Published online by Cambridge University Press: 13 June 2023
In this study, we investigate whether and how trust between board members and the CEO (board–CEO trust) affects the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that firms with higher levels of board–CEO trust exhibit poor M&A performance. High trust is associated with low acquisition announcement returns, long-term stock return performance, and post-deal operating performance. This negative effect of board–CEO trust is more pronounced among acquiring companies prone to agency problems. Our results suggest that, in the institutional setting of corporate boards, high trust can be too much of a good thing.
We thank the reviewer for insightful and constructive comments that greatly improved the article. We are grateful for comments from Warren Bailey, Nancy Buchan, Pierre Chaigneau, Ming Dong, Pouyan Foroughi, Melissa Frye, Louis Gagnon, Vidhan Goyal, Kiridaran Kanagaretnam, Jun-Koo Kang, Ambrus Kecskés, Kai Li, Lilian Ng, Duc Duy (Louis) Nguyen, Yihui Pan, Ari Pandes (NFA discussant), Jin Wang, Wei Wang, and Xiangang Xin. We also thank seminar participants at Queen’s University, Lingnan University, and Korea University, and participants at the 2020 Northern Finance Association meeting, the 2020 Financial Management Association meeting, and the 2020 Southern Finance Association meeting. Bae and El Ghoul appreciate the generous financial support from Canada’s Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.