1 See for example Bordo, Michael D., Taylor, Alan M., and Williamson, Jeffrey G., eds., Globalization in historical perspective, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2003.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The volume contains papers originally presented at a US National Bureau of Economic Research conference.

2 On the association between the gold standard and global financial integration, see Maurice Obstfeld and Alan M. Taylor, ‘Globalization and capital markets’, in Bordo, Taylor, and Williamson, Globalization. For a dissenting view of this association – ‘the gold standard explains at best only a tiny fraction … of financial globalization’ – see Marc Flandreau and Frédéric Zumer, The making of global finance, 1880–1913, Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2004; the quote is on p. 22.

3 J. M. Keynes, Indian currency and finance, London: Macmillan & Co., 1913 (republished as D. E. Moggridge and E. Johnson, eds., The collected writings of John Maynard Keynes, vol. 1, London: Macmillan, 1971) offers a good illustration of this tendency.

4 Rosenberg, Emily S., Financial missionaries to the world: the politics and culture of dollar diplomacy, 1900–1930, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999Google Scholar; Mark, Metzler, Lever of empire: the international gold standard and the crisis of liberalism in prewar Japan, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2006.Google Scholar

5 Barry, Eichengreen, ‘Hegemonic stability theories of the international monetary system’, in Elusive stability: essays in the history of international finance, 1919–1939, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990, pp. 271–311.Google Scholar

6 Michie, R. C., ‘The myth of the gold standard: an historian’s approach’, Revue Internationale d’Histoire de la Banque, 32–33, 1986, pp. 167–97Google Scholar; P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British imperialism: innovation and expansion, 1688–1914, London: Longman, 1993, pp. 147–8.

7 M. de Cecco, ‘Gold standard’ in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman, eds., The new Palgrave dictionary of economics, vol. 2, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 541–2.

8 Keynes, Indian currency, pp. 15–16; Marcello, de Cecco, The international gold standard: money and empire, London: Pinter, 1984.Google Scholar

9 On the London bank rate’s need for reinforcement, see Sayers, R. S., Central banking after Bagehot, Oxford: Clarendon Pres, 1957, pp. 14–15Google Scholar; idem, The Bank of England, 1891–1944, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, vol. 1, pp. 37, 52–3; W. M. Scammell, ‘The working of the gold standard’, in Barry Eichengreen, ed., Gold standard in theory and history, New York and London: Methuen, 1985, pp. 110–12.

10 On the role of ‘cooperation and credibility’ in the international monetary system, see Barry Eichengreen, Golden fetters: the gold standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 30 and ‘Hegemonic stability’; on cooperation, see A. G. Ford, ‘International financial policy and the gold standard, 1870–1914’, in Peter Mathias and Sidney Pollard, eds., The industrial economies: the development of economic and social policies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 219.

11 Flandreau and Zumer, Global finance; Lindert, Peter H., Key currencies and gold, 1900–1913, Princeton, NJ: International Finance Section, Princeton University, 1969, pp. 48–52Google Scholar; for an argument about empire, credibility, and regime stability in the context of the depression, see G. Balachandran, ‘The interwar slump in India: the periphery in a crisis of empire’, in T. Balderston, ed., The world economy and national economies in the interwar slump, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003, pp. 143–71.

12 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism.

13 See, for example, Christopher M. Meissner, ‘New world order: the emergence of an international monetary system, 1850 to 1913’, PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, summarized in Journal of Economic History, 62, 2, 2002, pp. 543–5.

14 The argument for bimetallism is developed in Marc, Flandreau, The glitter of gold: France, bimetallism and the emergence of the international gold standard, 1848–1873, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.Google Scholar

15 Obstfeld and Taylor, ‘Globalization’; for earlier statements, see de Cecco, International gold standard, ch. 3; and J. S. Foreman-Peck and R. Michie, ‘The performance of the nineteenth-century gold standard’, in Wolfram Fischer, R. Marvin McInnis, and Jürgen Schneider, eds., The emergence of the world economy, 1500–1914, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986, vol. 2, pp. 388–91, 395–7. For a dissenting view, see Flandreau and Zumer, Global finance.

16 Flandreau and Zumer, Global finance, p. 57.

17 F. Stern, Gold and iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the building of the German Empire, London: Allen & Unwin, 1980, pp. 180–1, 275. Bismarck himself was not opposed to bimetallism: see Marc, Flandreau, ‘The French crime of 1873: an essay on the emergence of the international gold standard, 1870–1880’, Journal of Economic History, 56, 4, 1996, p. 889.Google Scholar

18 Ritter, G., Goldbugs and greenbacks: the antimonopoly tradition and the politics of finance in America, 1865–1896, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 19–25, 288–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

19 E. H. H. Green, ‘Rentiers versus producers? The political economy of the bimetallic controversy c.1880–1898’, English Historical Review, 103, 408, 1988, pp. 588–612. There has, however, been some debate about how sharp these battle-lines were: see Howe, ‘Bimetallism, c.1880–1898: a controversy re-opened?’, English Historical Review, 105, 415, 1990, pp. 377–391; M. J. Daunton, ‘Gentlemanly capitalists and British industry, 1820–1914’, Past and Present, 122, 1989, pp. 132–42, 150–1; idem, ‘Financial elites and British society, 1880–1950’, in Y. Cassis, ed., Finance and financiers in European history, 1880–1960, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 139–40. Also see Green’s reply to Howe, ‘The bimetallic controversy: empiricism belimed or the case for the issues’, English Historical Review, 105, 416, 1990, pp. 673–83.

20 P. L. Cottrell, ‘Silver, gold, and the international monetary order, 1851–96’, in S. N. Broadberry and N. F. R. Crafts, eds., Britain in the international economy, 1870–1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 234–9.

21 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 153.

22 Green, ‘Rentiers’, pp. 605–7.

23 For a concise and accessible account, see de Cecco, International gold standard, pp. 63–7.

24 ‘The “Wizard of Oz” as a monetary allegory’, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 4, 1990, pp. 739–60.

25 De Cecco, International gold standard, ch. 4; Kaminsky, Arnold P., ‘“Lombard Street” and India: currency problems in the late nineteenth century’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 17, 1980, p. 321.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

26 Green, ‘Rentiers’, pp. 605–7.

27 J. A. Hobson, The war in South Africa: its causes and effects, London: J. Nisbet & Co., 1900. On links between London and South African mining finance, see R. V. Turrell, ‘“Finance … the governor of the imperial engine”: Hobson and the case of Rothschild and Rhodes’, City and empire, London: Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 1987, vol. 2, pp. 87–90.

28 Hobsbawm, E., Age of empire, 1875–1914, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987, p. 66.Google Scholar

29 For an assessment of the importance of settled conditions and lower wages for gold production, see Barry Eichengreen and Ian W. Mclean, ‘The supply of gold under the pre-1914 gold standard’, Economic History Review, 47, 2, 1994, pp. 300–4.

30 Jean Jacques Van-Helten, ‘Empire and high finance: South Africa and the international gold standard 1890–1914’, Journal of African History, 23, 4, 1982, pp. 529–48. As late as 1914, Treasury officials thought that they could rely on weekly gold arrivals from South Africa and Britain’s creditor position to finance any European war: The National Archives (UK), formerly Public Record Office (henceforth TNA), T170/19, ‘Gold Reserves’, Blackett’s memorandum, 22 May 1914. Also see Shula Marks and Stanley Trapido, ‘Lord Milner and the South African state’, History Workshop, 8, 1, 1979, p. 57.

31 Marks and Trapido, ‘Lord Milner’, pp. 56–7; J. J. Van-Helten, ‘Mining and imperialism’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 6, 2, 1980, pp. 233–4, also suggests that imperial strategists perceived gold as an economic and military necessity.

32 Turrell, ‘“Finance”’, pp. 79–93.

33 Russell, Ally, Gold and empire: the Bank of England and South Africa’s gold producers, Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994, pp. 25–8Google Scholar; also Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, pp. 376–81.

34 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 452.

35 Kathleen Burk, ‘Money and power: the shift from Great Britain to the United States’, in Cassis, Finance and financiers, pp. 359–60.

36 Royal commission on Indian finance and currency (henceforth Chamberlain Commission) (Cd 7070, London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1913), appendix III, pp. 96–7.

37 The latter are illustrated by the rise in US official gold stocks from about £140 million in 1899 to over £290 million by 1910: de Cecco, International gold standard, p. 124; Chamberlain Commission, Interim report, appendix XXX.

38 Andrew Pope: ‘The imperial matrix: Britain and the Australia–India gold trade, 1898–1919’, PhD thesis, Curtin University, Perth, 1993.

39 The classic statement here remains Saul, S. B., Studies in British overseas trade, 1870–1914, Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1960, pp. 57–63.Google Scholar

40 For the figures, see de Cecco, International gold standard, p. 241, table 10.

41 The best description here remains Keynes, Indian currency.

42 De Cecco, International gold standard, pp. 70–4.

43 Ibid., p. 125; Sayers, Bank of England, vol. 1, pp. 54–60. On the use of Indian funds to shore up sterling, see Ambirajan, S., Political economy and monetary management: India, 1860–1914, Madras: Affiliated East-West Press, 1984, pp. 169–70.Google Scholar

44 Keynes, Indian currency, pp. 80–1.

45 For an interesting argument about currency regimes and trading patterns in Asia, see K. Sugihara, ‘Patterns of Asia’s integration into the world economy, 1880–1913’, in Fischer, McInnis, and Schneider, Emergence, pp. 709–28.

46 G. Balachandran, ‘Introduction’, in Balachandran, ed., India and the world economy, 1850–1950, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 12–14. Historically based political-economy arguments about financial openness promoting the entry of new firms disregard (or implicitly assume as more efficient) the exclusion of participants brought about by changes in spatial geographies and institutional arrangements. For an influential example of such arguments, see Raghuram Rajan and Luigi Zingales, ‘The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the twentieth century’, Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 1, 2003, pp. 5–50. On short-term volatility in gold export points, to which council bill and telegraphic transfer interventions were tied, see Ronald I. McKinnon, ‘The rules of the game: international money in historical perspective’, Journal of Economic Literature, 31, 1, 1993, pp. 5–6.

47 Rosenberg, Financial missionaries, pp. 12–25.

48 Conant, C.A., History of modern banks of issue: with an account of the economic crises of the nineteenth century and the crisis of 1907, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1909, pp. 570–83.Google Scholar

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50 Metzler, Lever of empire, pp. xv, 38, 53–4.

51 As indeed it was nearly six decades later: see Aubrey, H. G., The dollar in world affairs: an essay in international financial policy, New York: Harper & Row, 1964, pp. 256–63.Google Scholar

52 Britain’s wartime financial difficulties in New York are discussed in Kathleen Burk, ‘The diplomacy of finance: British financial missions to the United States 1914–1918’, Historical Journal, 22, 2, 1979, pp. 355–60. On the implications of these difficulties for India, see Balachandran, G., ‘“Finance Orientalism”? Britain, the United States, and India’s wartime currency crisis, 1914–1918’, South Asia, 16, 2, 1993, pp. 92–5.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

53 Andrew, Pope, ‘Australian gold and the finance of India’s exports during World War I: a case study of imperial control and coordination’, Indian Economic and Social History Review, 33, 2, 1996, p. 120.Google Scholar

54 Ally, Gold and empire, pp. 31–5; W. A. Brown Jr., England and the new gold standard, London: P. S. King & Son, 1929, pp. 19–20.

55 Balachandran, ‘“Finance Orientalism”?’, pp. 99–102.

56 Ibid., pp. 102–4; see p. 99 for the reference to the Norfolk landing.

57 Brown, England, pp. 12–14, 42–3.

58 On this, see Balachandran, G., ‘Britain’s liquidity crisis and India, 1919–1920’, Economic History Review, 46, 3, 1993, pp. 575–91.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 For the British domestic context for these preferences, see Robert W. D. Boyce, British capitalism at the crossroads, 1918–1932: a study in politics, economics, and international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, pp. 36–8, 62–6.

60 Tsokhas, K., ‘The Australian role in Britain’s return to the gold standard’, Economic History Review, 47, 1, 1994, pp. 129–46CrossRefGoogle Scholar; L. S. Pressnell, ‘1925: The burden of sterling’, Economic History Review, 31, 1, 1978, pp. 78–80. For the Anglo-American context, see F. C. Costigliola, ‘Anglo-American financial rivalry in the 1920s’, Journal of Economic History, 37, 4, 1977, pp. 911–34; also Moggridge, D. E., British monetary policy, 1924–1931: the Norman Conquest of $4.86, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972, pp. 84–7.Google Scholar

61 This discussion broadly follows Ally, Gold and empire, especially chs. 3–5, and Brown, England, chs. 2, 4, 6, and 8; for the 1919 agreement, see Brown, England, pp. 37–9.

62 D. Innes, Anglo American and the rise of modern South Africa, London: Heinemann Educational, 1984, pp. 78–9, also pp. 88–9; Brown, England, pp. 23–5, 76–81.

63 Johnstone, F. A., Class, race, and gold: a study of class relations and racial discrimination in South Africa, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976, ch. 3Google Scholar; D. Yudelman, The emergence of modern South Africa: state, capital, and the incorporation of organized labor on the South African gold fields, 1902–1939, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983, pp. 164–212; Innes, Anglo American, pp. 80–2; Brown, England, pp. 127–30; also Jeremy Krikler, ‘The Commandos: the army of white labour in South Africa’, Past and Present, 163, 1999, pp. 204–6.

64 Shipping gold to London first represented a cost addition benefiting the largely British shipping companies. These were therefore tense months for relations between the mining and shipping companies: Brown, England, pp. 39–40.

65 Montagu Norman’s diary entries reflect fears for London’s future as the principal gold market: Bank of England archives (henceforth BOE), ADM 20/8, January 1920.

66 Brown, England, p. 136.

67 Innes, Anglo American, pp. 90–3.

68 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 132.

69 Until the South African Reserve Bank was established in 1921, two London-based banks dominated South Africa’s banking system and functioned as banks of issue. Currency and banking laws also varied between the four states.

70 BOE, ADM 16/2, Norman’s memorandum, 15 February 1921, and enclosure; Andrew, Boyle, Montagu Norman: a biography, London: Cassell, 1967, p. 206Google Scholar; Sayers, Bank of England, vol. 1, pp. 156–60; vol. 3, appendices 9, 10, 17; and G. Balachandran, ‘From concubinage to “Hindoo marriage”? Anglo-Indian monetary relations in interwar India, 1917–35’, Modern Asian Studies, 28, 3, 1994, pp. 626–8.

71 Sayers, Bank of England, vol. 1, pp. 202–3; pp. 201–10 generally for the Bank of England’s relations with dominion central banks.

72 Cain and Hopkins, British imperialism, p. 130.

73 Brown, England, pp. 182–4.

74 Bruce, Dalgaard, South Africa’s impact on Britain’s return to gold, 1925, New York: Arno Press, 1981, pp. 46–50Google Scholar; Ally, Gold and empire, pp. 111–22.

75 Ally, Gold and empire, p. 127.

76 Robert N. Seidel, ‘American reformers abroad: the Kemmerer Missions in South America, 1923–1931’, Journal of Economic History, 32, 2, 1972, pp. 520–45; Paul W. Drake, ed., Money doctors, foreign debt, and economic reforms in Latin America from the 1890s to the present, Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 1994, pp. 86–109. For a more elaborate account see Paul, Drake, The money doctor in the Andes: the Kemmerer Missions, 1923–1933, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1989.Google Scholar

77 Dalgaard, South Africa’s impact, pp. 93–4, 102–4.

78 TNA, T172/1499B, ‘Recent gold exports from USA’, 5 February 1925; also Churchill College Archives, R. G. Hawtrey Papers, 1/26, ‘The gold standard’, 2 February 1925. Hawtrey was, at this time, the director of financial enquiries at the British Treasury.

79 Seidel, ‘American reformers’, pp. 525–8.

80 Costigliola, ‘Anglo-American financial rivalry’, pp. 923–5; Brown, England, pp. 239–41; Dalgaard, South Africa’s impact, pp. 156–7.

81 Dalgaard, South Africa’s impact, p. 157.

82 Currency policies were, according to the Indian Finance Member George Schuster, the ‘worst cause of discord’ between India and Britain: B. R. Tomlinson, The political economy of the Raj, 1914–1947: the economics of decolonization in India, London: Macmillan, 1979, p. 87.

83 On the 1920 stabilization, see Balachandran, ‘Britain’s liquidity crisis’.

84 Though formally independent, the commission was ‘packed’ with members aligned with City interests: Balachandran, G., John Bullion’s empire: Britain’s gold problem and India between the wars, Richmond: Curzon, 1996, pp. 140–3.Google Scholar

85 British Library, India Office Collection, L/PO/2/3(i), Churchill to Birkenhead, ‘personal and secret’, 22 February 1926.

86 TNA, T172/1500A, Churchill’s comments on Niemeyer’s note of 10 February 1926.

87 TNA, T175/25B, Niemeyer’s note, 26 February 1926; Churchill’s comment, 28 February 1926.

88 Federal Reserve Bank of New York (henceforth FRBNY), C252/genl., Strong’s ‘Memorandum for Mr. Harrison: regarding discussions in London’, 24 December 1927; Costigliola, ‘Anglo-American financial rivalry’, pp. 922, 931–3. For other explanations for Strong’s suspicions, see Hogan, Michael J., Informal entente: the private structure of cooperation in Anglo-American economic diplomacy, 1918–1928, Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977, p. 47.Google Scholar

89 FRBNY, C262.5.1, Strong’s memo for Randolph Burgess, 6 March 1926.

90 BOE, G3/185, Norman to Schacht, 10 April and 26 April 1926; and Norman to Vissering, 10 April 1926; OV 56/85, Schacht to Norman, 17 April 1926; Norman to Schacht, 19 April 1926; and Vissering to Norman, 4 May 1926. Nor, unlike J. P. Morgan, who also could not appear in person before the commission, was Schacht invited to submit written views.

91 FRBNY, 1000.7, Strong to Harrison, 5 May 1926; Strong to Jay, 2 May 1926. For a more detailed discussion of this episode, see G. Balachandran, ‘Gold, silver, and India in Anglo-American monetary relations, 1925–1933’, International History Review, 18, 1996, pp. 577–86.

92 Balachandran, John Bullion’s empire, pp. 155–9.

93 Tomlinson, Political economy, p. 79.

94 Pressnell, ‘1925’, p. 83; Ian M. Drummond, The floating pound and the sterling area, 1931–1939, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 101 and ch. 4.

95 BOE, G1/411, George Schuster to F. C. Goodenough, 30 November 1929; Schuster to Niemeyer, 19 January 1930; Markovits, C., Indian business and nationalist politics, 1931–1939: the indigenous capitalist class and the rise of the Congress Party, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 46–7, 93CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tomlinson, Political economy, pp. 47, 87.

96 See here Eichengreen, Golden fetters, p. xiii.

97 Niall, Ferguson, Empire: how Britain made the modern world, London: Allen Lane, 2003, offers a particularly strident contemporary re-statement of an oft-made colonial claim.Google Scholar

98 Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War, Interim report (1918) and Final report (1919); M. June Flanders, International monetary economics, 1870–1960: between the Classical and the New Classical, Cambridge, 1990, p. 83; more generally, see pp. 67–83.

99 Sayers, Bank of England, vol. 1, pp. 110–11 suggests that the committee’s report was limited by the experience of its members, which was mostly confined to a few years immediately preceding the war.

100 Ford, A. G., The gold standard, 1880–1914: Britain and Argentina, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962.Google Scholar

101 Respectively, R. Triffin, Gold and the dollar crisis: the future of convertibility, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1960; idem, Evolution of the international monetary system: historical reappraisal and future perspectives, Princeton, NJ, International Finance Section, Dept. of Economics, Princeton University, 1964, ch. 1.

102 Such as through the Plaza accord: see Eichengreen, Golden fetters, chs. 1 and 2 for a concise account of his main views.

103 For example, D. N. McCloskey and J. R. Zecher, ‘The success of purchasing power parity: historical evidence and its implications for macroeconomics’, in M. D. Bordo and A. J. Schwartz, eds., A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, 1821–1931, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1984, pp. 121–50.

104 For example, Rajan and Zingales, ‘Great reversal’; Ferguson, Empire offers a good illustration of the former point.

105 For a recent re-statement of this distinction, see Ranald Michie, ‘The City of London and the British government: the changing relationship’, in Ranald Michie and Philip Williamson, eds., The British government and the City of London in the twentieth century, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 33.

106 Roberta, Allbert Dayer, Finance and empire: Sir Charles Addis, 1861–1945, London: Macmillan, 1988, p. xviii.Google Scholar

107 Silverman, Dan P., Reconstructing Europe after the Great War, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982, notes (pp. 58–9, 79, ch. 7) that the gold exchange standard was a minor sideshow overshadowed even at Genoa by discussions on restoring economic relations with the Soviet UnionCrossRefGoogle Scholar. On the gold exchange standard as a ‘British fad’, see Royal Institute of International Affairs, The international gold problem, Oxford: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1931, p. 91.

108 Sayers, Bank of England, vol. 1, pp. 347–50; Boyce, British capitalism, pp. 288–91; BOE, G14/313, Committee of Treasury, 30 November and 7 December 1927, 13 June 1928, 3 September, 10 September, 22 October, and 4 November 1930; Norman’s note, 1 March 1930; Treasury note, 2 March 1930; Moreau to Norman, 28 December 1928 and 8 January 1929; Norman to Lubbock, 2 February 1929; Norman to Harrison, 29 August and 6 September 1930; Norman to Young, 6 September 1930; Young to Norman, 4 September 1930; Harrison to Norman, 4 September 1930; ‘League inquiry into the stabilization of gold’, by Siepmann, 26 November 1928. On the delegation’s report, see Eichengreen, Golden fetters, pp. 198–201.

109 Drummond, Floating pound, pp. 128–33; Macmillan Committee, Report, paras. 140–50, 185, 240; also Boyce, British capitalism, pp. 290–1.

110 TNA, T170/46, ‘Gold standard and rationalization: notes’, undated; T160/430, f. 12317/1; Hawtrey to Hopkins, 10 December 1930; Boyce, British capitalism, pp. 290–1.

111 Thus, Montagu Norman described the interwar gold standard as a ‘competitive scramble for gold’: Evidence to the Committee on Trade and Industry (Macmillan Committee, 1931), Qq. 6724–5.

112 Judith, Kooker, ‘French financial diplomacy: the interwar years’, in Benjamin, Rowlands, ed., Balance of power or hegemony: the interwar monetary system, New York: New York University Press, 1976, pp. 97–8.Google Scholar