¹ Aristoteles und die alten Peripatetiker (Hildesheim 1963) 309–13Google Scholar.

² Cherniss, H. F., Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (New York 1962) 340Google Scholar.

³ Oates, W., Aristotle and the Problem of Value (Princeton 1967) 74Google Scholar.

⁴ Zeller (n. 1) 309–10; Bonitz, H., Aristotelis Metaphysica (Hildesheim 1960) 569Google Scholar n. 1; Natorp, P., Platons Ideenlehre (Leipzig 1903) 421;Google ScholarWerner, C., Aristote et l'idéalisme platonicien (Paris 1910) 70Google Scholar n. 1; Gomperz, T.Greek Thinkers (London 1912) 77–8;Google ScholarRoss, W. D., Aristotle (Oxford 1966) 170–2;Google ScholarAristotle's Metaphysics (Oxford 1970) i cix, ii 466;Google ScholarRobin, L., La pensée hellénique des origines à Epicure (Paris 1942) 520;Google ScholarAllan, D. J., The Philosophy of Aristotle (Oxford 1970) 120–1;Google Scholar Cherniss (n. 2) 339–51; Oates (n. 3) 73–4, 180–3, 365; Tricot, J., La Métaphysique (Paris 1962) i 439–42;Google ScholarAlbritton, R., JPhilos liv (1957) 708;Google ScholarLacey, A. R., Phronesis x (1965) 60–2Google Scholar.

⁵ Ps.-Alexander in Metaph. 792–3; Schwegler, A., Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Tübingen 1847–1848) ii 338;Google ScholarRobin, L., La théorie platonicienne des Idées et des Nombres (Paris 1908) 531–3;Google ScholarChevalier, J., La notion du nécessaire chez Aristote (Paris 1915) 142;Google Scholar P. Gohlke, Die Lehre von der Abstraktion bei Plato und Aristoteles (Halle n.d.) 95–6 de Corte, M., La Doctrine de l'Intelligence chez Aristote (Paris 1934) 224Google Scholar n. 2; Regis, L.-M., L'opinion selon Aristote (Paris 1935) 124Google Scholar n. 2; Antweiler, A., Der Begriff der Wissenschaft bei Aristoteles (Bonn 1936) 42–3;Google ScholarOwens, J., The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto 1962) 428Google Scholar; APhilosQ iii (1966) 166;Google ScholarWundt, M., Untersuchungen zur Metaphysik des Aristoteles (Stuttgart 1953) 69;Google ScholarWieland, W., Die aristotelische Physik (Göttingen 1970) 96Google Scholar n. 12; Grene, M., A Portrait of Aristotle (Chicago 1967) 208;Google ScholarTugendhat, E., TI KATA TINOΣ (Freiburg 1968) 108;Google ScholarDüring, I., Aristoteles (Heidelberg 1966) 256;Google ScholarSellars, W., Philosophical Perspectives (Springfield 1967) [100–107;Google ScholarSeidl, H., Der Begriff des Intellekts bei Aristoteles (Meisenheim am Glan 1971) 53;Google ScholarLeszl, W., R Metaphys. xxvi (1972) 278–313;Google ScholarMansion, S., Le jugement d'existence chez Aristote (Louvain 1976) 320–1Google Scholar.

⁶ I argue that substantial forms are individuals in ‘An Argument in Metaphysics Z 13', CQ xxx (1980) 72–85,Google Scholar and in Arch. Gesch. Philos. lxi (1979) 249–70Google Scholar.

That form is primary substance is shown by the following, (I) In Z 7 (1032b1–2) Aristotle explicitly says that form is primary substance. (2) In Z 11 Aristotle says that a soul is a primary substance (1037a5, 27–9), and a soul is a form (1035b14–16, 35–1036a2, 1037a28–9, 1043a35–b4; de An. 407b23–4, 412a19–21, b10-11). (3) At the end of Z 11 Aristotle says (1037b3–4): ‘By primary substance I mean that which is defined not by predicating one thing of another as its substratum and matter.’ And Aristotle has just explained in Z 10 and 11 that the form, unlike the composite, is definable without reference to matter. (Another debstable claim. I defend it in the second paper referred to above.) (4) At the end of Z 11 (1037a33–b2) Aristotle says that primary substances are identical with their essences and immediately b3–4) points out that composites of form and matter are not identical with their essences. (Z 6 does not contradict this. Rather, 1037a33–b2 says that this point was made before, and that can refer to nothing but Z 6. So this passage explains what Z 6 was talking about, viz forms). (5) In Z 3, at the start of his discussion of the substratum (1029a5–7), Aristotle says that if it turns out that form is prior to matter, it will also be prior to the composite of form and matter. The outcome of the discussion is that form is prior to matter (1029a27–30), and Aristotle dismisses the composite as plainly posterior to the form (1029a30–1).

It might be thought that Z 7, 1032a15–19 says that sensible individuals are the primary substances:

Now natural comings to be are the comings to be of those things which come to be by nature; and that of which they come to be is what we call matter; and that by which they come to be is something which exists naturally; and the something which they come to be is a man or plant or one of the things of this kind, which we most of all call substance (τὸ δὲ τὶ ἄνθρωπος ν᾿ φυτὀν ἤ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἄ δὴ μάλιστα λέγομεν οὐσίας εἶναι)).

If ‘the something which they come to be’ referred to the composite, then it might be thought that in the final sentence Aristotle is saying that the composite is primary substance. But this is impossible since, if Aristotle did mean that, he would contradict himself twenty lines later when he says that form is primary substance (1032b1–2).

That interpretation assumed that ‘the something which they come to be’ (τὸ δὲ τί, 18) refers to the composite. But in fact it refers to the form. The point is clearest in A 3, 1069b36–1070a2, where the three factors in generation mentioned at the start of Z 7 reappear: πᾶν γἀρ μεταβάλλει τὶ καὶ ὑπό τινος καὶ εἴς τι ὔφ᾿ οὖ μέν, τοῦ πρώτου κινοῦντος ὄ δέ ή ὔλη εἰς ὀ δέ τὀ εἶδος. So the τί which something becomes is the form, not the composite (cf. 1033a24–b10: what is generated is the bronze sphere [1033a30–1, 32–3, b1–2, 8–10; cf 1034b10-11], not the something which τὸ γιγνόμενον becomes, viz ‘sphere,’ which refers throughout to the form). Hence, ‘man’ and ‘plant’ are used in Z 7, 1032a17 to refer to the form of man or plant, just as ‘plant’ and ‘animal’ are used in 1032a33 to refer to the nature or form of a plant or animal. Such terms are used in a similar way throughout Z and H (1033a29, 33, b9, 17–18, 1034b11, 1035a7–9, 10, 11 (cf. 14–16), b1–3, 1036a1, 16–18, 1037a7–8, 1043a29–37; cf. 1070a16, GC 321b22–3, 33, Cael. 278a13–15).

Hence, 1032a15–19 is saying that forms are most of all substances. But Aristotle may have in mind the difference between natural substances and artifacts.

⁷ This is clear from 1003a9–12. Aristotle has said that if we were to suppose that the principles are universals, then they would not be substances, for substance is a this, and no universal is a this. He then argues: εἴ δ᾿ ἔσται τόδε τι καὶ ἔν θέσθαι τὀ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον, πολλἀ ἔσται ζῶα ὁ Σωκρἁτης αὐτός τε καἰ ὀ ᾶνθρωπος καὶ τὀ ζῷον, εἴπερ σημαἰνει ἔκαστον τόδετι καὶ ἔν. The suggestion that the principles are universal thises is not a suggestion that has snything to do with efficient, material or final causes. Rather, it is because the formal cause of Socrates becomes pluralized that the suggestion results in his becoming many animals. So the principles under discussion in this aporia are formal causes. And since M 10 answers this aporia, it too is concerned with formal causes.

That M 10 is concerned with forrml causes is also indicated by the following points. First, Aristotle thinks that the objections developed st the beginning of M 10 against the two conceptions of principles are objections to Platonic Ideas (1087a4–7; cf. with 1086b20–32, 999b27–1000a4 snd 1002b12–32). And in Aristotle's opinion the Forms were supposed to be formal causes of sensible things (988a10–11, b1–5). So formal causes are the principles he is concerned with. Secondly, one of Aristotle's arguments in M 10 against the view that universals are principles of substanees is identical with one of the arguments in Z 13 against the same view (1038b7–8). M 10, 1087a1: ἔσται μἤ οὺσία πρότερον οὐσίασ. Z 13, 1038b26: πρότερον γὰρ ἔσται μὴ οὺσία καὶ τὸ ποῖον οὐσίας. So we have the same argument deployed agsinst the same view, and since Z 13 is attacking the view that substantial forms are universals, M 10 too is attacking the view that substantial forms are universals.

⁸ He presents two arguments against the view that the principles are particulars (1086b20–32, 1086b32–7) and one argument against the view that the principles are universals (1087a1–4). But, while he leaves standing the argument against the view that universals are principles, he has a reply for both arguments against the view that the principles are particulars (1087a4–10, 10–25). So Aristotle is arguing that the principles in question are individuals, and we have already noted (n. 8) that the principles in question are forms. Hence, M 10 defends the position that substantial forms are individuals. (The first objection against the view that the principles are individuals is that, if so, there will not be more than one object exemplifying a kind, The objection assumes that the view that the principles are particulars is like the theory of Forms and makes each principle unique in its kind (cf. 999b27–1000a4, 1002b30–2). Aristotle's reply (1087a4–10) is that nothing prevents there being many individual principles of the same sort. I discuss this problem and Aristotle's answer in the first paper mentioned in n. 6.) There can be no question of the epistemological problem with the problem of whether sensible individuals can be known. The following passages prove conclusively that Aristotle is concerned with principles: 996a9–10, 1003a5–7, 14–17, 1060b22–3, 1086b20–2, 32, 37, 1087a2–4, 12, 21. This means that the examples in 1087a19–21 are analogies rather than illustrations.

⁹ Kenny, A., Phronesis xi (1966) 170Google Scholar.

¹⁰ At APo. 86a23 ‘universal’ may be being used in the strict sense of APo. A 4. But it is not necessary for ‘B is A’ to be universal in this way in order for the knowledge of it to constitute potential knowledge that C is A. This is shown by APr. B 21 and APr. A 1. In those chapters Aristotle is attempting to explain how one can know that all Bs are A, and hence know that C (an individual B) is A, but fail to recognize that C is A. The solution is that in knowing that all Bs are A one only knows potentially that C is A and so may still fail to have actual knowledge that C is A and may think that C is not A. The problem and its solution are not restricted to cases where ‘All Bs are A’ is universal in the strict sense of APo. A 4, as is shown by two of Aristotle's examples: ‘Every mule is sterile’ (APr. 67a35), ‘Every pair is even’ (APo. 71a31–2). Thus, knowledge of the first proposition constitutes potential knowledge that this mule is sterile even though it is not universal in the sense of APo. A 4.

¹¹ The reason why no universal (3) can be the object of potential₂ knowledge is that if ‘All Bs are A’ is a ‘commensurate universal’, then all As are B. Hence there is no genus G of B such that all Gs are A. So there is no truth—‘All Gs are A’—the knowledge of which could constitute potential₂ knowledge that all Bs are A.

¹² Cherniss argues that ‘this A’ at 417a29 cannot be intended to refer to a sensible particular. After having pointed out that in de Anima ii 5 (417b 19–26) Aristotle distinguishes between knowledge and sensation on the basis of the fact that actual knowledge is not dependent on an external object while actual sensation is, Cherniss goes on to say: ‘In the same chapter of De Anima in which this distinction is made and the reason given for it that actual sensation is of particulars while actual knowledge is of universals (417B22–23) he whose knowledge is actual is said to be knowing in the proper sense of the word (417A28–29). This [i.e. ‘this A’ at 417a29] cannot be interpreted as a particular here without convicting Aristotle of self-contradiction as obvious as it would be unnecessary’ (op. cit. [n. 1] 343). There are two replies to this argument. First, the ‘contradiction’ can be thought to exist only if Aristotle's explicit reference to actual knowledge of particulars at 417b26–8 is ignored: ‘The same holds for knowledge (ταῖς ἐπιοτήμαις) of the objects of perception, and for the same reason, viz because the objects of perception are particulars and are external objects.’ Cherniss (345 n. 253), like the Greek commentators, thinks that Aristotle is here referring only to the productive arts since he has just said that knowledge is of universals (417b22–3). But (1) there is nothing in the text to suggest this; and (2) in two other passages where Aristotle says that knowledge is of universals the examples of universals are drawn from the productive arts (Metaph. 981a5–27, EN 1180b3–23; cf. Rh. 1356b28–31, Alexander, in Metaph. 79. 15–22).

Secondly, and decisively, 417a30–b2 shows that ‘this A’ is a particular perceptible letter: ἀμφότεροι μὲν οὖν οἱ πρῶτοι κατἀ δύναμιν ἐπιοτημόνες [sc. the man who has the first-level potentiality of knowledge and the man who has the second-level potentiality of knowledge–417a22–7] ἀλλ᾿ ὁ μἐν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ ἐναντίας μεταβαλών ἔξεως [γίγνεται ὲπιστήμων], ὀ δὲ ὲκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν ἤ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾿ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. If the actual knowledge of ‘this A’ depends on actual sensation, then what is actually known must be a perceptible individual.

¹³ In 417b18–28 Aristotle distinguishes between actual knowledge of universals and actual knowledge of particulars by virtue of the fact that S can think of a universal he knows whenever he wants (διὀ νοῆσαι μἐν ἐπ᾿ αὐτῷ, ἐπόταν βούληται) but can have actual knowledge of particular sensible objects only while perceiving them, i.e. not ‘whenever he wants’. But in 417a29 what is actually known is an individual sensible letter and so when Aristotle there says that S can contemplate whenever he wants (βουληθεὶς δυνατὀς θεωρεῖν, ἀν μή τι κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν, a27–8) he cannot mean that S can contemplate ‘this A’ irrespective of his surroundings. Rather, the point is that if the individual ‘A’ is within the range of perception, then S can contemplate it whenever he wishes.

Aristotle uses the same expression in other places where he does not mean to suggest that the exercise of a potentiality can occur independently of what is externally present. For example, in Metaph. 1049a5–8: ‘The delimiting mark of that which as a result of thought comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders (ὄταν βουληθέντος γίγνεται μηθενὀς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός), while the condition on the other side–viz in that which is healed—is that nothing in it hinders the result.’ The man with medical knowledge can heal whenever he wants, Aristotle says, but obviously in saying this he does not wish to imply that the man with medical knowledge can heal independently of the presence of a body to be healed (cf. 1048a13–21).

¹⁴ Cf. Ps.-Alexander, in Metaph. 792. 21–4; 793. 2–12; Schwegler (n. 5) 338; A. Baudin, Revue Thomiste vii (1899) 277; Chevalier (n. 5) 149 n. 1; Geyser, J., Die Erkenntnistheorie des Aristoteles (Münster 1917) 243;Google Scholar Owens (n. 5) (1962) 428, (1966) 166, 168; Wieland (n. 5) 96 n. 12, 99 n. 15; Sellars (n. 5) 101–2; Seidl (n. 5) 53.

¹⁵ It is true that in Metaph. Θ8, 1045b27–1050a3 one of Aristotle's arguments for the priority of actuality to potentiality is that the learner acquires knowledge (δύναμις) by exercising (ἐνέργεια), and hence the actuality is temporally prior to the potentiality. However, in the immediately following argument (1050a4–14) Aristotle is assuming that potentiality precedes actuality, and specifically, that potential knowledge (θεωρητικήν) precedes actual knowledge (θεωροῦσιν, a12–13). And in a12–14 Aristotle explains that although the learner contemplates in order to have knowledge, he contemplates (knows) only in a way (οὑτοι δὲ οὐχὶ θεωροῦσιν ἀλλ᾿ῆ ὡδἰ). But then this ‘knowledge’ cannot be what is in question in Metaph. M 10 (cf. Cat. 935–8, EN 1147321–2).

¹⁶ Cherniss says that Aristotle cannot really wish to maintain that the individual is ever the object of actual knowledge. First, he argues: ‘Had Aristotle made the particular in any sense the object of actual knowledge, he could not have distinguished knowledge from sensation by asserting that the actualization of the former is not dependent, as that of the latter is, upon external objects. (De Anima 417B19–26)' op. cit. (n. 1) 343. But this argument fails since in the lines immediately following those referred to by Cherniss Aristotle points out that actual knowledge of perceptible objects, just as actual sensation, is dependent on the presence of the perceptible objects (417b26–8).

Secondly, Cherniss says: ‘If Aristotle means to say that the sensible particular is the real object of knowledge in the full and proper sense, he is … denying the doctrine which he everywhere else maintains, namely that actual knowledge is of the universal while particulars are objects of sense perception only.’ But it is not true that Aristotle ‘everywhere else maintains that actual knowledge is of the universal while particulars are objects of sense perception only’, since 417b26–8 explicitly distinguishes actual knowledge and actual sensation of particulars (cf. APr. 67a39–69).

¹⁷ It might be thought that the knowledge of a certain genus of soul (perhaps bovine soul, for example) constitutes potential₂ knowledge of particular species of soul, but this would be a mistake. If ‘three-sided plane figure’ is the definition of triangle, then to know that the triangle is a three-sided plane figure is to have potential₂ knowledge that the scalene triangle is a three-sided plane figure. But this is not yet to know the universal scalene triangle, for that requires knowledge of the complete definition of the scalene triangle.

¹⁸ In Metaph. 1025a30–3 Aristotle explains one sense of συμβεβηκός: ὅσα ὑπάρχει ἔκάστῳ καθ᾿ αύτὀ μὴ ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὄντα, οἶον τῷ τριγώνῳ τὸ δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχειν καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνδέχεται ἀἰδια εἶναι. This suggests that if S is P in itself, then it may be eternal but need not be eternal. Cf. H. Weiss, Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles (Darmstadt 1967) 184.

The fact that Aristotle does not explain ‘in itself’ predications in terms of necessity is not, as N. White thinks (RMetaphys xxxi [1972] 61)Google Scholar, of any importance. Aristotle says that ‘S is P in itself’ entails ‘S is necessarily P.’ And his statement that Aristotle never ‘uses statements involving necessity or possibility which are explicitly about such [sensible] particulars’ is simply false. See APr. 32b10–12; Top. 102b4–9, 129a3–5; SE 166a23–4; Metaph. 1025a14–24, 1047a26–9, b13–14, 1051b7–8, 13, 1059a2–7, 12; Int. 19a9–15; Cael. 281b9–12; cf. Top. 144a24–7, Metaph. 1019b27–30. The rest of White's arguments for claiming that Aristotle would not allow assertions of necessity about individuals are also unconvincing.

Martha Kneale errs in saying that ‘necessary predication is characterized as not only universal (κατὰ παντóϛ) but also as essential (καθ αὑτó)’ (The Development of Logic (Oxford 1968) 94;Google Scholarcf. Patzig, G., Aristotle's Theory of the Syllogism [Dordrecht 1968] 34)CrossRefGoogle Scholar. In the passage she refers to (APo. 73b25–8) it is the καθόλου that is κατὰ παντός and καθ᾿ αὐτό, and the latter characteristic entails necessity. Aristotle does not say that only the κατὰ παντός is necessary.

¹⁹ Barnes, J., Aristotle's Posterior Analytics (Oxford 1975) 130;Google Scholarcf. Mansion, A., Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne (Louvain 1946) 87, 89, 179–80;Google Scholar S. Mansion (n. 5) 90–1, 252.

²⁰ EN 1139b24's reference to the items in question as ἀΐδια does not show that they are objects (Metaph. 1025a30–3, Ph. 252b3, GA 742b23–8). Nor does its description of them as ἀγένητα καὶ ἄφθαρτα do so (Ph. 222a3–9, APo. 75b24, 27, Cael. 281a3–7).

²¹ Although it is usually assumed that when Aristotle says that knowledge is of universals, he is using ‘universal’ in sense (1) (what is predicable of many), sometimes he means universals of kind (2) (universal truths) (Metaph. 981a6, 10–12; APo. 87b32–3, 38–9; EN 1140b31; cf. Metaph. 1086b33–7, Rhet. 1356b28–31). Nevertheless, in some of these statements ‘universal’ is contrasted with the individual (Metaph. 981a16–19, 1003a7–9, 13, 16, 1059b25–6, de An. 417b22–3). There is a close connection between knowledge of universals of kind (1) and knowledge of universals of kind (2): normally, to know a (1) is to know a (2), and to know a (2) is to have knowledge about a (1) (to know that all Bs are A is to have knowledge about B).

²² The question of whether, in these other passages where Aristotle asserts that knowledge is of universals he means that potential₂ knowledge is of universals, is difficult to answer. It is clear that knowledge of universals will in fact be potential₂ knowledge. For the knowledge that all Bs are A will be a certain ἕξιϛ of the soul (Top. 121b36–8, 12433–4, 39–125a1, 133b24–30; APo. 99b18, 25, 32, 100a10, b6, 8; de An. 417a2, b16, 428a3–5; PA 639a1–3; Ph. 247b1–7, 255b1–3; cf. GA 735a9–11; EN 1094a26–b2; EE 1218b36, 1219a9–18 MM 1183333, 1208a32–5, b1–2), which is potential₂ knowledge that individual Bs are A. (A ἕξιϛ is a potentiality that can be actualized: EN 1098b31–3 1122b1–2, 1152b33, 1157b5–6, 1176333–b1, 1180b32; EE 1219a31–3, 1237a33–5; Top. 125b15–19; Ph. 228a15–16, 247b1; MM 1184b12–17). But there seems to be no evidence that Aristotle wishes to refer to potential₂ knowledge rather than potential₁ knowledge. De An. ii 5, 417b22–3 says ‘knowledge is of universals’ where potential₁ knowledge is in question. However (as noted below) this cannot be understood to contradict M 10 since in the same chapter of de Anima Aristotle refer to actusl₂ knowledge of individuals (417a28–9; cf. b26–7). Furthermore, M 10 (on my interpretation) says that potential₂ knowledge is of universals. And this is not incompatible with the assertion that there is potential₁ knowledge of universals. Of course, if the assertion that (potential₁) knowledge is of universals were intended to rule out actual₂ knowledge of individuals, then that assertion would be contradicted by M 10. But de An. ii 5 (417328–9, b22–3) appears to demonstrate that it is not so intended.

²³ This fact led Paul Shorey to argue that εἰ μή in lines 35 and 36 must mean ‘but only that’ rather than ‘unless’, so that the passage should be translated: ‘For we do not syllogize that this triangle has its angles equal to two right angles but that every triangle has its angles equsl to two right angles, nor that this man is an animal but that every man is an animal.’ (CPh viii [1913] 90–2.Google Scholar) But the motivation for this translation is removed once it is realized that the same line of argument as it appears in my translation also occurs in the statement of the aporia at the end of Metaph. B 6 snd in APo. A 31: see (2) and (4) infra. Furthermore, examples of demonstrations involving individuals do not occur merely occasionslly in Aristotle, as Ross says (Aristotle's Metaphysics ii 464). The fact is that the Posterior Analytics is loaded with such examples (74a13–15, 78a29–b4, 4–13, 15–28, 28–31, 83a20, 85a20–31, 87b37–88a4, 89b10–20, 93a37–b6, 94a24–36, 36–b8, 8–23, 95a14–16, 16–21, b32–37, 96a3–7, 98b19–24; also cf. 71a2-b8, 73b32–74a3, 83a1–32, b4, 85b30–5, 88a14–17, 89b26, 95b13–27, 98a29–34, 37-b2, APr. 43a37–40). I have not come across any attempts to explain how Aristotle could use such examples while maintaining that individuals cannot be known.

²⁴ Another example which may make the same point is APo. A 33 where Aristotle is concerned to distinguish knowledge and belief and begins by saying (88b30–2): ‘The knowable and knowledge differ from the opinable and opinion because knowledge is universal and through necessities and what is necessary cannot be otherwise.’ However, if the man discussed at the end of the chapter (89a33–b6) is an individual, then Aristotle is expressly allowing knowledge of an individual and contrasting knowledge and opinion after having said that knowledge is universal. But it is not clear whether it is an individual man that Aristotle is referring to.

²⁵ 302–3; cf. A. Mansion (n. 19) 322 n. 27.

²⁶ Another disputable claim. It is defended in the second paper referred to in n. 6.