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Political Accountability and Democratic Institutions: An Experimental Assessment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2020

José Gabriel Castillo Open the ORCID record for José Gabriel Castillo [Opens in a new window]  and
John Hamman Open the ORCID record for John Hamman [Opens in a new window]
José Gabriel Castillo*
Affiliation:
Center for Economic Research, Laboratory of Experimental and Behavioral Economics, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, ESPOL-Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral, Guayaquil, Ecuador
John Hamman
Affiliation:
Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL32306, USA
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

We study the extent to which centralized democratic institutions enhance collective action under political accountability. In a public goods game with costly punishment, we vary the appointment of one group member to enforce punishment. Specifically, we compare democratically elected punishers to those appointed exogenously, under both single- and multiple-selection environments. We find that democratically appointed sanctioning authority has muted effects on group outcomes; yet, they contribute as much as other group members when facing repeated elections, as opposed to the ones in single selection or exogenously appointed. One important feature of modern governance to discipline authorities is political accountability; when in place, it offers different incentives, and in particular, we observe a responsibility effect reflected in higher contribution behavior. Important in our study results, this effect rises only under a democracy.

Keywords

public goods gamesdemocracypolitical accountabilitycentralized punishment
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , Summer 2021 , pp. 128 - 144
Copyright
© The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2020

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