Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 November 2022
This article studies how changes in investor protection regulations affect local entrepreneurial activity, relying on the heterogeneous impact of a 2011 SEC regulation change on the definition of accredited investors across U.S. cities. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I show that cities more affected by the regulation change experienced a significantly larger decrease in local angel financing, entrepreneurial activity, innovation output, employment, and sales. I find that small business loans and second-lien mortgages became entrepreneurs’ partial substitutes for angel investment. My cost-benefit analysis suggests that the costs of protecting angel investors through the 2011 regulation change outweigh its benefits.
I am grateful to Scott Bauguess (the referee) and Jarrad Harford (the editor) for their valuable input. This article is based on chapter 2 of my dissertation at Carroll School of Management of Boston College. I am indebted to the guidance and support from my dissertation committee, Thomas Chemmanur (Chair), Francesco D’Acunto, Ran Duchin, Hassan Tehranian, and Xuan Tian. For helpful suggestions and comments, I thank Chang Suk Bae (discussant), Vyacheslav Fos, Rawley Heimer, Adam Jorring, Nadya Malenko, Alan Marcus, Philip Strahan, Ting Xu (discussant), seminar participants at Boston College, University of Iowa, Iowa State University, Washington State University, Tulane University, University of Delaware, University of Arizona, and conference participants at 2021 AFA PhD Student Poster Session, 2021 Midwest Finance Association Annual Meeting, 2021 Student Workshop on Entrepreneurial Finance and Innovation, and 2021 Eastern Finance Association Annual Meeting. Special thanks to Walls & Associates for providing me the access to the National Establishment Time Series (NETS) Database. I am responsible for all remaining errors and omissions.