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Comment: Haugen and Senbet Paper

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 April 2009

Avner Kalay
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Extract

Haugen and Senbet address several interesting issues, such as: a costless solution, with the use of options, to the agency problem and the incorporation of informational asymmetry into the agency problem, as well as the use of options to convey information. I'll start my discussion on their paper by providing general comments which are followed by some clarifying comments on the authors' argument for signaling with options.

Type
I. Incentive Signaling Models and Rational Expectations
Information
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , November 1979 , pp. 711 - 714
Copyright
Copyright © School of Business Administration, University of Washington 1979

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