¹ Of the very large literature I have found most illuminating, Herter, H., ‘Pylos und Melos’ in Rheinisches Museum xcvii (1954) 316–43.Google Scholar I ako owe thanks for suggestions and corrections to Professors V. Ehrenberg and A. Wasserstein.

² v 84, 2–114 and ibid. 115.4; 116.2–4.

³ For opposite view see Bury, J. B., The Ancient Greek Historians (London, 1909) 139.Google Scholar

⁴ The passage on ‘Hope’, v 103, links them.

⁵ Most bluntly v 93: The issue is περὶ σωτηρίας of the Melians v 87; ibid. 88; 91.2; 101.1. The Melians are gambling their all; ibid. 103; cf. 113.

⁶ Cf. Wassermann, F. M., ‘The Melian Dialogue’ in T.A.P.A. lxxviii (1947) 18–36Google Scholar on Melos as the typical autonomous city state, typical of the spirit that opposed Athens in Greece—and Sicily. Now see also Stahl, H. P., Thukydides (Munich, 1966) 158–171.Google Scholar

⁷ V 95; 97.

⁸ v 90: anticipates such indignation as would be aroused by die destruction of Melos, v 96: the argument that it is unreasonable to treat independent states in the same way as subdued rebel subjects implies that the issue is not merely subjection but also punishment. This would be destruction, v 100: the ‘so great risk’ need only be the hostility incurred by the attack on the freedom of Melos, but the destruction of Melos would bring even greater hostility and even greater risk.

⁹ v 36–50. Among many good writings on the debate: Wassermann, F. M., ‘Post Periclean Democracy in Action: The Mytilenean Debate’ in T.A.P.A. lxxxvii (1956) 27–41Google Scholar; de Romilly, J., Thucydide et l'impérialisme Athénien (Paris, 1951) 137–49Google Scholar; above all: Bodin, L., ‘Diodote contre Cléon’ in Mélanges Radet, R.E.A. xlii (1940) 36–52.Google Scholar

¹⁰ iii 39: Cleon, advocate of brutality, used moral arguments to arouse indignation. On the aptness of his speech: Winnington-Ingram, R. P., ‘τὰ δέοντα εἰπεῖν, Cleon and Diodotus’ in B.I.C.S. xii (1965) 70–82.Google Scholar

¹¹ Diodotus: iii 47. cf. ibid. 27. The degree to which the people were pro-Athenian is arguable. The fact of the division is not. Diodotus' remarks and the account of the surrender were surely written with reference to each other and the account is to endorse the remarks. Similarly in the case of Melos I would suggest that the account of the circumstances of the quarrel between Athens and Melos has been cut down to include only such facts as are needed to evaluate the dialogue and therefore that Thucydides has mentioned that the Athenian ambassadors were not taken before the Melian people as a whole (v 84.3–85) in order to suggest a division between the people and the ‘few’, and hence that Diodotus' argument applies. At v 116.3 he mentions treachery at Melos, iv 22 implies a similar division at Athens. On the universality of the division: iii 82.1. Cf. de Ste Croix, G. E. M., ‘The unpopularity of the Athenian Empire’ in Hitoria iii (1954) 1–55Google Scholar; de Romilly, , ‘Thucydides and the cities of the Athenian Empire’ in B.I.C.S. xiii (1966) 1–12.Google Scholar

¹² Diodotus: iii 45–46. Cf. v 100 (Melos) and iii 46.2 (Diodotus); v 102–3 (Melos) and iii 45. 4–7 (Diodotus). The Melians are a perfect illustration of Diodotus' thesis.

¹³ By his comments on the proposed execution and on Cleon: iii 36.2 ibid. 4 ibid. 6 (of Cleon) He is not merely weighing his language to induce the reader to accept a prejudiced view of Cleon (cf. Woodhead, A. G., ‘Thucydides' portrait of Cleon’ in Mnemosyne Ser. iv, xiii [1960] 289–17CrossRefGoogle Scholar). He is indicating his personal view of a policy, while keeping to his chosen con vention of objective narrative. Similarly I would argue that the sustained contrast of Brasidas and Cleon is not merely a contrast of personality. Brasidas through his moderate treatment of cities allied with Athens is shown to have benefited his country by inducing the Athenian subjects to trust Sparta (see esp. iv 81). Cleon (and his successors) alienated the cities more than was necessary and thus made inevitable the revolts in Athens' hour of weakness.

¹⁴ An example of the futile sharpening of penalties deplored by Diodotus: iii 45.3. A wiser solution: Cythera iv 54.3; 57.4. That Thucydides was right to maintain that the Melians were independent combatants is argued by Eberhardt, W., ‘Der Melier-Dialog und die Inschriften ATL Ag und IG i² 297 +’ in Historia viii (1959) 284–314.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The naval supremacy explained by Pericles (i 142.5 ff; ii 62) was greater than ever, cf. v 109; vi 17.8. While it lasted the island empire was safe. The rebellions of 412 were made possible by the loss of the Athenian fleet and the building of a Spartan one. Cf. viii 6.4 ff.

¹⁶ Cf. my ‘Thucydides and the Sicilian Expedition’ due to appear in Historia xvii (1968).

¹⁷ Cf. vi 76.2 (Hermoerates). Brasidas not Cleon is the example to follow. Is it chance that Thucy dides lets the Melians recall Brasidas (v 110)?

¹⁸ Contempt (v 109; ibid. 111) leads to Sicilian ambition (vi 11.5).

¹⁹ v 115.1–3; ibid. 116.1. Like the Dialogue (see below note 20), these passages have a double significance. For the present, they show how foolish the Melians are to rely on Sparta. In the long term, they show that the Athenians are heading for war with Sparta—again the Cleon spirit (e.g. iv 21 ff.) Cf. Méautis, G., ‘Le dialogue des Athéniens et des Méliens’ in R.E.G. xlviii (1935) 253–78, esp. 275 ff.Google Scholar

²⁰ vi 7.2; 105.

²¹ vii 18.2–4. Cf. Herter, note 1 above.

²² Cf. Andrewes, , ‘The Melian Dialogue and the last speech of Pericles’ in P.Cam.Phil.S. clxxxvi (1960) 1–10, esp. 5–6Google Scholar; Wassermann, note 9 above, esp. 35–8; de Romilly, , Thucydide, esp. 88–91Google Scholar; 250–9.

²³ de Romilly, , Thucydide 247–9.Google Scholar

²⁴ v 98–9; viii 2.1 shows fulfilment, with verbal reminiscence, cf. de Romilly op. cit. 232. But who were the states?

²⁵ v 110.

²⁶ v 99: ibid. 111:

²⁷ v 103; cf. iii 45.4. cf. Soph. Ant. 616. Cornford, F. M., Thucydides Mithistoricus (London, 1907) 182–5.Google Scholar Andrewes, op. cit. 2.

²⁸ v 89–91.

²⁹ This does not prove that it was written after 404. Andrewes, op. cit. 3–4, shows that 90–1 could have been written earlier. 89 certainly could. But the combination is likelier after 404. Also the forced introduction of the Spartans would have a clearer purpose after 404 than before. After 404 it would provide a reference to definite events in the light of which the following dialogue is to be interpreted. Also for a late date de Romilly, , Thucydide 231 ff.Google Scholar

³⁰ Xen. Hell. ii 2.19. Andoc. 1 Myst. 142.

³¹ See n. 16; de Romilly, , Histoire et raison chez Thucydide (Paris, 1956) 203.Google Scholar

³² As Athenians admit, cf. note 26 above. Cf. also v 113:

³³ vi 1.

³⁴ E.g. Jones, A. H. M., Athenian Democracy (Oxford, 1957) 65.Google Scholar Fully worked out by Cornford op. cit. On Thucydides' use of such contrasts see Gomme, A. W., The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History (Berkeley, 1954) 123 ff.Google Scholar

³⁵ Nicias feels guilt vii 64.1; ibid. 77.3–4.

³⁶ Examples in de Romilly, op. cit.; cf. also n. 16 above.

³⁷ Cf. Cornford, op. cit., citing Dion. Hal., Thu. 37 ff.

³⁸ Xenophon, born c. 430, Hell. ii 2.3. Isocrates, born 436, Pan. 100; ibid. 110 (written c. 380); Panath. 63; ibid. 89 (written 342). On relation of these to Spartan propaganda: de Romilly, , Thucydide 237 ff.Google Scholar

³⁹ Eteocles, in Eur. Phoen. 499 ff.Google Scholar similarly rejects right as relevant in a struggle for power. Creon in Soph. Ant. is comparable in that he is under the deluded impression that he is acting in the public interest.

⁴⁰ The sneer at oracles (v 103) suggests the deliberate creation of a situation like that of Creon, in Soph. Ant. 1033 ff.Google Scholar or of Oedipus, in Od.T. 964 ff.Google Scholar The fact that Thucydides may not believe in oracles would not prevent this remark from being an indication of ‘hybm’ to the ordinary reader.

⁴¹ Cf. Cornford op. cit. 241–3. On the logical and analytical character of Thucydides' treatment of hybris: de Romilly, , Thucydide 270–4.Google Scholar