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When Do Politicians Pursue More Policy Information?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2021

Peter John Loewen Open the ORCID record for Peter John Loewen [Opens in a new window] ,
Daniel Rubenson Open the ORCID record for Daniel Rubenson [Opens in a new window]  and
John R. McAndrews Open the ORCID record for John R. McAndrews [Opens in a new window]
Peter John Loewen*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, Toronto, ON, M5S 3K7Canada, Twitter: @PeejLoewen, @mcandrewsjr
Daniel Rubenson
Affiliation:
Department of Politics & Public Administration, Ryerson University, Jorgenson Hall 729, 350 Victoria Street, Toronto, ON, M5B 2K3Canada, Twitter: @dktr_dr
John R. McAndrews
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, Toronto, ON, M5S 3K7Canada, Twitter: @PeejLoewen, @mcandrewsjr
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

We conducted a field experiment with 334 Canadian Members of Parliament exploring whether politicians seek out more information about an issue when they are farther offside the average opinion in their constituency on that issue. In the midst of a contentious national debate on the oil industry, we invited MPs and their staff to watch a webinar or read a written summary of the webinar created by experts and containing a variety of viewpoints on the issue. For politicians on either side, the information could prove useful in future debate and conversation. Some politicians were randomly assigned to information about the distribution of opinion in their constituency on the issue. We find no evidence that politicians are more likely to pursue policy information when they are offside their average constituency opinion, and none that this effect is enhanced when they learn about their relative position vis-a-vis constituency preferences.

Keywords

Field experimentparliamentary representationpolitical informationelite experiments
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , Summer 2022 , pp. 216 - 224
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association

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