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The Face of the Problem: How Subordinates Shield Executives from Blame
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 June 2021
Abstract
Though avoiding blame is often a goal of elected officials, there are relatively few empirical examinations of how citizens assign blame during controversies. We are particularly interested in how this process works when an executive has been caught in a lie. Using two survey experiments, we examine whether subordinates can shield executives when they act as the face of a crisis. We first leverage a real-life situation involving the family separation crisis at the US–Mexico border in 2018. Respondents who read that Donald Trump falsely claimed he could not end the practice of family separation disapprove of his dishonesty. Yet this cost disappears when Trump’s then-Secretary of Homeland Security, Kirstjen Nielsen, is the primary official discussed in news stories. We then replicate these findings in a fictional scenario involving a city mayor, showing that the mayor is partially shielded from negative appraisals when the city manager lies on his behalf.
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- © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association
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Coauthorship of this paper is equal and authors are listed in alphabetical order.
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