¹ Curt, iv 1.35, 5.13. On these events and the source tradition see Tarn, W. W., Alexander the Great ii (Cambridge 1948) 110 Google Scholar f., 177; Errington, , CQ xix (1969) 234 Google Scholar f.; Briant, P., Antigone le Borgne (Paris 1973) 53–74 Google Scholar.

² For the importance of Alexander as a literary exemplum see Heuss, A., ‘Alexander der Grosse und die politische Ideologie des Altertums,’ Antike und Abendland iv (1954) 65 CrossRefGoogle Scholar ff., and (briefly) Bosworth, A. B., Historical commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander i (Oxford 1980) 12–14 Google Scholar.

³ Convenient and differently pointed digests of modern scholarship on Alexander are provided by Schachermeyr, F., Alexander der Grosse: das Problem seiner Persöntichkeit und seines Wirkens (SAWW cclxxxv (1973) 609–651)Google Scholar and Badian, E., ‘Some recent interpretations of Alexander’, Fond. Hardt xxii (1976) 279–311 Google Scholar.

⁴ Alexander the Great i 103, reproduced verbatim by Narain, A. K., Greece & Rome xii (1965) 160 Google Scholar.

⁵ Cf. (e.g.) Tarn i 68 (‘a local revolt which severity might repress’); Fox, R. Lane, Alexander the Great (London 1973) 302 Google Scholar (‘his garrisons had been murdered, so he repaid the compliment’).

⁶ For a brief outline of Alexander's settlement of Sogdiana and its implications see Bosworth, , ‘Alexander and the Iranians’, JHS c (1980) 10–11, 17–18 Google Scholar.

⁷ Droysen, J. G., ‘Alexanders des Grossen Armee’, Hermes xii (1877) 226–252 Google Scholar = Kleine Schriften zur alten Geschichte ii (Leipzig 1894) 208 Google Scholar ff.; Berve, H., Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage i (Munich 1926) 103–217 Google Scholar. Recent research in English has started from Tarn's modifications of Berve's treatment of the subject (Alexander the Great ii 135–169). See in particular Brunt, P. A., ‘Alexander's Macedonian cavalry’, JHS lxxxiii (1963) 27–46 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; (additions and modifications in his Loeb edition of Arrian, vol. ii [1983] 483–90); Milns, R. D., ‘The army of Alexander the Great’, Fond. Hardt xxii (1976) 87–136 Google Scholar.

⁸ Rostovtzeff, M. I., A social and economic history of the Hellenistic world ii (Oxford 1941) 1136:Google Scholar ‘Thousands of adult male Macedonians left their native country never to return. A larger part of the Macedonian army was never demobilised after Alexander's death; on the contrary it was from time to time reinforced by fresh Macedonian recruits.’ Cf. also Launey, M., Recherches sur les armées hellénistiques i (Paris 1949) 290 Google Scholar.

⁹ Diod. xvii 17.3, 5. These are the only detailed figures for the individual contingents of the Macedonian army, but the infantry numbers at least are self-consistent, totalling 32,000 (which Diodorus scales down to a round figure of 30,000). The contemporary historians, Anaximenes and Callisthenes, gave substantially higher totals, 43,000 and 40,000 respectively (Plut. de Alex. fort. i. 3, 327 E, Alex. 15.1; Plb. xii 19.1), which are usually thought to include the expeditionary force operating in Asia Minor under Parmenion (cf. Droysen [n. 7] 229; Brunt [n. 7] 34; Milns, , JHS lxxxvi [1966] 167)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In that case the advance force was probably 10,000 strong. Polyaenus v 44.4 is not such direct confirmation as is sometimes assumed. He states that Parmenion and Attalus had 10,000 troops at Magnesia, but the figure is suspiciously rounded, perhaps exaggerated to give Memnon additional credit for his victory. In any case the entire army was not present at Magnesia. The third commander, Calas, was apparently elsewhere, and he presumably had forces of his own.

¹⁰ In 335 Calas was operating in the Troad with a mixed force of Macedonians and mercenaries (Diod. xvii 7.10). The Macedonian component was evidently significant, for when Memnon raided Cyzicus he disguised his men with the typically Macedonian kausia (Polyaen. v 44.5).

¹¹ Arr. vii 12.1; Diod. xvii 109.1, xviii 4.1, 12.1, 16.4; Justin xii 12.7 (11,000—probably including cavalry).

¹² Milns (n. 7) 112; Schachermeyr, , Alexander in Babylon (SAWW cclxviii (1970), 14 Google Scholar f., Alexander der Grosse (n. 3) 491.

¹³ Diod. xviii 7.3 (he was to receive 10,000 mercenary infantry from the upper satrapies).

¹⁴ Diodorus gives no impression how long Peithon's expedition lasted, but he had to concentrate an army from a number of different satrapies and then face the returning colonists somewhere to the cast of the Iranian plateau. The operations presumably lasted well into 322.

¹⁵ Plut. Eum. 4.3–4, cf. 5.5; Diod. xviii 29.5; PSI xii 1284 (on which see Bosworth, , GRBS xix [1978] 227–237)Google Scholar.

¹⁶ Plut. Eum. 5.2 (Alcetas refused to help Eumenes in 321 on the grounds that the Macedonians under him would not fight against Craterus); cf. Diod. xviii 44.3–5.

¹⁷ This is revealed by a new fragment of Arrian's History of the Successors Book X, preserved on two palimpsest folios in the University of Gothenburg: Noret, J., ‘Un fragment du dixième livre de la Succession d'Alexandre par Arrien’, AC lii (1983) 235–42Google Scholar (F 73^r, lines 9–11: ταῦτα δὲ ἔπρασσεν Ἀλκέτας ἐν πρώτοις καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τούτῳ [sc. δύναμιν Μακεδονικὴν τὴν πλείστην οὖσαν ἐθέλων ἑαυτῷ προσποιῆσαι). Eumenes had annexed Neoptolemus' forces on the eve of the encounter with Craterus (Plut. Eum. 5.5: Arr. Succ. F 1. 27; cf. GRBS xix [1978] 235–36)Google Scholar and kept them subsequently, diminished by the battle losses. Despite his victory he acquired none of Craterus' Macedonian veterans, who made their escape as a body and joined Antipater's army (Diod. xviii 32.3–4; Arr. Succ. F 1.27 fin.; Nepos Eum. 4.3).

¹⁸ Arr. Succ. F 1.35 (Roos). For the strength of the argyraspides at this time see Diod. xviii 58.1, xix 28.1, 30.6.

¹⁹ Arr. vii 23.3–4. Milns (n. 7) 127 f., believing in a maximum of 3,000 Macedonian infantry, argues that only c. 12,000 of the Persians were used in the mixed phalanx. It is more likely (if the detail is to be contested) that the total figure in Arrian is rounded up. One obviously cannot lay emphasis on this single passage in isolation, but it does cohere with the rest of the historical data for the phalanx infantry after Alexander's death.

²⁰ Brunt (n. 7) 38–39.

²¹ Arr. vii 12.4 (cf. Justin xii 14.5; Curt, x 10.15; Metz Epitome 87). For the political background see Badian, E., JHS lxxxi (1961) 36–37 Google Scholar (the objections of Griffith, G. T., PACA viii [1965] 12 Google Scholar ff. are not convincing; cf. Bosworth, , CQ xxi [1971] 125 Google Scholar f.; Schachermeyr [n. 3] 516–518). The pattern of reinforcements during Alexander's reign is argued in greater detail below (pp. 5–9).

²² The number would be even higher if Curtius' figure of 13,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry (x 2.8) referred to the Macedonian forces left after the demobilisation of Craterus' veterans. Unfortunately the text is not sufficiently explicit. Curtius seems to distinguish between two groups of Macedonians, those demobilised and those retained by Alexander (x 2.12, 16). But there is a further assumption that the troops retained are intended as a permanent garrison army in Asia (x 2.8, 12), and the figures given are explicitly figures for that permanent army. In other words there were three groups, the Opis veterans, Alexander's royal army and the garrison army of Asia. One cannot imagine the king assigning all or the majority of his Macedonians to a force which he would not personally command, and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Curtius' source intended the total of 13,000 to include mercenaries (Berve, [n. 7] i 134; Bosworth, , JHS c [1980] 19 Google Scholar; Brunt, , Arrian ii [n. 7] 489)Google Scholar. There is a strong hint that that is so in the words Alexander is made to utter a few lines later, when he claims that the soldiers with grounds for complaint are the minority of the army, utpote cum plures dimiserim quam retenturus sum (x 2.19). The troops retained were less than those discharged, less than 10,000, and Curtius' figure for the Asian army, if it is correctly transmitted, cannot comprise Macedonians alone.

²³ Arr. iv 4.1; cf. iv 22.5, 24.7, v 1.5, 27.5. Some foundations such as Nicaea and Alexandria Charax were settled exclusively by mercenaries (Arr. v 29.3, vii 21.7), but it seems that when Macedonian disabled were available they were settled in the colonies.

²⁴ Curt, vii 5.15; Arr. vi 24.1. Strasburger, H., Hermes lxxx (1952) 470–473 Google Scholar, gives an impressive list of ‘Strapazenberichte’.

²⁵ Arr. iii 5.5 (Arrhybas), iii 25.4 (Nicanor), vi 2.1 (Coenus), vi 27.1 (Thoas), vii 14.1 (Hephaestion).

²⁶ Arr. ii 7.1, iv 16.6, v 8.3, vi 25.2–3; cf. Berve (n. 7) i 196 f.

²⁷ Arr. Ind. 15.11–12 (cf. Strabo xv 1.45 [706]) = FGrH 133 F 10.

²⁸ Diod. xvii 94.3 (70 days' rain); Strabo xv 1.27 698).

²⁹ It first served under Longinus, L. Cassius (Caes. BC iii 34.2)Google Scholar and was then transferred to the command of Calenus, Q. Fufius (BC iii 56.2)Google Scholar. In the interim it suffered defeat at the hands of Scipio (Dio. xli 51.2; cf. Brunt, P. A., Italian manpower [Oxford 1971] 692)Google Scholar.

³⁰ Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 takes a 50% survival rate as a maximum; Milns' estimate ([n. 7] 112) of 38% casualties unacceptably low.

³¹ Compare Arr. Ind. 19.5 (from Nearchus): σύν οῖς ἀπὸ θαλάσσης τε αὐτὸς ἀνήγαγε καί αὖθις οἱ ἐπί συλλογὴν αὐτῷ στρατιᾶς πεμφθέντες ἦκον ἔχοντες. This is a similar distinction between the original force and later supplements, but it is much vaguer and applies to the entirety of Alexander's army, not merely the Macedonians. In particular it is difficult to identify the sea referred to in the passage. Is it the Aegean (in which case the army of 334 is meant) or is it the Mediterranean (which Alexander left only in the summer of 331)? If the former were intended, one would expect an explicit reference to the Hellespont. The balance of probability must tip in favour of the second alternative.

³² Brunt (n. 7) 38 n. 35 is inclined to distinguish between the veterans of campaigns before Gaugamela and those from later reinforcements. If we include the expeditionary force of 336/5, Alexander's Macedonian infantry may have totalled as much as 15,000 in 334 (above, pp. 2–3), and 6,000 of them may have survived to Opis. Even so, the survivors from the veterans of the crossing were not all discharged; some at least remained to serve with the argyraspides (cf. Diod. xix 41.1–2).

³³ The clearest case is the arrival of Amyntas' reinforcements (below), which is placed by Arrian (iii 16.10) at Susa, by Curtius (v 1.39) at Babylon, and by Diodorus (xvii 65.1) midway in Sittacene.

³⁴ Berve (n. 7) i 179 suggested that the total was a conflation of all reports of reinforcements between the Hellespont and Issus; Beloch, K.J. (Griechische Geschichte iii ^2. 2 [Berlin 1923] 331 Google Scholar f.) that it was a garbled report of Arrian's Gordium reinforcements (so Milns [n. 7] 106). Neither view is cogent. Polybius' report is detailed, giving precise numbers and a fairly precise location, and it cannot be combined with any other material in the sources. He does not mention the reinforcements at Gordium and Ancyra, but that is immaterial. His purpose is to prove that the Macedonian forces could not be deployed in the terrain of Issus in the phalanx formation described by Callisthenes, and, given his erroneous assumption that the phalanx comprised all Alexander's infantry, it was easy to demonstrate. He only needed Callisthenes' figures at the crossing and the most recent reinforcements. It was not necessary for him to chase up each and every reinforcement reported by Callisthenes (he is content with a theoretical estimate of absentees from the battle).

³⁵ Atkinson, J. E., A commentary on Q. Curtius Rufus' Historiae Alexandri Magni: Books 3 and 4 (Amsterdam 1980) 181 Google Scholar.

³⁶ Arr. ii 2.1; Curt, iii 3.1. See further Boswor.th (n. 2) 181; Atkinson (n. 35) 115 f.

³⁷ Aeschin. iii 164; Diod. xvii 32.4; Joseph, . AJ xi 315 fGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ Cf. Arr. ii 21.3, 22.6–7. The vulgate account is vivid and explicit about casualties; see Bosworth, , ‘Arrian and the Alexander Vulgate’, Fond. Hardt xxii (1976) 17–20 Google Scholar.

³⁹ For Amyntas' mission see Diod. xvii 49.1; Curt, iv 6.30. The numbers of his reinforcements are provided by the vulgate alone (Diod. xvii 65.1; Curt, v 1.40–42).

⁴⁰ Curt, vii 1.37–40. The context is a forensic speech, but the statement is detailed, specifically naming three reluctant conscripts. There is no warrant for dismissing it as invention.

⁴¹ This chronology has controversial implications for the interpretation of Agis' war (cf. Bosworth, , Phoenix xix [1975] 35–37 Google Scholar; Atkinson [n. 35] 483 f.), but they are fortunately irrelevant to the issue here.

⁴² Berve (n. 7) i 184 gives a convenient summary of the data.

⁴³ Arr. iii 19.5–6; Diod. xvii 74.3–4.

⁴⁴ Curtius (vii 10.11–12) gives the only detailed report of figures. Arrian (iv 7.2) confirms the date and agrees on the names of the principal commanders of contingents.

⁴⁵ Cf. Curt, v 1.40–41: Macedonian peditum VI milia … cum his DC Thracas, adiunctis peditibus eiusdem generis III milibus D et ex Peloponneso mercennarius miles ad IIII milia advenerat.

⁴⁶ A certain Menidas arrived in Babylon in 323, bringing his unit of cavalry (Arr. vii 23.1). He is usually identified with the Menidas sent with Epocillus in 327, and it is suggested that he brought one of several contingents from Macedon (Berve ii 257 no. 508; Brunt [n. 7] 39; Milns [n. 7] 109). But Arrian combines Menidas' arrival with the arrival of the satraps of Caria and Lydia. He is, I think, the Menidas assigned to the garrison of Media in 330 (Arr. iii 26.3: pace Berve, there is no reason to think that he was recalled to the main army before 327 and sent to Macedon with Epocillus—there were two distinct individuals). The other Median commanders rejoined Alexander in Carmania, bringing the bulk of the holding army (Arr. vi 27.3). I suggest that Menidas was summoned later and brought with him the residual force of mercenary cavalry. If so, he was untainted by the accusations of corruption made against his colleagues, for he continued in favour at court (cf. Arr. vii 26.2).

⁴⁷ Diod. xvii 95.4 (totals only: 30,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, 25,000 infantry panoplies and 100 talents of medicine); Curt, ix 3.21 (Memnon brings 5,000 cavalry from Thrace, 7,000 mercenary infantry from Harpalus and 25,000 gold and silver panoplies). The original clearly gave a detailed list of contingents which Curtius reproduced very partially while Diodorus recorded the grand total alone. If there was a Macedonian contingent as argued by Brunt, (Arrian ii [n. 7] 488–89)Google Scholar, it was not particularly prominent, for it is excluded from both reports.

⁴⁸ Note the comments of Diodorus (xvii 94.1–2) and Arrian (v 27.5–6: Coenus' speech). Even if rhetorically pointed they represent the conventional view in antiquity.

⁴⁹ Aeschin. iii 165 (πολὺν χρόνον συνῆγε στρατόπεδον). I have argued elsewhere ( Phoenix xix [1975] 38 Google Scholar ff.) that this recruiting took place over the winter of 331/0. The delay, however, is a fact and independent of the exact chronology.

⁵⁰ Diod. xvii 63.1. The allies are not named, but they probably included Corinth, Argos and Messenia as well as the northern members of the Corinthian League (cf. McQueen, E. I., Historia xxvii [1978] 40–51)Google Scholar. Antipater had a large pool of allies antipathetic to Sparta.

⁵¹ Diodorus (xviii 12.2) terms all Antipater's infantry Μακεδόνες, but the blanket designation means very little. He probably inferred that all the troops on the Macedonian side were native Macedonian. The alternative, that he omitted a non-Macedonian contingent, is most improbable. If Antipater had far more than 13,000 foot at the outset, it is hard to explain his later discomfiture, and the attested numbers at Crannon appear surprisingly small.

⁵² Diod. xviii 12.2: ἀπέλιπε στρατηγὸν Σίππαν, δούς στρατιώτας τοὺς ἱκανοὺς καί παραγγείλας στρατολογεῖν ὡς πλείστους.

⁵³ Diod. xviii 14.5 Leonnatus seems to have modelled himself on Alexander, with a vanguard of Nisaean horses and his own agema of Companions (‘Suda’ s.v. Λεόννατος = Arr. Slice. F 12 [Roos]—probably describing the advance through northern Greece). Unfortunately this permits no inference about the proportion of Macedonians in his army.

⁵⁴ Diod. xviii 16.4–5. Antipater and Craterus retained an army of 30,000 for the campaign against the Aetolians over the winter of 332/1 (Diod. xviii 24.1).

⁵⁵ Arr. iii 29.5: τῶν τε Μακεδόνων ἐπιλέξας τούς πρεσβυτάτους καί ἤδη ἀπολέμους… ἐπ̕ οἴκου ἀπέστειλεν.

⁵⁶ Arr. Succ. F. 1.43; Diod. xix 29.3 (Antigonus); Diod. xviii 51.1 (Arrhidaeus: 1,000 Macedonians to 10,000 mercenaries and 500 Persian bowmen and slingcrs). The latter may well have served with Craterus (cf. Diod. xviii 16.4), to be transferred to Arrhidaeus' command after Triparadeisus.

⁵⁷ Diod. xix 48.3–4; Polyaen. iv 6.15; Plut. Eum. 19. For a survey of Macedonian troops in the armies of the Successors see Launey (n. 8) i 295–303.

⁵⁸ Polyaen. iv 6.6. The episode has been variously dated, but it took place when Antigonus was wintering in Cappadocia. The best context seems to be the operations against Eumenes after Triparadeisus. Then Antigonus had only 5,000 of the Macedonians given him by Antipater (cf. Diod. xviii 40.7 with Engels, R., MH xxxviii [1971] 228 Google Scholar f.). The mutineers may already have been discharged.

⁵⁹ Arr. vii 12.2; cf. Justin xii 4.1–11.

⁶⁰ In 318 BC Polyperchon was able to raise an army of 20,000 Macedonian infantry and 4,000 allies for his invasion of Attica (Diod. xviii 68.3) and in 321, even after the departure of the expeditionary forces of Antipater and Craterus, he was able to crush a revolt in Thessaly μετὰ δυνάμεως ἀξιολόγου (Diod. xviii 38.6; cf. Westlake, H. D., CR lxiii [1949] 90)Google Scholar. In the latter case no figure is given for the whole army, let alone the native Macedonians, and in the former there is every likelihood that the forces from Macedon included mercenaries as well as citizen troops.

⁶¹ Diod. xx 110.4; cf. Fortina, M., Cassandro, re di Macedonia (Turin 1965) 102–5Google Scholar.

⁶² Diod. xx 107.1: the majority of these forces may have come from the Autariatae settled by Cassander around Mt. Orbelus—2,000 of them are attested serving with Lysimachus (Diod. xx 113.3; cf. xix 19.1). According to Plutarch (Demetr. 23.2) 6,000 Macedonians had come over to Demetrius when he captured Heracleia in 304. Once again it is difficult to define what is meant by ‘Macedonians’. They were presumably not all phalanx troops, for the total Macedonian component of Demetrius' army was only 8,000 (Diod. xx 110.4) and he must have received a substantial nucleus of Macedonian troops from his father Antigonus (he had commanded 5,000 during the Babylonian campaign of 312 [cf. Diod. xix 100.4]).

⁶³ Plutarch (Arat. 43.1) claims that Doson deployed 20,000 Macedonian infantry in 224 BC, but once again there is no figure given for non-Macedonian troops. Plutarch may have assumed that the army was wholly composed of native Macedonians.

⁶⁴ For Philip's levy and its results see Liv. xxxiii 3.1–5, 4.4–6.

⁶⁵ Liv. xxxix 24.3; xlii II.6.

⁶⁶ For details and sources see Errington, R. M., ‘Alexander in the Hellenistic world’, Fond. Hardt xxii (1976) 146–52Google Scholar. Goukowsky, P., Essai sur les origines du mythe d'Alexandre i (Nancy 1978) 105–11Google Scholar (see also his Budé edition of Diodorus xvii, pp. xxiv–xxvi; Chamoux, F., in Ancient Macedonia iii [Thessaloniki 1983] 57–66)Google Scholar, dismisses the entire tradition of Cassander's hostility to Alexander as a distorted echo of the propaganda of Antigonus and Demetrius. It is true that modern scholars have been too ready to infer a vendetta against the entire memory of Alexander. There must, however, have been some hostile acts, as Plutarch (Demetr. 37.3) emphasises when he describes as a matter of fact the Macedonians' hatred for what Cassander had done against the dead Alexander (ἄ κάσσανδρος εỉς Άλέξανδρον τεθνηκότα παρενόμησεν). Demetrius may have capitalised upon the hostility but he did not originate it. As for Antigonus, he was careful not to invoke the memory of Alexander against Cassander (see below). One cannot accredit him with the creation of a myth. The verdict of Diod. xvii 117.2 is probably the standard reaction to Cassander's attested actions, not an echo of propaganda. See also Mikrogiannakes, E., in Ancient Macedonia ii (Thessaloniki 1977) 225–36Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Plut. Alex. 74.6. On this passage see Bendinelli, G., RFIC xciii (1965) 150–64Google Scholar; Fortina (n. 61) 10–11.

⁶⁸ This is conceded by Goukowsky (n. 66) 110. The fact that Cassander called one of his sons Alexander is immaterial: the name was common in the Argead house and, for that matter, in Macedonia—it was not unique to the son of Philip.

⁶⁹ Diod. xx 37.4 (Cleopatra); xix 52.1, 61.2 (Thessalonice); xix 52.5 (Philip and Eurydice). Cf. Errington (n. 64) 152: ‘paradoxically his anti-Alexander policy relied very heavily on the reputation of Philip.’

⁷⁰ Diod. xix 52.4 (cf Justin xiv 6.13). This denial of royal privilege is a strong argument against Goukowsky's thesis ([n. 66] 106) that Rhoxane and her son were merely kept in protective custody to prevent their being exploited by other contenders for power. Cassander was deliberately treating the legitimate king as a private individual.

⁷¹ Plut. Demetr. 37.3; Justin xvi 1.15–17.

⁷² Plut. Demetr. 37.4, cf. 14.2; Diod. xix 59.3–6.

⁷³ Diod. xix 61.2: ἔτι δὲ ὡς Όλυνθίους ὄντας πολεμιωτάτους Μακεδόνων κατῴκισεν… καί Θήβας ἀνέστησε τὰς ὑπὸ Μακεδόνων κατασκαφείσας. See also Justin xv 1.3.

⁷⁴ Diod. xix 11.2 claims that the Macedonians remembered the benefactions of Alexander and respected the axioma of Olympias. Her propaganda certainly stressed the achievements of her son, but it may have been her status as Philip's wife which tipped the balance (cf. Justin xiv 5.10: seu memoria mariti seu magnitudine filii).

⁷⁵ Diod. xix 35–36; Justin xiv 6. See Briant (n. 1) 297–99, Lévy, E., Ktema iii (1978) 208–9Google Scholar, and Errington, , Chiron viii (1978) 118 Google Scholar ff. for the constitutional significance (or insignificance) of the trial of Olympias.