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Just Don’t Call it a Tax! Framing in an Experiment on Voting and Redistribution

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 November 2017

Jan Lorenz ,
Fabian Paetzel  and
Markus Tepe
Jan Lorenz
Affiliation:
Bremen International Graduate School for Social Sciences, Jacobs University Bremen, Campus Ring 1, 28759 Bremen, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Fabian Paetzel
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Social Science, Helmut Schmidt University, Holstenhofweg 85, 22043 Hamburg, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
Markus Tepe
Affiliation:
Department of Social Sciences, Carl von Ossietzky Universität Oldenburg, Ammerländer Heerstraße 114-118, 26129 Oldenburg, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Utilizing a simplified version of the Meltzer–Richard redistribution mechanism, we designed a laboratory experiment to test whether it matters if voters were asked to decide on a tax rate or a minimum income, leaving the redistribution mechanism itself unchanged. Framing the vote about redistribution as a decision about a minimal income increases the individually and ideally preferred level of redistribution. This effect outlives the groups’ deliberation processes and leads to the implementation of a higher level of redistribution.

Keywords

Redistributionvotingframinglaboratory experimentminimal incometaxation
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 4 , Issue 3 , Winter 2017 , pp. 183 - 194
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2017 

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