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Implicit Contracts in the Japanese Bank Loan Market

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Hiroshi Osano  and
Yoshiro Tsutsui
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Extract

The implicit contract theory explored by Azariadis [2] suggests that wage rigidity and underemployment are explained by the microeconomic optimizing behavior of each agent in the labor market. In this theory, the former phenomenon is interpreted as risk-sharing arrangements between firms and workers, whereas the latter may occur when workers have the opportunity to use leisure or unemployment insurance benefits.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 1985 , pp. 211 - 229
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1985

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