The subject I should like to discuss grows directly out of the theme of the meetings as a whole. They have been concerned with the American West as an Underdeveloped Region, and the title was intended to suggest the analogy between the United States of an earlier period and the so-called underdeveloped nations of the present day. To many it would suggest a contrast in policy. These other nations are now in many cases striving to achieve economic development by national planning and deliberate measures of governmental policy. On the other hand the United States achieved its massive economic development without over-all economic planning, without five-year plans or explicit national targets of input and output, and—it is sometimes believed—without the adoption of policies deliberately intended to promote development.

Previous “new” economic history research on late Victorian Britain often assumes that technology was exogenous to British entrepreneurs. Foreign innovations were available for inspection, and if they were not found suitable, there was no way to adapt new techniques to the British situation. Alternatively, one can assert that technological failure is a key issue in any study of retarded economic performance. A test for the presence of induced innovation—an endogenous theory of technological change—is applied to the British pig iron and cotton textile industries. Results are compared to other technological studies of British and American industry.

The general sentiment of Congress toward resumption of specie payments had become more and more desultory, not to say negative, during the early part of the 1870's. Nevertheless, the Resumption Act was passed in 1875, and resumption of specie payments at the pre-Civil War parity occurred on schedule in 1879. Observers have slighted this incongruity. Passage of the Resumption Act has come to be regarded as a true reflection of Victorian sentiment; ultimate resumption in 1879 was the proof of the pudding.2 What seems to have been lost in this rationalization of cause and effect is the generally unfavorable light in which resumption was being viewed in the middle 1870's, the alternatives that were available in lieu of resumption, and some of the forces of “immorality” that made these alternatives attractive.

The following nore on source material relates to an important aspect of British industrial development in the eighteenth century. Some use of this material has been made by M. W. Flinn of Aberdeen University and myself in our studies of the industry in the Seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the field of the sources is so wide and relevant to so much of the economic history of Britain in that period that a summary may be of use to future researches in these rich and neglected sources.

This paper is concerned with two questions: What was iron and steel used for in the course of the late nineteenth century? And how were the uses of iron and steel affected by changes in the methods of production of iron and steel? The first question asks what was the composition of the iron and steel industry's output, that is, what products were being produced. The second question asks if the changes in this composition were caused by changes in the supply schedules of the industry.

This paper estimates the causal impact of short-term aggregate fluctuations in Egypt, 1911–48, using global cotton price shocks. Firm entry was procyclical, and exit was acyclical. There were persistent differences between cohorts over the cycle; expansionary cohorts were of lower quality. The evidence supports models of firm entry with ex-ante heterogeneity. The findings highlight the extensive margin of entry as the primary adjustment mechanism. As a result, recessions had a strong “isolation” effect. This nature of firm entry amplified and propagated temporary price shocks.

We identify the longest expansion in U.S. history, a recession-free 16-year period from 1841 to 1856 that we call America's First Great Moderation. Using newer data on industrial production, we show that the record-long expansion was primarily driven by a boom in transportation-goods investment following the discovery of gold in California. Furthermore, the low volatility of industrial production and stock returns during the First Great Moderation, which occurred during a period without a U.S. central bank, is similar to that observed for the Second Great Moderation (1984–2007).

Recent scholarship contends that ancient Mediterranean economies grew intensively. An explanation is that Smithian growth was spurred by reductions in transaction costs and increased trade flows. This paper argues that an ancient Greek institution, proxenia, was among the key innovations that allowed such growth in the period 500–0 BCE. Proxenia entailed a Greek city-state declaring a foreigner to be its “public friend,” a status that conferred both duties and privileges. The functions performed by “public friends” could facilitate economic transactions between communities. Accordingly, network and regression analyses establish a strong relationship between proxenia grants and trade intensity.

This paper assesses the causal relationship between POW assignments and labor productivity for a vital sector of the German World War I economy, namely coal mining. Prisoners of war (POWs) provided significant labor. Combining data on all Ruhr mines with a treatment-effects approach, I find that POW employment alone accounted for 36 percent of the average POW-employing mine’s annual productivity decline over wartime. Estimates also suggest that the representative POW’s productivity averaged 32 percent of the representative regular miner’s productivity and that POWs’ contribution to wartime coal output amounted to 3.9 percent. Violence did not serve as a powerful work incentive.

The present state of economic history in Canada contrastswith that of a quarter century ago. It could be written sharplyin the 1930's that the most distinctive work in Canadian economics was being done by economic historians concerned with the study of transportation and tariffs, trade associations and agricultural organizations, money and banking. There was at the same time a close approach to a generally accepted framework of analysis and interpretation and more than a suggestion of synthesis in Canadian historical writings. This pre-eminence of economic history and this unity of theme are now things of the past. As to the first, the rate of progress in economic analysis and statistics, in sociology and political theory, has brought with it both a change in status and the prospect of extensive revisions, factual and interpretative, of our views of the past. Similarly, a former unity of approach resting on the economics of staple production has lost ground before the complexities of modern industrial change. For the economic historian these changes promise much for present and future research even if, at the moment, they bring small comfort.