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Using Innovative Securities under Asymmetric Information: Why Do Some Firms Pay with Contingent Value Rights?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Sris Chatterjee  and
An Yan
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Abstract

This paper provides the first theoretical explanation and the first empirical analysis of contingent value rights (CVRs), which have been used as a means of payment in acquisitions, exchange offers, debt restructurings, Chapter 11 reorganizations, and lawsuit settlements. A CVR is a put option committing to pay additional cash or securities to CVR holders, contingent on the issuer's share price falling below a prespecified reference level. In this paper, we develop a model to show that CVRs can help a higher-intrinsic-value firm to reveal its firm type when the firm faces an asymmetric information problem. Our model predicts that i) when CVRs are offered along with cash or stock, the announcement period abnormal stock return is greater than that in stock offers, ii) firms facing more severe asymmetric information problems are more likely to offer CVRs to signal their firm type, and iii) firms that are relatively more cash-constrained are more likely to offer CVRs rather than cash. We test all three predictions using a sample of mergers and acquisitions. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the model.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 43 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 1001 - 1035
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 2008

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