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The Cavalry Battle at the Hydaspes1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 December 2013

Extract

Alexander's battle against the Indian king, Porus, at the R. Hydaspes is in many respects the most interesting of all his set engagements. There he had to cope with a new weapon, the elephant, and few things show his military genius more clearly than the resource which he displayed in solving this difficult problem. The main outlines of the battle are clear, but, despite all that has been written, there is little agreement amongst historians regarding Alexander's tactics in the cavalry engagement which led up to the main action. The most recent treatment of the problem is that by Sir William Tarn, and it is this which has led me to examine the question more closely. Although, as will become clear, I find myself at variance with Tarn's interpretation on numerous points he has, I believe, shown that it is only by a detailed study of Arrian's text that we can arrive at a satisfactory understanding of the orders to Coenus—the hub of the matter. I intend, therefore, to re-examine Arrian's narrative and to attempt to substantiate a view of the overall strategy—particularly the part played by Coenus—radically different from that put forward by Tarn. Moreover, Tarn has subjected Arrian's account of the battle and its preliminaries to such severe criticism that it is not, I think, unfair to say that, if Tarn's interpretation of the operations is accepted, Arrian must be held to have misunderstood his source on several important points and to have failed to make Alexander's tactics intelligible. This article has, therefore, a second purpose—to demonstrate that the undoubted difficulties in Arrian's narrative, due in part to the complicated manoeuvres involved in part to the ambiguity of military terminology, do not indicate any fundamental misunderstanding of the situation by the historian.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies 1956

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References

2 For a full bibliography see Glotz, G. and Cohen, R., Histoire Grecque, vol. iv. i. (2nd ed. 1945), p. 117 and p. 148 n. 156.Google Scholar The works of Breloer and Kornemann listed there have not been accessible to me. Smith, V. A., The Early History of India (1924), pp. 65 ff.Google Scholar (followed by Glotz-Cohen), and Robinson, C. A. Jr., Alexander the Great (1947)Google Scholar give a picture of the operations similar to mine, but do not discuss the sources in detail. For a plan of the battle see Smith, op. cit., p. 82. There is, however, no warrant for placing a line of infantry in front of the elephants or for making the Indian line extend up to the river on the left. The arrangement of the elephants in eight ranks is not supported by the sources, but is due to Smith's views on the site of the battle.

3 Alexander the Great (1948) vol. 2 app. 6 ‘The Battle of the Hydaspes’, pp. 190 ff. (esp. pp. 193–6). Burn, A. R. has remarked (JHS 1947, p. 141)CrossRefGoogle Scholar that ‘every serious student of Alexander, probably for generations, will have to start from Tarn's analysis of the sources and discussion of the chief problems of the narrative’. This judgement, with which I entirely agree, may perhaps justify my approach to the problem. R. Meiggs, in the third edition of Bury, 's History of Greece (n. to pp. 803–6)Google Scholar has already accepted Tarn's interpretation of Alexander's tactics.

4 References: Arrian, Anabasis 5.11–18; Plutarch ‘Alexander’ ch. 60; Diodorus Bk. 17.87–8; Curtius Bk. 8.13–14. The battle is also described by Polyaenus 4.3.22.

5 There is no decisive evidence about this. Tarn himself admits (p. 197) that ‘the earlier part of the letter … has been carefully done from good sources, and would pass muster’ (cf. Schachermeyr, F., Alexander der Grosse, p. 520 n. 228Google Scholar). He is wrong to reject the letter because of the (alleged) difference between and (post). The sentence does, in fact, agree with Arrian's account of the battle, although this does not, of course, prove that the letter is genuine.

6 Arrian 5.13.1. (sc. )

7 For an exhaustive discussion of the relative merits of the ancient sources see Veith, G., Die Kavalleriekampf am Hydaspes, Klio 8 (1908), pp. 131 ff.Google Scholar Veith proves conclusively, I believe, that any reconstruction of the battle must be based primarily on Arrian, and effectively disposes of the attempt by Schubert, R. (Rh. Mus. 56 (1901), pp. 543 ff.)Google Scholar to set aside Arrian's account in favour of Polyaenus. The main defect of Veith's article is that he does not support his conclusions (with which I am, in the main, in agreement) by reference to Arrian's own usage.

8 5.14.1 (cf. 51.8.3).

9 It is interesting to note that Thirlwall had already doubted the number 6,000 and had put Alexander's forces as high as 20,000 men.

10 On the mercenary cavalry see Berve, H., Das Alexanderreich, vol. 1, pp. 148–9.Google Scholar

11 If the elephants were drawn up in a single line (as Arrian seems to imply) the Indian line must have extended for about five miles across the plain. If we take the calculations of Polybius (12.20–1) as a basis, the Indian infantry, occupying six feet per man, cannot have been drawn up more than eight deep. One would expect a greater depth, and Veith (p. 139) may well be right in thinking that Porus' line did not extend so far. Veith rightly emphasises the difficulty of estimating the length of a battle-line even in modern times. Mr. A. R. Burn draws my attention to Plut. Alex. 62, 1, where Porus' forces in the battle are given as 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, and suggests that Arrian's figures may include all Porus' forces, and not merely those in the battle-line. The modest figures given by Plutarch (? from Alexander's letter) contrast sharply with the gigantic totals of the Indian troops across the Ganges mentioned in the same chapter, and are thus all the more credible. If they are correct it is even more doubtful whether the Indian line extended for five miles. There are many possible sources of the error, if error there is; Arrian may have failed to make it clear that the elephants occupied more than a single line or, perhaps more probably, the estimate of about 100 feet between the elephants may be an over-estimate. Very probably Arrian has given us the information he found in Ptolemy, and it is the latter, if anyone, that is at fault.

12 Tarn (p. 195 n. 3) translates ‘he began to ride towards the Indian left, as if he was going to charge it (but he was not)’ adding, ‘ὡς is common enough in this sense’.

I agree that the imperfect must have its proper force, i.e. ‘he began to ride’, but although ὡς may mean ‘as if’ there is nothing in the phrase itself to prevent our taking it as a statement of Alexander's real intentions, i.e. that he intended to attack the left wing eventually. I do not mean that he now galloped off to make his attack. The interpretation of the phrase, in fact, depends upon our view of Alexander's tactics (see also note 25).

13 There are approximately ninety examples of ὡς ἐπί in Arrian. Apart from its use in geographical expressions meaning ‘towards’, as in Strabo, (see esp. Arrian's description of the rivers of Asia in Chapters 5 and 6 of Book 5), it is commonly used with the following verbs: ἄγειν (and its compounds), and ἐλαύνειν. Alexander's charge at Gaugamela (3.14.2) is described in these words: while closely parallel to the present passage is 3.15.1 (also at Gaugamela) (sc. ).

14 See Abicht's edition at 4.16.2.

15 Arrian 3.15.1. Cf. also 3.2.3. and 4.29.1.

16 See also 3.9.6 and 5.23.7. This use of κατά is not uncommon in Plutarch (cf. Nicias 18.3 and Them. 29.1), and Alex. 32 affords an excellent example——where the left wing is the Macedonian, not the Persian. If we compare the use in Polybius (26.7) of as the equivalent of with the common Hellenistic use of as a periphrasis for the person himself (cf. Strachan-Davidson, , Selections from Polybius, pp. 114–15Google Scholar) we can see that in later Greek there is little difference between κατά and περί in this sense. In the passage in Arrian κοτά is virtually equivalent to περί (or ἀμφί).

17 LS s.v. ἔχω C. 2 cite only Demosthenes 18.79 for ἔχεσθαι ‘fasten upon, attack’, but W. W. Goodwin in his edition of the De Corona rightly renders ‘clung to, followed up closely’. For this use in Arrian see 4.5.8. and 4.6.5.

18 I now find that McCrindle, J. W., The Invasion of India by Alexander the Great, p. 104Google Scholar, takes it thus.

19 Alexander der Grosse, p. 171 (E.T., p. 182). Tarn rejects this suggestion because of his conviction that Alexander did not charge, but, by sending away Coenus, induced the Indian cavalry (4,000 strong) to charge him, and thus allow Coenus to take them in the rear.

20 It is, of course, possible that the fault is not Arrian's but Ptolemy's; that Arrian has reproduced all the information available to him. But Ptolemy, whatever else he knew about the battle, must have known, one would think, Alexander's orders to Coenus. Even if he described only his own ‘acta’, as Breloer holds, one would expect him to have dealt fully with the orders.

21 In criticising Arrian's time sequence Tarn (p. 195 and n. 1) remarks that Coenus could not have been sent off before the horse-archers ‘or he would have blocked them’, and later adds (p. 196) that ‘the Indians might suppose that he (Coenus) was going to support the horse-archers’. But the two units were clearly proceeding in different directions, and Coenus would be well clear to the left when the horse-archers charged.

22 It is difficult to know exactly what meaning to assign to παρελαύνειν, but the usual force of παρά in compounds of this kind is ‘past’ or ‘along’, and the latter seems to fit here. Heitland (Alexander in India, p. 122) writes: ‘Arrian (5.16.2) tells that Alexander was making a flanking movement (παρήλαυνεν) with the bulk of his cavalry to attack the enemy's left wing.’ This expresses my view exactly, but I cannot agree with the remainder of his interpretation.

23 LS 9 cite only two instances of in this sense. Tarn himself writes (p. 137): ‘Finally it is worth remarking that Arrian wrote in the second century A.D., and that his use of common words is not variniably that of a Xenophon or a Demosthenes.’

24 Sect. 16 (Loeb ed. p. 444). Xenophon ‘The Cavalry Commander’ II. 2–3 seems to imply that the Athenian cavalry regiment was organised in column.

25 Arrian 3.14.2. Asclepiodotus 7.3 (Loeb ed. p. 279) also refers to the Macedonian wedge formation.