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Bank Dividend Policy and Holding Company Affiliation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Extract

This study compares the dividend policies of independently owned and bank holding company-affiliated commercial banks. The hypothesis tested is that there exists a significant, positive relationship between the amount of cash dividends paid by a bank and its affiliation with a holding company. The issue is an important one because the distribution of earnings as dividends obviously reduces a bank's ability to generate capital internally, and retained earnings have been the chief source of growth in bank equity capital. For some time the bank supervisory authorities have been concerned over the relative decline in importance of capital in the balance sheet of the average bank, such funds permitting banks to absorb unexpected losses and weather periods of financial crises. Capital adequacy is thus a major consideration in the regulators' assessment of bank dividend policy. Prior research has shown that the banking subsidiaries of bank holding companies have maintained lower capital in relation to assets than have other banks despite achieving greater profitability. Since a bank's capital position is usually positively correlated with its earnings, this implies that affiliated banks have been more generous in paying dividends. Indeed, the statistical evidence of this study indicates that the banking subsidiaries of holding companies paid significantly higher dividends than other banks over the four–year period from 1973 through 1976. Whether or not this has resulted in these firms maintaining less than “adequate” capital is a question that goes far beyond the scope of this paper, but which ultimately must be considered.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1980

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References

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