The 16th ACM SIGPLAN International Conference on Functional Programming (ICFP) took place on September 19–21, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan. After the conference, the programme committee, chaired by Olivier Danvy, selected several outstanding papers and invited their authors to submit to this special issue of the Journal of Functional Programming. Kenichi Asai and Benjamin C. Pierce acted as editors for these submissions. This issue includes the three accepted articles, each of which provides substantial new material beyond the original conference version. The selected papers represent the importance of various aspects of proof techniques, from theory to practice, all of which aim at verifying realistic programs.

Most interactive theorem provers provide support for some form of user-customizable proof automation. In a number of popular systems, such as Coq and Isabelle, this automation is achieved primarily through tactics, which are programmed in a separate language from that of the prover's base logic. While tactics are clearly useful in practice, they can be difficult to maintain and compose because, unlike lemmas, their behavior cannot be specified within the expressive type system of the prover itself.

We propose a novel approach to proof automation in Coq that allows the user to specify the behavior of custom automated routines in terms of Coq's own type system. Our approach involves a sophisticated application of Coq's canonical structures, which generalize Haskell type classes and facilitate a flexible style of dependently-typed logic programming. Specifically, just as Haskell type classes are used to infer the canonical implementation of an overloaded term at a given type, canonical structures can be used to infer the canonical proof of an overloaded lemma for a given instantiation of its parameters. We present a series of design patterns for canonical structure programming that enable one to carefully and predictably coax Coq's type inference engine into triggering the execution of user-supplied algorithms during unification, and we illustrate these patterns through several realistic examples drawn from Hoare Type Theory. We assume no prior knowledge of Coq and describe the relevant aspects of Coq type inference from first principles.

Distributed applications are difficult to program reliably and securely. Dependently typed functional languages promise to prevent broad classes of errors and vulnerabilities, and to enable program verification to proceed side-by-side with development. However, as recursion, effects, and rich libraries are added, using types to reason about programs, specifications, and proofs becomes challenging. We present F*, a full-fledged design and implementation of a new dependently typed language for secure distributed programming. Our language provides arbitrary recursion while maintaining a logically consistent core; it enables modular reasoning about state and other effects using affine types; and it supports proofs of refinement properties using a mixture of cryptographic evidence and logical proof terms. The key mechanism is a new kind system that tracks several sub-languages within F* and controls their interaction. F* subsumes two previous languages, F7 and Fine. We prove type soundness (with proofs mechanized in Coq) and logical consistency for F*. We have implemented a compiler that translates F* to .NET bytecode, based on a prototype for Fine. F* provides access to libraries for concurrency, networking, cryptography, and interoperability with C#, F#, and the other .NET languages. The compiler produces verifiable binaries with 60% code size overhead for proofs and types, as much as a 45x improvement over the Fine compiler, while still enabling efficient bytecode verification. We have programmed and verified nearly 50,000 lines of F* including new schemes for multi-party sessions; a zero-knowledge privacy-preserving payment protocol; a provenance-aware curated database; a suite of web-browser extensions verified for authorization properties; a cloud-hosted multi-tier web application with a verified reference monitor; the core F* typechecker itself; and programs translated to F* from other languages such as F7 and JavaScript.

Most major OS kernels today run on multiprocessor systems and are preemptive: it is possible for a process running in the kernel mode to get descheduled. Existing modular techniques for verifying concurrent code are not directly applicable in this setting: they rely on scheduling being implemented correctly, and in a preemptive kernel, the correctness of the scheduler is interdependent with the correctness of the code it schedules. This interdependency is even stronger in mainstream kernels, such as those of Linux, FreeBSD or Mac OS X, where the scheduler and processes interact in complex ways. We propose the first logic that is able to decompose the verification of preemptive multiprocessor kernel code into verifying the scheduler and the rest of the kernel separately, even in the presence of complex interdependencies between the two components. The logic hides the manipulation of control by the scheduler when reasoning about preemptable code and soundly inherits proof rules from concurrent separation logic to verify it thread-modularly. We illustrate the power of our logic by verifying an example scheduler, which includes some of the key features of the scheduler from Linux 2.6.11 challenging for verification.