Article contents
Human Capital, Management Quality, and the Exit Decisions of Entrepreneurial Firms
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2016
Abstract
We model the employee incentive problem jointly with a firm’s exit decision. Our model predicts that firms in industries where human capital is important are more likely to go public and use high-powered, stock-based compensation. We also show that the higher the management quality, the more likely a firm is to go public than to be acquired. Regarding life cycle, a firm with high capital intensity and/or high management quality will choose to go public at a younger age.
- Type
- Research Article
- Information
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , August 2016 , pp. 1269 - 1295
- Copyright
- Copyright © Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington 2016
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