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Performance Changes following Top Management Turnover: Evidence from Open-End Mutual Funds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Ajay Khorana
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Abstract

I examine the impact of mutual fund manager replacement on subsequent fund performance. Using a sample of 393 domestic equity and bond fund managers that were replaced over the 1979–1991 period, for the underperformers, I document significant improvements in post-replacement performance relative to the past performance of the fund. On the other hand, the replacement of overperforming managers results in deterioration in post-replacement performance. I find evidence supporting the presence of strategic risk shifting in the fund portfolios prior to replacement. Futhermore, consistent with the notion of window dressing, I document that the level of portfolio turnover activity decreases significantly in the post-replacement period. Lastly, the replacement of poor performers is preceded by significant decreases in net new inflows in the fund.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 36 , Issue 3 , September 2001 , pp. 371 - 393
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 2001

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