¹ Successive versions of this paper were delivered to seminars at the Universities of Cambridge and of Keele. I would like to express my thanks to the chairman on each occasion (Prof. Keith Hopkins at Cambridge and Mr Richard Wallace at Keele) and to the other members of the seminars for the discussion which followed; to Dr Paul Cartledge, Dr Nick Fisher, Dr Mogens Hansen, Dr Paul Millett, Dr Robin Osborne, Prof. Peter Rhodes, Prof. Anthony Snodgrass, Prof. Gerhard Thür, and Mr Thomas Wiedemann, who sent me various additional suggestions, ideas and corrections; to Prof. Tony Bottoms, who supplied me with some very useful bibliographical advice on criminology, and who did his best to correct many of my misconceptions about the modern jury; and to the successive editors and the anonymous referees of JHS. None of the above, however, are to be blamed for any views or errors expressed in this paper.

The following modern works are referred to throughout this paper by author's name alone: Jones, A. H. M., Athenian democracy (Oxford 1957)Google Scholar; Markle, M. M., ‘Jury pay and assembly pay at Athens’, in Cartledge, P. A. & Harvey, F. D., eds., Crux: essays presented to G. E. M. de Ste. Croix on his 75th birthday (Exeter 1985) 265–97.Google Scholar

² Rolph, C. H., ed., The Trial of Lady Chatterley (London 1961) 16Google Scholar: a transcript of the trial with comments by the editor. Sir Allen Lane's private edition of this work contains also a report of the debate on the book held by the House of Lords on 14 December 1960 (see n. 10 below.)

³ Rolph (n. 2) 17.

⁴ It was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act of 1972 (Baldwin, J. & McConville, M., Jury trials [Oxford 1979] 94Google Scholar).

⁵ Devlin, Lord, Trial by jury (London 1956) 20.Google Scholar

⁶ Rolph (n. 2) 6.

⁷ Rolph (n. 2) 6.

⁸ The remark had ‘a visible—and risible—effect on the jury’, Rolph (n. 2) 17. Cf. also Rolph (n. 2) 203: when Gardiner cited the remark for the second time, the editor adds, ‘And the jury smiled’.

⁹ Rolph (n. 2) 195, 203.

¹⁰ Viscount Gage quoted a (suspiciously unnamed) peer who, on being asked whether he objected to his young daughter reading Lady Chatterley's Lover, replied that he had ‘no such objections, but he had the strongest objections to the book being read by his gamekeeper’ (Rolph [n. 2] 2064).

¹¹ For details, see Robertson, G., Obscenity: an account of censorship laws and their enforcement in England and Wales (London 1979) 299–300.Google Scholar

¹² Biographies of great advocates are common: two of the most notable are Campbell, J., F. E. Smith, first Earl of Birkenhead (London 1983)Google Scholar and Hyde, H. M., Carson: the life of Sir Edward Carson, Lord Carson of Duncairn (London 1953).Google Scholar Similarly common are memoirs or books of anecdotes by or about great barristers: see for instance Fordham, E. W., Notable cross-examinations (London, Toronto & Cape Town 1951Google Scholar) and Hastings, P., Famous and infamous cases (London 1956).Google Scholar Perhaps the most interesting study of the barrister's profession however is du Cann, R., The art of the advocate (London 1964)Google Scholar: this is a book written for the newcomer and the outsider, and it does much to strip away the mystique with which the profession frequently surrounds itself. What du Cann discusses (and what he fails to discuss) provides a useful index of what barristers themselves think is important about their job.

¹³ Cornish, W. R., The jury (London 1968) 50.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Cornish (n. 13) 49.

¹⁵ Cornish (n. 13) 21–5.

¹⁶ McCabe, S. & Purves, R., The shadow jury at work (Oxford 1974)Google Scholar attempt to avoid this problem; instead of playing a recording to a simulated jury, they put an unofficial ‘jury’ in the public gallery, took them out when the jury retired, and asked them to imagine that they were the real jury. This obviously gains something—although it is hard to say how much—in immediacy; equally, it loses the advantage of the ‘control’ experiment.

¹⁷ The pioneering work was that of Kalven, H. & Zeisel, H., The American jury (Boston 1966)Google Scholar, based on interviews with Chicago judges. A more sophisticated study was undertaken by Baldwin & McConville (n. 4), who made use of questionnaires completed by judges, prosecuting and defending solicitors, and police in Birmingham and London: the Bar refused permission for its members to participate, and the Law Society severely restricted the questions which could be put to solicitors.

¹⁸ Baldwin & McConville (n. 4) 93.

¹⁹ Baldwin & McConville (n. 4) 28.

²⁰ ‘Published’ versions of law-court speeches (most of our texts are of this kind) should be distinguished from literary pamphlets in speechform (e.g. Isokrates i–xv). Both genres are intended to be read, presumably by the élite. We possess no transcripts of trials, and we cannot tell how far speeches in the first group have been revised for ‘publication’, which could distort the social values they profess. But Isokrates in his pamphlets puts forward reactionary political views which could hardly have been expressed in court (see n. 55 below); and it is striking that we do not find views like this expressed in the published law-court speeches: their authors are presumably more keen to retain the illusion of a law-court. Revision would of course provide every incentive to suppress any notorious gaffes like that of Griffith-Jones, which ironically makes them more reliable for the purpose of this paper.

²¹ The two most important forms of taxation at Athens were the eisphora and the ‘liturgy’ (leitourgia). The former was a direct capital tax levied at irregular intervals when required (usually in time of war): the level of the eisphora would be set by the assembly as a percentage of the total capital assets of those required to pay. A ‘liturgy’ however was not a formal tax; instead, those liable were obliged to fund a particular public project (‘liturgy’), such as the production of a play or the commissioning of a warship. Both forms of taxation, and especially liturgies, affected only the rich: roughly half the citizen population served as hoplites (heavy-armed soldiers, who had to supply their own armour); but the eisphora seems to have affected perhaps 10–15%, and less than 5% were apparently liable for liturgies.

²² For the appendix, see pp. 170–3 below.

²³ Cornford, F. M., Thucydides mythistoricus (London 1907)Google Scholar; Pickard-Cambridge, A. W., Demosthenes and the last days of Greek freedom (London 1914)Google Scholar; Glotz, G., The Greek city and its institutions (French original, Paris 1928; cited from English translation, London 1929)Google Scholar; Bonner, R. J. & Smith, G., The administration of justice from Homer to Aristotle (2 vols, Chicago 1930–1938)Google Scholar; Ehrenberg, V., The people of Aristophanes: a sociology of Old Attic Comedy ² (Oxford 1951)Google Scholar; Hignett, C., A history of the Athenian constitution (Oxford 1952).Google Scholar

²⁴ Ehrenberg (n. 23) 53–4 and 161, on age (Aristophanes' picture exaggerated but otherwise valid) and on poverty (‘the majority … poor men’) respectively. He applies the same argument on poverty to the assembly: see p. 170 and n. 208 below.

²⁵ Bonner & Smith, i (n. 23) 231–3, focus on age, and try at length to reconcile Wasps with occasional references in the orators to ‘younger men’ among the jury (e.g. Ant. v 71) and the assumed needs of military service. They later note that in the fourth century there was no longer available a pool of unemployed refugees, forced from the countryside into the City, as there had been during the Spartan occupation of Dekeleia in 413–404 (Bonner & Smith i [n. 23] 366–7); but the question of poverty does not bulk large in their thinking.

²⁶ Pickard-Cambridge, (n. 23) 89–90, describes the jurors as ‘the aged and infirm, the poor and the idle’. Pickard-Cambridge is one of the few scholars to differentiate between jurors and members of the assembly see p. 170 and n. 207 below.

²⁷ Hignett (n. 23) 221, citing Ath. Pol. 27.4 (for which see further p. 152 below): the poorer citizens formed a majority in the court.

²⁸ Cornford (n. 23) 15–24 passim: the jury consisted of artisans and tradesmen, and the country farmers were hardly represented. The thesis of this book was that the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War should be read as the result of pressure by the Athenian mercantile classes (who in Cornford's opinion dominated policy-making) to break the strangle-hold of Corinth over the trade route through the Corinthian Gulf. There is no evidence for this, and the modernizing view of ancient economic history which underlies it has generally and rightly been rejected.

²⁹ Glotz, (n. 23) 241, suggests that the jury are basically middle- and lower-class town-dwellers; his unstated premise is that of physical proximity. See, however, pp. 162–3 below.

³⁰ For a discussion of Markle's paper, see PP. 153–8 below.

³¹ Jones 35–7, 50, 124. Much the same interpretation is applied by Jones 109 to the assembly: see p. 171 and n. 208 below.

³² For Jones' subtlety and ambiguity, see n. 38 below.

³³ Jones 124.

³⁴ Jones 35–7: the tax in question is the eisphora (see n. 21 above).

³⁵ Straton in Dem. xxi 95 (Jones' reference is misprinted): Jones 36 and n. 81.

³⁶ Jones 124.

³⁷ The phrase is that of Jones 37.

³⁸ The added subtlety of Jones' case is his argument that the rich were particularly dominant in public (i.e. major political) trials: he believes that this was the result of deliberate jury-packing (Jones 36–7), but this presupposes a surprising level of conscious party-organization. This argument has apparently been ignored both by Jones' followers and by his opponents. Jones' most notable ambiguity concerns the position of those unable to earn a full day's wage: Jones 124 believes that in the late fifth century three obols would have been enough to attract them (but not the able-bodied) into jury service; in the fourth century, however, the real value of three obols dropped, but Jones 37 leaves it unclear whether three obols continued so to attract them. Jones' followers have developed his argument here in different directions: cf. n. 40 below.

³⁹ Jones 10.

⁴⁰ Harrison, A. R. W., The law of Athens ii (Oxford 1968–1971) 49Google Scholar n. 2 (the fourth-century jury consisted only of the well-off); Carey, C. & Reid, R. A., Demosthenes: selected private speeches (Cambridge 1985) 1Google Scholar and n. 2 (the jury contained the unemployable as well). Both cite Jones as authority for their views: cf. n. 38 above. Carey & Reid makea tantalising passing reference to ‘those whose work was seasonal’; but this group plays no further part in their analysis.

⁴¹ Davies, J. K., ‘Athenian citizenship: the descent group and the alternatives’, CJ lxxiii (1978) 109Google Scholar; and Fisher, N. R. E., Social values in classical Athens (London & Toronto 1976) 31–2Google Scholar, who canvasses a number of alternative explanations, among them Dover's suggestion, that a poor jury might wish to be treated as if they were prosperous (cf. p. 160 below).

⁴² Perlman, S., ‘The politicians in the Athenian democracy of the fourth century BC’, Athenaeum xli (1963) 327Google Scholar, is non-committal; but in his later paper, ‘Political Leadership in Athens in the fourth century BC’, Parola del Passato xxii (1967) 165–6, Perlman more clearly aligns himself with Jones' position. M. I. Finley ‘Sokrates and Athens’ (cited from Finley, , Democracy ancient and modern ² [London 1985] 117–18Google Scholar), claims against Jones that the very poor were disproportionately represented on the jury, but contrast Finley's views expressed elsewhere on the composition of the assembly (‘Athenian demagogues’, Democracy ancient and modern, 52).

⁴³ Wolff, H. J., Demosthenes als Advokat: Funktionen und Methoden des Prozesspraktikers im klassischen Athen (Berlin 1968) 7 n. 13CrossRefGoogle Scholar, without reference to Jones. de Ste. Croix, G. E. M., The origins of the Peloponnesian War (London 1972) 376Google Scholar, and The class struggle in the ancient Greek world (London 1981) 289, insists against Jones that the poor made up a substantial proportion of the jury; whereas MacDowell, D. M., The law in classical Athens (London 1978) 33–5Google Scholar, sees the jurors as predominantly elderly.

⁴⁴ Isager, S. & Hansen, M. H., Aspects of Athenian society in the fourth century BC. a historical introduction to and commentary on the paragraphê-speeches and the speech Against Dionysiodorus in the Corpus Demosthenicum (Danish original, 1972; cited from the English translation, Odense 1975) 122Google Scholar, suggest that pay was intended to cover only the juror's individual needs and not those of his family. (For Hansen's later views on assembly-pay, see p. 170 and n. 207 below.) Adkins, A. W. H., Moral values and political behaviour in ancient Greece (London 1972) 120Google Scholar, sees jury-pay as a form of poor-relief, and argues that the rich will not have wanted the stigma associated with receiving it. (Social values in law-courts and assembly form the subject also of chapter 10 of Adkins, , Merit and responsibility: a study in Greek values [Oxford 1960]Google Scholar, but here he concentrates on the orators' appeals to the often rival claims of justice and expediency.)

⁴⁵ Burford, A., Craftsmen in Greek and Roman society (London 1972) 154Google Scholar, claims that the assembly (and presumably also the jury) will have consisted primarily of poor craftsmen, rather than peasants, because these were the people who lived in Athens and Peiraieus (cf. the views of Cornford and Glotz, see p. 149 n. 28 and n. 29 above); Harding, P. E., ‘In search of a polypragmatist’, in Shrimpton, G. S. and McCargar, D. J., eds., Classical contributions … M. F. MacGregor (New York 1981) 43 n. 20Google Scholar, rejects this proposition. Both arguments however are weakened by hidden assumptions: Burford is eager to find a significant rôle for her craftsmen to play in Athenian life; and Harding is trying to prove that the vaunted dichotomy between radical towndwellers and conservative country-dwellers is a myth. Harding's argument is probably over-stated (see p. 163 below), but I suspect that his picture is closer to reality than that of Burford.

⁴⁶ Dover, K. J., Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford 1974) 34Google Scholar, on Dem. xix 237. For the suggestion (Dover 34–5) that a jury of poor men might wish to be treated as if they were prosperous, see p. 160 below.

⁴⁷ Rhodes, P. J., A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaiôn Politeia (Oxford 1981) 691Google Scholar: he uses Wasps, Ath. Pol. 27.4 (cf. n. 54 below), and Isok. vii 54 (cf. n. 53 below) to support this argument. The possibility that jury-pay might have attracted the very poor was of course latent within Jones' model (see n. 38 and n. 40 above), but Rhodes develops this possibility to the extent of explicitly repudiating Jones' model.

⁴⁸ Mossé, C., La fin de la démocratie athénienne (Paris 1962) 266Google Scholar: after twenty years of war-exhaustion, the tax was unpopular with everyone. She further argues that several statement by for instance Isokrates are incomprehensible unless the jury consisted basically of the poor and the unemployed (citing Isok. vii 83; clearer perhaps would be Isok. vii 54 and viii 130: see n. 53 below).

⁴⁹ Strauss, B. S., Division and conquest: Athens 403–386BC (unpublished dissertation, Yale 1979) 12 n. 18Google Scholar: Demosthenes was trying to create an impression of unity, and to ‘soak the rich’ would under-score the divisions in Athenian society. Strauss here suggests that the poor made up the largest group in the jury, even though the well-todo formed a significant minority; in the published version of his thesis (Athens after the Peloponnesian War: class, faction and policy 403–386 BC [London & Sydney 1987] 171) he appears in another context to accept Jones' thesis that the poor became for demographic reasons a progressively less significant force during the fourth century, but he does not develop the implications of this for the composition of the jury.

⁵⁰ Kroll, J. H., Athenian bronze allotment plates (Cambridge, Mass 1972) esp. 71–83 and 261–7.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In addition to the criticisms expressed here, see the perceptive comments of Sinclair, R. K., Democracy and participation in Athens (Cambridge 1988) 130 n. 94 and 135 n. 118.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵¹ There is, however, a further problem here, not faced by Kroll: the very poor man has more reason for pride in his status as a citizen of a democracy, and perhaps therefore more reason to want his pinakion buried with him.

⁵² Dem. xxi 182: the aristocratic Pyrrhos was executed for this; and Dem. xxiv 123: ordinary citzens who commit this offence are severely punished, but the Athenians are far too lenient towards their orators.

⁵³ Isok. vii 54: ‘who can but feel aggrieved when he sees many of our citizens drawing lots [i.e., in the daily allocation of jurors to courts] in front of the court-house for the necessities of life, whether he is to have them or not’ and Isok. viii 130: ‘those who live off the law-courts’(clearly in context jurors rather than prosecutors). Other passages of Isokrates could perhaps be cited to the same purpose, for instance Isok. xv 152, referring to ‘those who are compelled to get their livelihood from the city’ (and presumably therefore from state-pay); but Isok. vii 83 is less direct, referring simply to ‘those who are destitute’, without any specific mention of public pay (compare n. 48 above).

⁵⁴ Ath. Pol. 27.4: ‘some people claim that the juries have become kheirô [either “lower class” or “morally degenerate” or more probably both] as a result of jury-pay.’

⁵⁵ It is important to note that the Isokrates passages in question (see n. 53 above) come from political pamphlets rather than from law-court speeches: he could hardly have said this in a democratic court. Compare n. 20 above.

⁵⁶ Other examples of the ‘some people say’ motif are to be found at Ath. Pol. 6.2–3 and 9.2.

⁵⁷ Markle 265–97.

⁵⁸ Sinclair (n. 50); Hansen, M. H., The Athenian assembly in the age of Demosthenes (Oxford 1987)Google Scholar; Powell, C. A., Athens and Sparta: constructing Greek political and social history from 478 BC (London 1988)CrossRefGoogle Scholar: for details see n. 107 below. There is no reference to Markle's views in the brief incidental discussion by Garner, R., Law and society in classical Athens (London & Sydney 1987) 65.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Markle 265–6.

⁶⁰ Markle 271–81.

⁶¹ Markle 293–7.

⁶² Markle 281–92.

⁶³ Markle 267–71.

⁶⁴ Markle 267–71.

⁶⁵ This point is well made by Ehrenberg (n. 23) 37–42. It would be equally dangerous to infer from the chorus-leader's rambling remark, ‘the crops need rain’ (Wasps 253–65), that the ‘typical juror’ is therefore a country-man rather than a town-dweller (see, rightly, D. M. MacDowell, Aristophanes, Wasps [Oxford 1971] 168); and I have therefore made no use of this passage in support of my argument on pp. 158–9 below.

⁶⁶ Aristophanes Wasps 300–1, 303–11 respectively.

⁶⁷ Markle 267.

⁶⁸ The same attitude of distaste towards the institution of jury-pay (‘it made the Athenians lazy’) is found in Plato Gorgias 515e2–7, on which see Markle 272.

⁶⁹ Markle further argues that the archetypal juror Philokleon (the protagonist of the Wasps) is really a rich man who is only pretending to be poor, and that the same therefore is true of the chorus also; but it is doubtful whether this would serve any comic purpose. Admittedly Philokleon's son Bdelykleon is rich, but we should not therefore conclude (as Markle 267) that ‘clearly the family had property’. Aristophanes is often more interested in the joke of the moment than in consistency of character: the extreme poverty of the jurors is the running joke throughout the first half of the play, and Philokleon's attempt to come to terms with high society throughout the second half; but the connexion between the two propositions is not emphasized.

⁷⁰ Markle 267–71. Markle's argument includes a discussion of the term aporoi, which is ignored in my simplified summary.

⁷¹ Austin, M. M. & Vidal-Naquet, P., Economic and social history of ancient Greece: an introduction (French original, Paris 1972; cited from English translation, London 1977) 16.Google Scholar

⁷² De Ste. Croix (n. 43: 1981) 431.

⁷³ For instance Aristotle in the Politics (1279b18–20, discussed by Markle 268) defines democracy as that government where the state is controlled by the aporoi (a term which in Aristotle's thought, according to Markle, is equivalent to the penêtes).

⁷⁴ Markle 271–7.

⁷⁵ Markle 277–81 and 293–7.

⁷⁶ To what extent is the introduction and especially the raising of state-pay intended to encourage participation in public life and break the hold of the rich on the juries, to distribute the wealth of the community among its members (and perhaps thereby to limit the need for aristocratic patronage: see Millett, P. C., ‘Patronage and its avoidance in Classical Athens’, in Wallace-Hadrill, A. F., ed., Patronage in ancient society [London & New York 1989] 15–47)Google Scholar, or as a bid for popularity on the part of the politician proposing the increase? See further p. 157 below.

⁷⁷ For instance in the briefly successful oligarchic revolution of 411, Markle 271–2.

⁷⁸ Markle 272.

⁷⁹ Markle 272–4: this applies in his view to the fifth century (Markle 274) as well as to contemporary politics.

⁸⁰ When Aristotle makes an empirical statement (‘in city x they do y’), this can usually be taken at face value; when however he makes a theoretical statement, frequently cast in indefinite form (‘when x conditions obtain …’ or ‘when there is a democracy of x type …’), these have to be inter preted much more cautiously. The quotations on which Markle 273–4 bases his argument are of the theoretical rather than the empirical kind.

⁸¹ Markle 273: ‘he must be describing not only the Athenian constitution but other Greek democracies which enabled the poor to participate by offering pay.’

⁸² Aristotle Politics 1292a4–7 (decree and law) and 129333–7 (cited by Markle 273: state-pay).

⁸³ In the fourth century (although not the fifth) decrees at Athens were strictly subordinated to laws: see Hansen, M. H., The Athenian ecclesia: a collection of articles 1976–1983 (Copenhagen 1983) 161–177 and 179–206.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ My reading of the Politics here is by no means uncontested: see e.g. Hansen (n. 58) 10.

⁸⁵ Positive wishful thinking is to be found in Politics 1292b25–29: Aristotle approves the type of democracy where farmers and those who possess a ‘moderate’ amount of property are in charge of the state, because they will be too busy farming to playan active part in politics. (Whenever Aristotle mentions the word ‘moderate’ [mesos or, as here, metrios ], he is usually idealizing.) Presumably he is envisaging a situation without any state-pay, although given ancient conditions of farming (see p. 168 below) it is difficult to take him very seriously here.

⁸⁶ Markle 274–6. A similar argument is developed by Ehrenberg (n. 23) 84, 227, and by Hansen (n. 83) 27.

⁸⁷ Full documentation for the various levels of pay is given by Jones 136–7 and by Markle 265 n.1.

⁸⁸ Aristophanes Ekkl. 300–10

⁸⁹ Aristophanes Ekkl. 282–92, 376–82

⁹⁰ Markle assumes here that 3 obols was the standard level of assembly-pay (‘at first … effective’, Markle 274; ‘I am primarily interested in the 3–obol figure’, Markle 274). I am inclined (for reasons discussed on pp. 172–3 below) to believe that Markle may be correct in suggesting that the jump from 3 to 6 and 9 obols was both late and sudden; but Markle's is a dangerous use of logic, because on the one hand he does not himself put forward any real argument to support this assumption, and on the other hand the assumption is itself necessary to his case: unless 3 obols was adequate for the assembly, it will not have been enough for the jury. (For Markle's suggested ‘non-economic reasons’ for the rise to 6 and 9 obols (Markle 285), see p. 171 and n. 214 below.)

⁹¹ The impact of several of these factors is thoughtfully discussed in Sinclair (n. 50) 119–135.

⁹² It is precisely jokes on the theme ‘arrive early or you will not get paid’ that seem most likely to be exaggeration born of fantasy; we cannot deduce from this that the change to 3 obols produced a full house. Still less can we simply compare the jokes about the red rope, used in Akharmans 21–2 (produced in 427) to force people in to the assembly and in Ekkl. 378–9 (produced in the late 390s) to exclude late-comers, and deduce that patterns of attendance had changed. The two are separate jokes, directed against separate (but in Aristophanes' opinion typical) facets of the Athenian national character: their irresponsibility in the Akharnians, and their officiousness and willingness to do anything for money in the Ekklêsiazousai.

⁹³ On the political rivalry of the 390s, see Strauss (n. 49: 1987).

⁹⁴ See p. 154 and n. 76 above.

⁹⁵ Markle 277–81, supported by his appendix (Marklc 293–7).

⁹⁶ Markle 296–7 our only reliable figures concern the daily pay of artisans, and Markle sounds a proper caution against simply multiplying such figures by 350 without allowing for (e.g.) festivals and days laid off.

⁹⁷ Markle 280: but I is a 30% contraction not of 1.3 but of 1.43.

⁹⁸ Markle 277 ‘the cost of living in the late fifthcentury Athens’ (this phrase serves to introduce the statistical survey), and Markle 280 ‘the other kinds of food … at the end of the fifth century BC’.

⁹⁹ Markle 293.

¹⁰⁰ A minimum of 6000 volunteers was required for jury-service each year, and without this number the system of allocation to courts would have broken down. Concerning the assembly we are less well-informed, but 6000 was a necessary quorum for certain types of fairly routine business (for instance grants of citizenship). Hansen indeed has recently and I believe correctly argued that 6000 was perceived as the proper attendance for a normal assembly: Hansen (n. 83) 1–23, cf. n. 218 and n. 223 below; but see further p. 172 and n. 224 below.

¹⁰¹ Markle does admit in passing that even in the late fifth century jury-pay will have entailed a loss of income (Markle 281: ‘at the sacrifice of about half their wages’), and jurors will therefore presumably have required considerable motivation to attend; but he nowhere mentions the everincreasing need for tightened belts which his model implies.

¹⁰² Sinclair (n. 50) 127–133 supports Markle's model by suggesting various reasons for the continuing attractiveness of the jury as compared with the assembly; but this does not really get to the heart of the problem: if, as Markle accepts, the value of obols in comparison with wages was steadily declining, he needs to establish not simply a continuing but an increasing attractiveness, in order to compensate for the decline in value.

¹⁰³ The other possible explanation (canvassed on pp. 167–9 below) of the failure to raise jury-pay is that it was not primarily a subsistence-allowance.

¹⁰⁴ Markle 281–92.

¹⁰⁵ Markle 287 n. 40 (anticipated by Dover [n. 46] 34 n. 1) against Jones 36: see p. 150 above.

¹⁰⁶ Markle 282 on Lys. xxviii 1, and Markle 285 on Ant. v 8 respectively.

¹⁰⁷ Powell, (n. 58) 302, calls Jones' social values ‘inconclusive’, and accepts Markle's arguments about the level of pay. Hansen, (n. 58) 47–8, discussing the assembly, agrees with Markle (cited with approval at 48 n. 326) that the crucial factor determining the attractiveness of pay is its purchasing power (sc. as a subsistence-allowance). Sinclair, (n. 50) 124–7, focuses on the attitudes taken towards tax-payers in Lysias xxviii (delivered to the assembly) and xxix (a court-speech), in an attempt to determine their relative importance within these two bodies; this is an interesting and important discussion, but with so few assembly speeches extant it must remain speculative. Sinclair, (n. 50) 127, does, however, make clear in passing his support for Markle.

¹⁰⁸ Markle 281.

¹⁰⁹ Markle 283.

¹¹⁰ Jones 124, 37 respectively.

¹¹¹ Hoggart, R., The uses of literacy (London 1957)Google Scholar

¹¹² Finley, M. I., The ancient economy ² (London 1985) 38.Google Scholar

¹¹³ For the general theory see Adkins (n. 44: 1960) esp. 195–214; the theory is applied in more detail to political behaviour in Adkins (n. 44: 1972).

¹¹⁴ Adkins (n. 44: 1972) 119–26.

¹¹⁵ Aristotle Rhetorika only mentions liturgies once (ii 23.17), and they are not in context benefactions.

¹¹⁶ Ehrenberg (n. 23) 143–145.

¹¹⁷ Dover (n. 46) 37–41.

¹¹⁸ Dover (n.46) 34.

¹¹⁹ Isager & Hansen, (n. 44) 50–2, believe that more than half the population of Attica made a living as artisans or traders rather than as farmers. This estimate is in my opinion substantially exaggerated, and relies on a belief (which I would reject) that Athens had a developed market economy; but even Isager & Hansen assume that a substantial majority of Athenian citizens were farmers: most of their artisans and traders are metics (resident aliens) or slaves. See further p. 169 and n. 203 below.

¹²⁰ Anthropologists would tend to restrict the term ‘peasant’ to members of a sub-culture which feels itself to be economically or politically dependant on a larger society. Osborne, R. G., Demos: the discovery of classical Attika (Cambridge 1985) 183–9Google Scholar, cf 142, rightly emphasizes that it is the absence of a sharp distinction between town and country that makes Athens so exceptional; if ‘peasant’ is used in a strict sense, there were no peasants in classical Attica. See however Millett, P. C., ‘Hesiod and his world’, PCPS xxx (1984) 84–115 (esp. 90–3)Google Scholar, who argues for a broader use of the term.

¹²¹ The Athenian literary élite appear to have retained the peasant outlook; and this may be significant as an instance of shared values: the peasant virtue of self-sufficiency or autarkeia forms the philosophical basis of much of Aristotle's social and economic theory.

¹²² I owe this point to Prof. Anthony Snodgrass.

¹²³ Euripides Orestes 917–30.

¹²⁴ Carter, L. B., The quiet Athenian (Oxford 1986) 76–98Google Scholar, translates ‘the peasant farmer’ back into Greek consistently as ‘the autourgos’, without recognizing the rarity of the Greek word in our sources.

¹²⁵ Tacitus Annals xiv 42–5.

¹²⁶ Westermann, W. L., The slave systems of Greek and Roman antiquity (Philadelphia 1955) 114.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ de Ste. Croix (n. 43: 1981) 372.

¹²⁸ Finley, M. I., Ancient slavery and modern ideology (London 1980) 102–3.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Jones 19 suggests, on the basis of two acts of enfranchisement, that the same ‘sense of fellow feeling’ existed between Athenian slaves and poor citizens; but his evidence is not convincing: it is only the Ath. Pol. who tells us tendentiously that Thrasyboulos' intended beneficiaries in 403/2 were ‘mostly slaves’. The mass liberation and enfranchisement of the slaves who fought in the battle of Arginoussai in 406 is the exception which breaks all the rules, and serves to indicate the strength of the immediate crisis; even after the battle of Khaironeia in 338, Hypereides proposed freedom and not enfranchisement.

¹³⁰ Suetonius Augustus 40.3–4; for details of the laws, see Gaius Institutes i 38 and 42. Athenian social critics do not speak of too many slaves being freed, but of slaves being ‘too free’: see n. 137 and n. 138 below.

¹³¹ Admittedly the citizen rights of a libertus (freed slave) at Rome were restricted, but any child born to him after manumission was ingenuus (free born) with the full rights of citizenship.

¹³² Dover (n. 46) 34 does suggest that the existence of slavery allowed every Athenian to feel in some sense part of an élite; but he does not acknowledge the importance of Athens' failure to manumit and enfranchise.

¹³³ Ehrenberg (n. 23) 173–5, Austin & Vidal-Naquet (n. 71) 101–3: the case of Pittalakos is described by Aiskh. i 54–62.

¹³⁴ Austin & Vidal-Naquet (n. 71) 101–3.

¹³⁵ The case of Lampis occurs in Dem. xxxiv. Lampis is permitted to witness before the arbitrator in § 18. It is not clear whether he can do this because he is a particularly privileged type of slave (khôris oikôn), or because he is involved in a particularly flexible type of legal procedure (dikê emporikê ), and the latter alternative was proposed by Gernet, L., ‘Aspects du droit Athénien de l'esclavage’, AHDO v (1950) 59–87Google Scholar, cited from Gernet, , Droit et société dans la Grèce antique (Paris 1955) 162–3.Google Scholar It is indeed possible that Lampis is not really a slave: he is described as an oiketês, the normal term for a slave, in §5; but this may simply mean that he is an exslave, or that the term is being used loosely to describe a servant: it is difficult to see how a slave could be described as a nauklêros (ship-owner) in his own right, as at §6.

¹³⁶ For the careers of Pasion and Phormion, see Davies, J. K., Athenian propertied families 600–300 BC (Oxford 1971) 427–31Google Scholar (Pasion) and 431–2 (Phormion).

¹³⁷ [Xen.] Ath. Pol. I 10–12; we may wonder why he is so disappointed at not being permitted to do this.

¹³⁸ Plato Republic 563b4–d1.

¹³⁹ Cf. p. 164 and n. 163 below.

¹⁴⁰ Aiskh. i 17 gives a different rationalization of the purpose of the law from that of Demosthenes (below, n. 141).

¹⁴¹ Dem. xxi 47–50: Demosthenes claims that ‘the barbarians’ will be so impressed at this that they will all queue up to register the Athenians collectively as their protectors (proxenoi).

¹⁴² See the papers by Fisher, N. R. E. and by Murray, O. in Cartledge, P. A., Millett, P. C. and Todd, S.C., eds., NOMOS: essays in Athenian law, politics and society (Cambridge, 1990 in press).Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Dem. liii 16.

¹⁴⁴ Dem. xxii 55—a statement made precisely in defence of the rights of free citizens.

¹⁴⁵ Genovese, E. D., Roll, Jordan, roll: the world the slaves made (New York 1974) 22.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Stampp, K. M., The peculiar institution: slavery in the ante-bellum South (New York 1956) 104Google Scholar, quoting a (successful) appeal by slave-owners to poor whites.

¹⁴⁷ Carter (n. 124).

¹⁴⁸ Harding (n. 45), cf. p. 151 and n. 45 above.

¹⁴⁹ Athenian demes were local communities, but unlike English villages, they had important constitutional roles. For instance, a man's citizen rights depended on his being a member of a deme: see generally Osborne (n. 120) and Whitehead, D., The demes of Attica 508/7–c. 250 BC: a political and social study (Princeton 1986).Google Scholar

¹⁵⁰ Osborne (n. 120) 47–63; Whitehead (n. 149) 352–8, 233–4.

¹⁵¹ Hansen (n. 58) 8–12 (cf. his earlier paper, ‘Political activity and the organization of Attica inthe fourth century BC’ GRBS xxiv [1983] 235–7). For the locations of Athenian demes, see Traill, J. S.The political organization of Attica: a study of the demes, trittyes and phylai, and their representation in the Athenian council (Hesperia Suppl. 14, Princeton 1975) 14–23Google Scholar and tables I–X (quota), 37–54 and map 1 (locations), and 133–4 (addenda).

¹⁵² Hansen (n. 58) 10–11 appears to confuse two senses of the term thêtes, as census-class and as occupation: those who are too poor to serve as hoplites (cf. n. 21 above) are not necessarily all hired labourers; and even though he himself notes that many city-dwellers were themselves farmers walking out to their fields (Hansen [n. 58] 11), the way that his argument is developed (Hansen [n. 58] 8–11) tends to identify city-dwellers with artisans and labourers.

¹⁵³ Most recently by Carter (n. 124) 97, 194: he believes that the peace-proposals of 429 and of 411 (both unsuccessful, although Carter does not say this) were made because the peasants held a temporary majority in the assembly.

¹⁵⁴ Aiskh. ii 141, 166–7; Dem. xviii 127 and esp. 257–62.

¹⁵⁵ Lys. xx 11.

¹⁵⁶ There are changes in political values—for instance the charge of oligarchy has a far greater use and a far more specific meaning in 403–c. 380 (being connected not with present disposition but with a single past action, behaviour during the oligarchy of 404/3)—but that is a different matter.

¹⁵⁷ Aiskh. iii 117, 130.

¹⁵⁸ Lys. xiv 41–45; xxvi 3.

¹⁵⁹ Lys. iii 6; Dem. xl 57: attitudes to women are discussed further on p. 165 below.

¹⁶⁰ Andok, i 146–150.

¹⁶¹ Lys. xix 14–15.

¹⁶² e.g. Lys. xiii 8, etc.; xxx 2, etc.; Aiskh. ii 79.

¹⁶³ The most notable, if admittedly tendentious, examples are Plato Republic 563b4–7 and [Xen.] Ath. Pol. 1.10–12, cited above (n. 137 and n. 138).

¹⁶⁴ See the remarks about Lokhites and Meidias on p. 165 below.

¹⁶⁵ Lysias xxvii 9–11 and xxx 27 attacks (politically active) opponents for their sudden rise from poverty to wealth. The implication here is that they have become rich through embezzlement or receipt of bribes; but Dem. lvii 30–1 and esp. 52 suggests that the speaker is acutely embarrassed about the fact that he is rich whereas his parents had been poor.

¹⁶⁶ Isaios, esp. speech xi; Dem. xxvii–xxxi.

¹⁶⁷ Dem. xxii 65: for liturgy-payers, see n. 21 above

¹⁶⁸ Dem. xlii 22: zên here presumably means ‘to live off (sc. without having to labour with one's own hands)’.

¹⁶⁹ For hoplite-service, see n. 21 above.

¹⁷⁰ Lys xxiv 6. For the speaker's financial status, see Bizos, M.Lysias, quatre discours (Paris 1967) 130.Google Scholar

¹⁷¹ Dem. lix 122.

¹⁷² On hybris, compare p. 162 and n. 142 above

¹⁷³ Dem. xxi, as interpreted by Jones 36, followed by Dover (n. 46) 34 and n. 1; compare also Isok. xx, esp. §§11, 15, 19.

¹⁷⁴ Dover, K. J., Greek homosexuality (London 1978) 22.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁵ Dover (n. 174) 23–24.

¹⁷⁶ For homosexuality as an aristocratic practice see Ehrenberg (n. 23) 100–2.

¹⁷⁷ Aiskh. i 136.

¹⁷⁸ For the significance of homosexuality as it developed in the archaic period within the nexus of gymnasium, symposium, hunting and courtship that together made up aristocratic culture, see Murray, O., Early Greece (London 1980) 203–4.Google Scholar

¹⁷⁹ Aiskh. i 97–100: according to Aiskhines, the process had already been started by Timarkhos' father Arizelos (i 101). The tax here is the liturgy, to which only the richest were liable: n. 21 above.

¹⁸⁰ Xen. Oikonomikos 4, passim.

¹⁸¹ Vernant, J.–P., Myth and thought among the Greeks (French original, 1965; cited from English translation, London 1983) 252–3.Google Scholar

¹⁸² Plato Republic 370b4–c6, Laws 846d1–847b6; Aristotle Politics 1252b 1–5.

¹⁸³ Plato Republic 420e1–421a9 (implicit), 4683 5–7: guardians are not to be farmers or artisans; Republic 406e4–407a6 (with 406e1), 434a2–b8, 434C7–10, 440e10–441a2, 456d8–10, cf. also 495c8–e2: guardians are distinguished only from artisans.

¹⁸⁴ Plato Laws 842e6–850d2, cf. esp. 846d2–3.

¹⁸⁵ Aristotle Politics 1256a40–b2, cf. 1256b40–1257a5.

¹⁸⁶ Plutarch Agesilaos 26.5 repeated in Moralia 213f–214b: to prove that only the Spartans were ‘proper’ soldiers, Agesilaos separated Spartans from allies and ordered all the ‘potters, smiths, builders, and those who followed any other tekhnê’ to stand; virtually all the allies stood, but none of the Spartans. If this story has any basis in reality, Agesilaos' list must surely have included ‘farmers’: the allied contingents would have included many peasants, whereas Spartans did not farm their land in person. But as a statement of Plutarch's views, the list is significant: farmers are not tradesmen.

¹⁸⁷ Plato Protagoras 319c8–d6; Xenophon Memorabilia iii 7.6: I owe this point to Dr. Paul Millett. Xenophon does, incidentally, include farmers (presumably peasants) as one of his despised groups; cf. Plato's uncertainty over the status of peasants, above n. 183.

¹⁸⁸ Aristophanes Ekklêsiazousai 385–7, and 431–4 respectively. Shoe-makers were notoriously pale (scholiast on Aristophanes Peace 1310: I owe this reference to Dr Mogens Hansen); but Xenophon Oikonomikos 4.2–3 regards pallor as the occupational hazard not merely of shoe-makers but of all artisans.

¹⁸⁹ The argument here concerns the rate of pay (for which see also pp. 150–3 above) and the occupation of the jurors; for a discussion of status and ideology see pp. 149–53 (on Jones), pp. 153–8 (on Markle), and pp. 158–63 above; for the question of distance see p. 163 above. On the workdone by slaves and women, see p. 168 below.

¹⁹⁰ I have not discussed in this paper the question of elderly jurors. The impression given here by Aristophanes Wasps (above, p. 149) may well be correct: if 3 obols was attractive to peasants because they had a low marginal return for additional work, it would have been particularly attractive to those who were past their physical prime. On the other hand, the minimum age for jury-service was thirty, whereas any adult citizen could attend the assembly. This will have had a significant effect on the age of the jury: using the model life table recommended by Hansen, M. H.Demography and democracy: the number of Athenian citizens in the fourth century B.C. (Herning 1985) 11–13Google Scholar, it would mean that 37.2% of potential assembly-members were too young for jury-service. This may be part of the reason for Aristophanes' caricature of the elderly juror.

¹⁹¹ Markle's statistical argument (see p. 157 above) depends on the assumption that jury-pay is essentially a subsistence-payment.

¹⁹² Cornish (n. 13) 58–9.

¹⁹³ Ehrenberg (n. 23) 120–1 notes that the ‘demagogues’, whom modern scholars usually describe as ‘manufacturers’, are portrayed in comedy as ‘sellers’.

¹⁹⁴ I owe this point to Prof. Keith Hopkins.

¹⁹⁵ I am not wholly convinced by the arguments of Jameson, M. H., ‘Agriculture and slavery in classical Athens’, CJ lxxiii (1977) 122–45Google Scholar, that Athenian agriculture was labour-intensive; given the low marginal return, some farmers may have preferred to combine a slightly lower yield with more days spent earning jury-pay: see further p. 169 and n. 202 below.

¹⁹⁶ e.g. Clark, C. & Haswell, M., The economics of subsistence agriculture ⁴ (London 1970) 112CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Grigg, D., The dynamics of agricultural change: the historical experience (London 1982) 98–9.Google Scholar

¹⁹⁷ Aristotle Politics 1292b25–29: see p. 155 and n. 85 above.

¹⁹⁸ Clark & Haswell (n. 196) 142.

¹⁹⁹ For a summary of Hesiod's farming calendar, see West, M. L., Hesiod, Works and days (Oxford 1978) 253.Google Scholar

²⁰⁰ See p. 163 n. 151 above.

²⁰¹ We therefore avoid the problem implicit in Markle's theory: see p. 157 and n. 101 above.

²⁰² Contrast the calculations of for instance Jameson (n. 195) 131.

²⁰³ Hansen (n. 58) 12 n. 88 draws on the calculations of P. D. A. Garnsey, ‘Grain for Athens’, in Cartledge & Harvey (n. 1) 62–75, that Athens in a good year had to import half the grain consumed by the population of Attica; he infers that ‘at least half the citizens (sic) … had to buy their daily bread in the market’. But this is to assume that everybody buys either all or nothing, and that anybody who buys any has moved entirely from subsistence to cash economy. Compare the comments on autarkeia as an ideal, p. 160 above.

²⁰⁴ Note the increasing powers (apophasis is only the most striking) given during the fourth century to the Areiopagos, and the movement from the middle of the century to reorganize Athenian finance towards efficiency and away from the use of the lot in appointments: for details, see Rhodes, P. J., ‘Athenian democracy after 403 BC’, CJ lxxv (1980) 319–20 and 309–15Google Scholar respectively.

²⁰⁵ I hope in a forthcoming paper to argue that by the mid fourth century, what was left of the old aristocracy had combined with those who in the fifth century would have been ‘demagogues’ to work the system together. No one was left to supply the ‘radical democrat’ leadership.

²⁰⁶ As promised on p. 149 and n. 22 above.

²⁰⁷ Pickard-Cambridge (n. 23) 89–90 (see n. 26 above) disliked the popular juries, and therefore contrasted them unfavourably with the assembly. Hansen, (n. 83) 137, (n. 58) 32–4 and 47, suggests that six obols of assembly-pay provided full compensation for broken time, because the assembly sat for only part of the day (the nine obols for ‘special’ assemblies is therefore explained by the somewhat greater length of these meetings); there is an implicit but undeveloped contrast here with Hansen's earlier views on jury-pay, which apparently provided only partial compensation (Isager & Hansen [n. 44] 122: see n. 44 above). Sinclair, (n. 50) 114–135, rightly emphasizes the difference between the assembly and the courts; but his discussion (Sinclair [n. 50] 127–135) of the relative attractiveness of the two bodies to a potential voter relies heavily on his belief that consistently different attitudes towards tax-payers are displayed in assembly- and in court-speeches (argued in Sinclair [n. 50] 119–27; cf. n. 107 above); and I am not convinced that there is enough evidence here to permit certain conclusions (cf. p. 170 and n. 210 below).

²⁰⁸ Ehrenberg (n. 23) 161 (see n. 24 above); Jones 109 (see n. 31 above); Markle 274, 285 (see pp. 155–6 above).

²⁰⁹ See p. 156 and n. 87 above.

²¹⁰ Despite the impressive attempts to make the most of this material by Sinclair (n. 50) 119–27: cf. n. 107 above.

²¹¹ See n. 90 above.

²¹² See p. 154 and n. 76, and p. 158 above.

²¹³ Jones, 37.

²¹⁴ Markle, 285: see n. 90 above.

²¹⁵ Hansen (n. 83) 137, (n. 58) 32–4: see n. 207 above.

²¹⁶ Hansen (n. 83) 35–72, (n. 58) 20–24, argues that after C. 355, assembly-meetings were legally restricted to forty per year; this view is disputed, but nobody would deny that the figure of forty is approximately correct. The courts however appear to have sat on 150–200 days per year: Hansen, , ‘How often did the Athenian dikastêria meet?’, GRBS xx (1979) 243–6.Google Scholar

²¹⁷ Rhodes (n. 47) 728–29 gives full references.

²¹⁸ Cf. n. 100 above and n. 223 below.

²¹⁹ Hansen's most recent and broadest work on the subject has concentrated on the cost of assembly-pay to the state (Hansen [n. 58] 48), which he does explicitly contrast with the cost of the juries (Hansen [n. 58] 119); and on the value of assembly-pay to the individual (Hansen [n. 58] 47], where he does not raise the question.

²²⁰ Hansen, M. H., The sovereignty of the people's court in Athens in the fourth century BC and the public action against unconstitutional proposals (Odense 1974) 12 and 59–61Google Scholar: it is not certain, however, that Hansen would still hold the views expressed here in quite this form; certainly in his latest work (Hansen [n. 58] 94–107) he specifically repudiates use of the term ‘sovereignty’, preferring to speak in terms of the Greek adjective kyrios (‘authoritative’).

²²¹ Dover (n. 46) 34–5.

²²² Pnyx I (until c. 400 BC), c. 2,400 square metres; Pnyx II (from c. 400 to [at least] c. 345),c. 2,666 square metres. The big expansion comes with Pnyx III, c 5,500 square metres: the date of this final rebuilding is discussed immediately below. For the dimensions, see Hansen (n. 83) 16.

²²³ Hansen (n. 83) 1–23, (n. 58) 14–19: see n. 100 above.

²²⁴ The point is well made by Sinclair (n. 50) 118. It should be noted that the House of Commons can seat only some two-thirds of its 650 members; and it is easier to tell when a space looks empty than whether it is ‘full’ or ‘over-full’.

²²⁵ Hansen (n. 83) 16–18, (n. 58) 14–19.

²²⁶ The changing views of the archaeologists are clearly summarized by Hansen (n. 83) 23, cf. Hansen (n. 58) 12 n. 96. Hansen himself now dates the rebuilding at ‘c. 340’: Hansen (n. 58) 14 n. 104.

²²⁷ For the dates of Euboulos, see Cawkwell, G. L., ‘Eubulus’, JHS lxxxiii (1963) 47–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Lykourgos is said to have been in charge of Athenian revenues for ‘three periods of four years’ ([Plutarch] Moralia 841b–c): if this means the four year periods between successive Panathenaic festivals, it can only refer to 338–26; but may not, and Rhodes (n.204) 313 prefers the more cautious figure I have given. The revenue-figures`derive from Dem. x 37–8 and Theopompos fr. 166 (Euboulos), and a combination of [Plutarch] Moralia 841b–B and 842f (Lykourgos).

²²⁸ For Lykourgos' building-programme, see [Plutarch] Moralia 841c–d, who lists a series of projects but does not mention the Pnyx. Given the nature of this text, however, such a silence is by no means indicative: cf. n. 232 below.

²²⁹ Hansen (n. 58) 19 (cf. Hansen, , ‘The construction of Pnyx II and the introduction of assembly pay’, C&M xxxvii [1986] 93–7Google Scholar) suggests that admission (and therefore pay) in the period of Pnyx II was restricted to the first 6,000, but that this restriction no longer applied after the construction of Pnyx III. He does not, however, draw the corollary proposed here.

²³⁰ See pp. 155–6 above.

²³¹ Hansen' view that the insttution of four meetings of the assembly per prytany did not occur until after 355 might support this hypothesis (Hansen [n. 83] 35–72, [n. 58’ 20–4, cited at n. 216 above).

²³² It is striking that we have no hint of such a conscious policy in any of the speeches of the later orators; but this may be simply a statement about the lacunose nature of our sources for this period. We have, after all, no direct literary evidence for the construction of Pnyx III: cf. n. 228 above.