¹ A notable exception to this standard account is the view of Ferrara, G., La politica di Solone (Napoli 1964) 124–26Google Scholar, that Solon, fr. 34 W is addressed to ‘nobili “demagoghi”’ who wished to take advantage of the peasants' discontent, using the peasants' support to gain riches and power for themselves, but were thwarted by Solon who did not revise the constitution to give poor and rich an equal share in government. Something of the same view appears to be expressed more briefly by Stinton, T.C.W., ‘Solon, fragment 25,’ JHS xcvi (1976) 159–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² This point is forcefully made by Harding, P., ‘Androtion's view of Solon's seisachtheia,’ Phoenix xxviii (1974) 285–87.Google Scholar

³ This is not to deny that wealth was to some degree redistributed de facto through liturgies, taxes and fines which fell more heavily upon the wealthy, though this was not the intent of legislation mandating liturgies, etc., and their de facto redistributive effects often went unnoticed (cf. Arist. Pol. 1309¹ 14–20). There is a real difference between the redistribution of money incidentally resulting from policies whose primary aim was to tax according to one's ability to pay, and an intentional policy of land redistribution aimed at equalizing the primary means of producing surplus wealth. Just as no Athenian democrat ever proposed gês anadasmos, no one ever proposed karpôn anadasmos either.

⁴ The two ideas are also found together in [Dem.] xvii 15 and in the text of the heliastic oath inserted in Dem. xxiv 149. [Dem.] xvii 15 quotes (or paraphrases) the treaty implementing the League of Corinth; since this treaty is essentially a conservative document—conservative thought not being limited to Athens—it is not surprising to find in it provisions against the same fears professed by Isocrates and Plato (cf. similarly the treaty's provision against δούλων ὰπελευθερώσεις ὲπὶ νεωτερισμῷ). The text of the oath in Dem. xxiv 149 is almost certainly a later interpolator's fabrication, only the beginning and end of which are likely to reflect the oath actually sworn by fourth–century jurymen (Fränkel, M., ‘Der attische Heliasteneid,’ Hermes xiii (1878) 452–66Google Scholar); in particular, the oath has jurymen promising that they will never vote for tyranny, oligarchy or chreôn apokopê and gês (and oikiôn) anadasmos, but it is difficult to envisage an occasion when jurymen qua jurymen could cast such a vote. It is possible that the archon's proclamation upon entering office that property rights will remain secure during his term (cf. Ath. Pol. 56.2) may have been intended to calm fears of democratically motivated land redistribution, but I suspect that the assurance is a more general one, that no one on any side will lose his property through stasis.

⁵ Cf. Isoc. vii Areopag. 31–35, where the integrity of contracts and the security of possessions are seen as characteristic of ‘the good old days,’ thus blending into the broader conservative theme of the patrios politela.

⁶ For Solon as a proto–democrat in the Ath. Pol. see 9.1, 10.1, 41.2; for a more reasonable account see Arist. Pol. 1273^b35–1274^a21. More generally see Fuks, A., The ancestral constitution [London 1953]) 14–15Google Scholar with notes for sources.

⁷ This interpretation of Solon fr. 34 W is not the only place in the Ath. Pol. where its author has been influenced by contemporary conservative speculation. The assertion at Ath. Pol. 13.2 that among the Ten Archons of 581 there were three agroikoi and two dêmiourgoi is a similar product of fifth—and fourth—century conservative theory, as indeed may be the whole episode of the Ten Archons; on this point see further Gernet, L., ‘Les dix archontes de 581’, RP ³ xii (1938) 216–27Google Scholar; Rhodes, P. J., A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politela (Oxford 1981) 183Google Scholar, while inclined to follow Cavaignac, E., ‘La désignation des archontes athéniens jusqu'en 487,’ RP ² xlviii (1924) 145Google Scholar, in identifying the ten as the prokritoi for the archonship from each tribe divided five Eupatrids, five non–Eupatrids, also rejects as a late invention the tripartite membership described by Aristotle.

⁸ Ferrara (n. 1) 120.

⁹ For what it may be worth, the expression ὲφ᾿ άρπαγαῖσι also occurs at Eur. Herc. 591 speaking of rich layabouts who have spent themselves poor and now support Lycus in the hope of gaining wealth έφ᾿ άρπαγαίσι τῶν πέλας; cf. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U., Euripides: Herakles (Berlin 1889)Google Scholarad loc., who cites, for the type, Plato, Rep. 555D on impoverished ouk agenneis.

¹⁰ Plutarch's account of events after Dion gained control of Syracuse in 356 includes the detail that Dion's rival Herakleides put up ‘one of the demagogues’ to undermine Dion's popularity with the dêmos by proposing gês anadasmos, on the grounds that ‘equality was the beginning of freedom while poverty was the beginning of slavery for those without possessions’ (Plut. Dion 37.5; cf. 48.6 which refers to redistribution of land and houses). Plutarch's account, however, is seriously distorted by his desire to portray Dion as a victim of radical democrats and, pace Fuks, A., ‘Redistribution of land and houses in Syracuse in 356 BC, and its Ideological Aspects,’ CQ xviii (1968) 207–23CrossRefGoogle Scholar, the passage probably tells us more about Plutarch's views of democracy, views shaped by the texts discussed above, than it does about the arguments and events in Syracuse in 356 BC. The account of these same events in Diodorus Siculus xvi 16–17 makes no mention of land redistribution.

¹¹ E.g. Hdt. vi 159. Note also Meiggs-Lewis 13 (‘A Lokrian community settles new territory: (?)525–500 BC’), lines 7–14, which prohibit subsequent attempts to upset the original distribution which is the principal subject of the law (cf. IG i³ 46, lines 20–26, for similar provisions for the Athenian colony at Brea). The most famous distribution of conquered land is of course the allocation to Spartiates of klêroi in Messenia.

¹² E.g. Thuc. viii 21. Asheri, D., Distribuzione di terre nell' antica Grecia (Torino 1966)Google Scholar, provides an extensive list of occasions upon which land was distributed in ancient Greece, with discussions of the reasons for these distributions.

¹³ I have discussed the emergence of the concept of democratic equality and its relation to aristocratic equality in ‘The tyrant in Athenian democracy,’ QUCC xxx 3 (1988) 46–52.

¹⁴ Fr. 15 W, v. 1. Agathoi are normally wealthy, kakoi normally are not. The point of the verse is that the normal order of things has been upset, and that some kakoi have gained wealth (while remaining kakoi) and some agathoi have lost their wealth (while remaining agathoi), not that even poor people can be morally good. For the unhappy state of the impoverished agathos cf. e.g. Theog. 173–80, 929–30.

¹⁵ The use of the terms esthlos = agathos and deilos = kakos elsewhere in the surviving fragments of Solon's poems is consistent with the interpretation given here, that esthlos = agathos refers to the hereditary aristocracy and that deilos = kakos refers to anyone outside the circle of agathoi, including wealthy landed non–aristocrats. (Fr. 13 W, v. 33 [agathos, kakos] v. 39 [agathos, deilos], fr. 15 W, v. 1 [agathos, kakos], fr. 36 W, v. 18 [agathos, kakos]. Note especially fr. 13 W, v. 39 in contrast with vv. 41–42, and fr. 15 W, vv. 1–4. Esthlos is used only in fr. 34 W, v. 9 to indicate social status.) For the use of the terms in the Theognid poems see the discussion of Cerri, G., ‘La terminologia sociopolitica di Teognide: I. L'opposizione semantica tra agathos–esthlos e kakos-deilos,’ QUCC vi (1968) 7–32.Google Scholar

¹⁶ And doubtless many agathoi (e.g. Theog. 525–26) thought they all deserved to be.

¹⁷ On these relatively wealthy kakoi see Starr, C. G., Individual and community: the rise of the polis 800–500 BC (New York and Oxford 1986) 93–96Google Scholar, drawing especially on Theognis. Starr's language here could suggest that only relatively wealthy non–aristocrats were called kakoi (hence the critique of Millett, P., ‘Hesiod and his world,’ PCPS xxx (1984) 88–90Google Scholar; Starr is a bit clearer in CHA ² 3.3 (1970) 432, that all non–aristocrats were kakoi, some of whom were relatively wealthy.

¹⁸ In all likelihood the subjects of the poem were identified in sufficient detail in the earlier, now lost, part of the poem where Solon probably told how he had urged moderate expectations upon them, ‘but they …’ (οἰ δ', v. 1).

¹⁹ The question of how a family became qualified by birth for public office in pre–Solonic Athens lies outside the scope of this paper, but I would suggest that in the traditional society of archaic Athens the essential criterion was gradual acceptance by the other members of the privileged political class (cf. Ath. Pol. 8.2); that wealth had a great deal to do with this acceptance; that acceptance, once achieved, was then passed down from father to son, to be lost only when the family's wealth was dissipated or the family itself died out; and that as some families rose in wealth and others fell, their changing relative fortunes were responsible for tensions in Athens not unlike those we see in the Theognid poems. On the absence of a closed Eupatrid ‘caste’ see most recently Figueira, T. J., ‘The ten archontes of 579/8 at Athens,’ Hesperia liii (1984) 954–59.Google Scholar

²⁰ For the argument is this paragraph see especially Hignett, C., A history of the Athenian constitution to the end of the fifth century BC (Oxford 1952) 102–7Google Scholar; see also Andrewes, A., CAH ², vol. iii 3, 384–85.Google Scholar Athenian society may have been organized into hippeis, zeugitai and thetes, presumably for military purposes, before Solon, but the use of these categories (with the addition of the pentakosiomedimnoi) to determine eligibility for political office was Solon's innovation, as was also possibly the definition of these categories in terms of specific amounts of agricultural produce.

²¹ For land ownership as the primary basis of wealth at this time see Starr, C. G., The economic and social growth of early Greece 800–500 BC (New York 1977) 124–26.Google Scholar

²² Hignett (n. 20) 103–5. See also Ellis, J. R. and Stanton, G. R., ‘Factional conflict and Solon's reforms,’ Phoenix xxii (1968) 97–98Google Scholar; more generally see Sealey, R., ‘Regionalism in Archaic Athens,’ Historia ix (1960) 155–75.Google Scholar

²³ Dependency could also arise from non–economic factors, e.g. a weaker man's desire for a stronger man's protection, or the stranger's pressure upon the weaker. Whatever the cause of the dependency, one form of its acknowledgement, possibly a traditional one, was the compulsory payment by the dependent of a part of his produce (cf. Forrest, W. G., The emergence of Greek democracy [London 1966] 150Google Scholar, though not all these relations of dependence need be as old as the Dark Ages as Forrest would have it), and this obligation, if not met, could, again, eventually lead to the dependent's loss of his land. For a more detailed account of how such developing dependency might work see French, A., ‘The economic background to Solon's reforms,’ CQ vi (1956) 17–19Google Scholar, though I do not feel it necessary to accept French's principal thesis, that the crisis faced by Solon was precipitated by the ecological consequences of a switch, prompted by population pressures, from a meat-to grain-based diet; the year-to-year hazards of subsistence agriculture would be enough to catch some farmers short.

²⁴ It has been argued by Murray, O., Early Greece (Brighton 1980) 184Google Scholar, correctly I believe, that what had begun as a traditional dependence structure came to be exploited by aristocrats in the late seventh century to fund a new, and expensive, aristocratic lifestyle. I would only add that the dependence structure could also be exploited by up-and-coming non-aristocrats who were even more motivated to imitate the aristocrat lifestyle by their desire to be accepted by the aristocrats (cf. n. 19).

²⁵ On this see further Andrewes (n. 20) 382.

²⁶ Fr. 32 W., in which Solon speaks of sparing the gês… patriaos and of rejecting tyranny, may similarly mean that he refused to become tyrant and reward his supporters with land confiscated from his opponents.

²⁷ Political power is here understood as the ability to get things done in the political sphere (cf. the adjective dunatoi elsewhere used to describe the politically powerful). It does not necessarily require access to magistracies, but can operate equally well through influence, particularly in a small oligarchic state such as Athens was in the early sixth century.

²⁸ One might object that if the estates of the esthloi passed over to wealthy kakoi, the result could hardly be characterized as isomoiriê between the two. In reply it could be argued that even if Solon had confiscated property, he would have confiscated that of only some of the esthloi, viz. those who had opposed his tyranny, while other esthloi would have remained in possession of theirs; in this case isomoiriê would still denote a rough equality between the possessions of individual kakoi (viz. those who received the confiscated estates) and individual esthloi (viz. those whose estates had not been confiscated). The absence of articles with κακοίσιν and ὲσθλοὺς may indicate that the comparison is between some esthloi and some kakoi, and not between hoi esthloi (or ho esthlos) and hoi kakoi (or ho kakos) as inclusive categories.

²⁹ Cf. the description of archaic Greek society given by Forrest (n. 23) 48–49.

³⁰ Whatever the seisachtheia was, it would have affected wealthy landed agathoi and wealthy landed kakoi alike. Conceivably this was a price which at least some wealthy landed kakoi were willing to pay for access to public office through Solon's political reform. In any event, the effects of the seisachtheia could not have been too radical, or they would not have been accepted by the landed interest, noble and ignoble, which dominated early sixth–century Athenian society.