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Committee Decisions under Majority Rule Revisited

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 June 2016

Jan Sauermann
Jan Sauermann*
Affiliation:
Cologne Center for Comparative Politics, University of Cologne, P.O. Box 411020, 50870 Cologne, Germany, e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Spatial committee decision-making experiments provide ample evidence for the predictive power of the majority rule core if it is not empty. Furthermore, an empty core does not substantively reduce the stability of majority decision making. In this article, I put these two findings to a critical test using two preference configurations from Fiorina's and Plott's (1978) seminal committee experiments. In my experiment, committees with fixed individual preferences make multiple decisions over time. Contrary to the existing evidence, I find that results diverge from the core in the course of the experiment. In line with previous research, an empty core has no noticeable behavioral effects.

Keywords

Committee decision makingmajority rulelaboratory experiment
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Experimental Political Science , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Winter 2016 , pp. 185 - 196
Copyright
Copyright © The Experimental Research Section of the American Political Science Association 2016 

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