Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T12:18:07.919Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Effect of Adoption of Long-Term Performance Plans on Stock Prices and Accounting Numbers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Abstract

Long-term performance plans are theoretically adopted to better align the interests of the managers and stockholders by redirecting managerial decision-making toward the longterm performance of the corporation. This study reports significant positive excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption, which is consistent with the view that such plans would reduce the agency problem. In addition, this study finds an association between the adoption of long-term performance plans and subsequent growth in profitability, suggesting that long-term performance plans may have been successful in motivating an enhancement in the accounting measures of profitability used to reward managers under the plan. Finally, the excess returns around the announcement of performance plan adoption are found to be positively correlated with subsequent change in growth of earnings per share, the most commonly used accounting performance measure.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1992

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Bhagat, S., and Brickley, J. A.. “Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights.” Journal of Law and Economics, 27 (10 1984), 339365.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brickley, J. A.Interpreting Common Stock Returns around Proxy Statement Disclosures and Annual Shareholder Meetings.” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21 (09 1986), 343349.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Brickley, J. A.; Bhagat, S.; and Lease, R. C.. “The Impact of Long-range Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7 (04 1985), 115129.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Foster, G.Financial Statement Analysis, 2nd Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall (1986).Google Scholar
Gaver, J. J.Incentive Effects and Managerial Compensation Contracts: A Study of Performance Plan Adopters.” Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 7 (Spring 1992), 137156.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaver, J. J.; Gaver, K. M.; and Battistel, G. P.. “The Stock Market Reaction to Performance Plan Adoptions.” Working Paper, Univ. of Oregon (1989).Google Scholar
Gaver, J. J.; Gaver, K. M.; and Furze, S.. “The Association between Performance Plan Adoption and Corporate Investment Decisions.” Working Paper, Univ. of Oregon (1989).Google Scholar
Jensen, M. C, and Meckling, W. H.. “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (10 1976), 305360.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kaplan, R., and Atkinson, A.. Advanced Management Accounting, 2nd Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall (1989).Google ScholarPubMed
Lambert, R. A., and Larcker, D. F.. “Executive Compensation, Corporate Decision-Making and Shareholder Wealth: A Review of the Evidence.” Midland Corporate Finance Journal, 1 (Winter 1985), 622.Google Scholar
Lambert, R. A., and Larcker, D. F.. “An Analysis of the Use of Accounting and Market Measures of Performance in Executive Compensation Contracts.” Journal of Accounting Research, 25 (Supplement 1987), 85125.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Larcker, D. F.The Association between Performance Plan Adoption and Corporate Capital Investment.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 3 (04 1983), 330.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Louis, A. M.Business is Bungling Long-Term Compensation.” Fortune, 110 (07 23, 1984), 6469.Google Scholar
Patell, J. M.Corporate Forecasts of Earnings per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests.” Journal of Accounting Research, 14 (Autumn 1976), 246276.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, and Co. Capital Accumulation Trends among the 1,000 Largest Industrials. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, and Co. (1982).Google Scholar
Rich, J. T., and Larson, J. A.. “Why Some Long-Term Incentives Fail.” Compensation Review, 16 (First Quarter 1984), 2637.CrossRefGoogle Scholar