Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 October 2019
In many situations, incentives exist to acquire knowledge and make correct political decisions. We conduct an experiment that contributes to a small but growing literature on incentives and political knowledge, testing the effect of certain and uncertain incentives on knowledge. Our experiment builds on the basic theoretical point that acquiring and using information is costly, and incentives for accurate answers will lead respondents to expend greater effort on the task and be more likely to answer knowledge questions correctly. We test the effect of certain and uncertain incentives and find that both increase effort and accuracy relative to the control condition of no incentives for accuracy. Holding constant the expected benefit of knowledge, we do not observe behavioral differences associated with the probability of earning an incentive for knowledge accuracy. These results suggest that measures of subject performance in knowledge tasks are contingent on the incentives they face. Therefore, to ensure the validity of experimental tasks and the related behavioral measures, we need to ensure a correspondence between the context we are trying to learn about and our experimental design.
The research design of the paper was presented at the 2017 ISA Annual Convention, at the EITM Summer Institute at the University of Houston, and in the Networked Democracy Lab at the University of Southern California. We would especially like to thank Pablo Barberá, A. Burcu Bayram, Harold Clarke, Gail Buttorff, Francisco Cantú, Dennis Chong, Douglas Dion, Nehemia Geva, Jim Granato, Patrick James, Brian Rathbun, Frank Scioli, Philip Seib, Rick Wilson, Sunny Wong, Jonathan Woon, participants in the panels, the anonymous reviewers and the Associate Editor for excellent comments and suggestions. Any errors that remain are our own responsibility. This research was supported by a USC Dornsife Gold Family Fellowship and the University of California, Riverside. The authors are aware of no conflicts of interest regarding this research. The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available at the Journal of Experimental Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/WVFZGE (Jamieson and Weller, 2019).