclau, I., Der Platonische Menexenos (Stuttgart 1961)Google Scholar, Scholl, N., Der Platonische Menexenos (Rome 1959)Google Scholar. and, in a modified form, Thurow, R., Der Platonische Epitaphios (diss. Tübingen 1968)Google Scholar.

I doubt whether the distortion of history in the Menexenus can be seen as being of the same character as, g., the myth of the metals in the Republic, as such interpretations would require it to be. Socrates' remark at 235C4 seems an adequate reply to such ‘utopian’ interpretations: funeral speeches, he claims, give the impression that one is living in the Isles of the Blessed—until one remembers the truth. (Contrast Republic 519c1–6.)

³⁴ Cf. Henderson (n. 23) 34–5. See also Cogan, M., ‘Mytilene, Plataea and Corcyra: ideology and policy in Thucydidcs book three’, Phoenix xxxv (1981) 15–17Google Scholar, on the equation of άττικισμός with μηδισμός at Thucydides iii 64.5–65.1 and the development of this comparison—making it seem more likely that Plato could have expected his readers to recognise the parallel.

See also the treatment of Spartan hegemony at 244c–d, similarly suggesting a comparison discreditable to Athens. (Cf. Kahn [n. 8] 228, Henderson [n. 23] 44.)

³⁵ Cf. Henderson (n. 23) 34. For arguments to the effect that the Greeks regarded the ideas of freedom for oneself and domination of others as complementary rather than inconsistent, see Larsen, J. A. O., ‘Freedom and its obstacles in ancient Greece’, C. Phil., lvii (1962) 230–4CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Walbank, F. W., A historical commentary on Polybius i (Oxford 1957) 630–1Google Scholar, on v 106.5; de Romilly, J., Thucydide et I'impérialisme athénien (Paris 1947) 73Google Scholar. (Compare, e.g., Gorgias 452d6–7, αἵτιον ἃμα μέν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῑς τοῑς ἀνθρώποις, ἅμα δέ τοῦ ᾅλλων ἀρχεῖν) Avery, H. C., ‘Herodotus' picture of Cyrus’, A.J.P. xciii (1972) 529–46Google Scholar, argues that while Herodotus presents Persian freedom in this light, he portrays the Greeks as fighting for a freedom which does not imply rule over others; this might suggest some unease at the connection. Emphasis on the domination of others would in any case be more embarrassing for Athens in that Aspasia's speech presents her as guarding not only her own freedom but that of other Greeks (239b).

³⁶ A further consequence of the parallel between Athens and Persia would be increased irony at 241b5–6—Athens is self-defeating in putting an end to fear of superior naval power. (The idea of Athens as school of Greece is adapted here—see 240d5 διδάσκαλοι, e5 μαθηταί, 24ICI παιδευθῆναι; and cf. Kahn [n. 8] 233 n. 12, Scholl [N. 33] 45–6.)

³⁷ Lysias (ii. 8–9) mitigates the inconsistency by insisting that the earlier campaign was undertaken out of piety, not out of favour towards the Argives. See also his insistence (8, 14) that Athens had no previous quarrel either with Thebes or with Argos under Eurystheus, and could hope for no material gain from conflict with the latter.

³⁸ Cf. Bloedow, E. F., ‘Aspasia and the “mystery” of the Menexenus’, Wien. Stud., ix (1975) 43Google Scholar.

³⁹ Loraux (n. 5) 283–9 explores the relation between rhetoric and elenchus. The underlying opposition is neatly summarised in her account of Socrates' and Alcibiades' awakenings from the different spells cast upon them: ‘Les deux expériences s'achèvent l'une et l'autre par un difficile réveil. Mais ici la ressemblance s'inverse en opposition: Socrate se retrouve, Alcibiade se perd’ (186).

⁴⁰ Cf. Arist. Rhet. 1355b17–18, ἡ γάρ σοφιστικὴ οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει ἀλλ̕ έν τῇ προαιρέσει, also Metaph. 1004b17–26.

⁴¹ See G.Vlastos, ‘ΙΣΟΝΟΜΙΑ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΗ’, Platonic Studies (Princeton 1973) 196–201, for an analysis of these tendencies in the Periclean portrait of democracy and a comparison with the Menexenus. As Vlastos says (199), ‘[Plato] flaunts the word Pericles had held back, he says outright that the constitution … is an aristocracy.’ Loraux, Invention ch. 4, both analyses Pericles' treatment of the constitution and argues that praise of democracy in terms of aristocratic ideals was a feature of ἐπιτάφιοι as a genre.

⁴² Plato may also be exploiting a rhetorical tendency to redescribe a constitution according to the orator's immediate purpose. See Henderson (n. 23) 38 n. 55; and to his examples add, perhaps, κατ̕ ὀλιγαρχίαν ισόνομον at Thucydides iii 62.3. de Romilly, J., ‘Le classement des constitutions d'Hérodote jusqu' à Aristote’, R.E.C. lxxii 1959) 81–99Google Scholar, discusses the increasing difficulty of identifying a particular constitution as classifications become more complex (95–9); this would result in correspondingly greater scope for persuasive redescription.

⁴³ At Laws 701a2, ἀριστοκρατία is compared favourably with θεατροκρατία in the context of judging music; the uses at 68Id3, 72IC3, d7, are neutral—ἀριστοκρατία is used descriptively, or as the name of a currently recognised constitution. The uses of the word in this work thus confirm the importance of context in determining whether it conveys a favourable or unfavourable judgement.

⁴⁴ Cf. Vlastos (n. 41) 200 n. 133: ‘The irony in this passage has been misunderstood. The joke is on the Athenians—not because the δόξα of an electorate could never result in ἀριστοκρατία (else the joke would be also on the city of the Laws …), but because the δόξα of the Athenian ὅχλος could not.’ The remarks at Menexenus 233d and 236a are important in conveying this opinion of the Athenian ὅχλος within the dialogue itself.

⁴⁵ Here at least it cannot be objected, as with the use of the word ἀριστοκρατία, that Plato cannot be exploiting rhetorical practice, and a feature of funeral speeches in particular. See, e.g., Diels-Kranz 82.A 1.4–5, B5b, on the use of the theme in Gorgias' Epitaphios and Olympicus.

⁴⁶ But contrast Politicus 262–3, calling the absolute distinction between Greek and barbarian into question.

⁴⁷ See above on the elements of undercutting in the narrative. As a further example, note the adaptation at 242c3–4 of the traditional κοινῆ / ίδία contrast. Athenian behaviour is apparently constant, characterised by the opposition which is regularly applied to it; but here, in place of the usual contrast between the common safety of Greece and the individual Athenian efforts which secured it (see, e.g., Lysias ii 44), we see the shared victory over Persia contrasted with Athenian conquest of other Greeks.

⁴⁸ Cf. Kahn (n. 8) 227–8.

⁴⁹ This need not exclude the criticism of Spartan readiness to adopt a policy which resulted in her finding herself in a position corresponding to the earlier fate of Persia, any more than the ironic presentation, at 245b–e, of Athens' role in negotiations with Persia should conceal Plato's disapproval of the conduct of the other states. Plato concentrates on the failings of Athens; but this does not prevent him from conveying at the same time awareness and condemnation of other states' deficiencies.

⁵⁰ Cf. Lysias ii 67–8, where the apparent inconsistency in the formation of alliances becomes an instance of Athenian magnanimity.

⁵¹ Plut. Ages. 15 is explicit in commenting on and condemning the reversal; see also 16.4. Xen. H.G. iv ii.8 notes that on his return to Greece, Agesilaus took τήν αὐτἡν ὁδόν ἥνπερ βασιλεύς ὅτε ἐπί τήν Έλλάδα ἐστράτευεν.

⁵² See, e.g., Scholl (n. 33) 59 ff.; Stern (n. 15); Kahn (n. 8) 229. Thurow (n. 33) 54, 144 ff., sees the whole speech as dependent upon this section.

⁵³ Clavaud (n. 6) 209 remarks, ‘On peut même parler … d'une “transpositïon” inversée qui dégrade le platonisme en lui ôtant la rigueur de son raisonnement commonet son ascétisme moral …’.

⁵⁴ The instructions given at Menander περί ἐπιδεικτικῶν ii 9 (περι παραμυθίας) 414.2 flf. suggest the conventional character of some such reflections at least in later rhetorical tradition; it may be significant that they are introduced with the comment that some philosophising in such circumstances is οὐκ ἁπειρόκαλον.

Ziolkowski (n. 23) 138–63 discusses the common places of παραμυθία, giving evidence for the conventional character of the sentiments. See also Méridier (n.3) 71–3; Clavaud (n. 6) ch. 6.

⁵⁵ Scholl (n. 33) 63 compares this passage with Apology 29–30; but άρετή is not there opposed to ἐπιοτήμη, as he suggests, but rather associated with it.

⁵⁶ Compare the effect, in Eur. I.A., of the contrast between Iphigeneia's arguments at 1347 ff. and the representation of the situation at 334 ff., 511 ff.

⁵⁷ This turns to some extent on the interpretation of the words λόγους … πολιτικούς at 249e4. P. Friedländer, Plato ii (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1965) 218–20, suggests that a contrast is intended with the speech which Socrates has just delivered. Contrast, however, the presentation in Loraux Invention of έπιτάφιοι as the λόγοι πολιτικοί par excellence; see also Loraux (n. 5) 172–3; Thurow (n. 33) 7. Dionysius of Halicarnassus (Demosthenes 1027.6–7) calls the Menexenus κράτιοτος πάντων τῶν πολιτικῶν λόγων.

Socrates' promise to deliver further speeches composed by Aspasia gains an extra irony through its relation to his own habit of concluding a conversation with the comment that further enquiry is called for—see especially the end of the Laches.

⁵⁸ Cf. Eur. Suppl. 1143 ff. Contrast the care for his sons which Socrates requests at Apology 41c.

⁵⁹ I have profited constantly from comments on this paper by Dr C. B. R. Pelling and Dr R. B. Rutherford, for which I am deeply grateful.