Sixteen years ago, in happier times, Europe seemed about to become again what she had been to our American parents of the Victorian Age—a rich expanse of industrious and (according to the standards then prevalent) comfortable daily life, ornamented everywhere by monuments emanating from generations of culture, blessed by opportunities for quiet leisure, for travel at what was once considered a rapid pace, and for serious discussions of philosophy and art, such as provided Henry James and Henry Adams with the indispensable nourishment they missed at home. Sixteen years ago, for several weeks on end, I shared to my advantage a table in a modest Basque inn on the French side of the Pyrenees with a distinguished economic historian. In addition to our wives, we had as our companion an elderly professor from a lycée in Bayonne, named Georges Herèlle. We were told that the old gentleman was the greatest authority in France, if not in the world, on the Basque language. He was also the French translator of two writers then prominent, the Spaniard, Blasco Ibáñez, who rose to fame in the United States with Rudolph Valentino riding simultaneously all his “four horsemen,” and the Italian poet, Gabriele d'Annunzio, whose name was known round the world in those prehistoric times before any one had heard of “Mussolini,” let alone of “Hitler.”

The connections between financial development and economic growth are drawing increased attention on many fronts. This dissertation studies ways in which the American financial system functioned to aid in the accumulation and mobilization of capital in the second half of the nineteenth century. The evolution of the banking system, by far the dominant nineteenth-century financial intermediary, is emphasized, but the role of Federal government finance is of scarcely less importance. The interrelated actions of the banks and the Treasury did much to set the tone in various financial markets during most of the period. While considerable study has been devoted to these actions and their short-run effects, much less has been written about their long-run implications. A major contention of the work is that financial strains caused by the Civil War and the various responses to these strains were accompanied by significant changes in the banking system—in its structure, the types of assets in which it dealt, and in its relations with the Treasury—all of which increased its potential for satisfying the demands placed upon it by a rapidly expanding economy. These changes helped to make capital, which may well have been the relatively scarce factor in the antebellum era, more abundant in the postwar Gilded Age, and they therefore abetted the rapid industrialization of those decades.

German imperial expansion, begun under Bismarck, swiftly unfolded with the aid of industrial technology along lines that adapted it ideally for the organization, not of a national state, but of a continent or even the world. In this fact lies a major contrast between the neo-mercantilism which followed 1879 and the cameralism borrowed from the Burgundians by the German princes in the sixteenth century. The system extolled by Becher was designed to meet the power needs of dwarf states perpetually torn, by a mule-and-the-two-haystacks dilemma, between the fractioning particularism of the lay princes on the one hand, and the centrifugal pull of a meaningless imperial universalism on the other. The ‘new age’ for which, as Schulze- Gavaernitz once remarked, Bismarck played the role of ‘obstetrician,’ employed a machinery for internal unification that fitted the national—in particular the German—state almost as badly as it did the political fractions of which it was compounded.

This paper rejects the traditional interpretation that farmers shifted from wheat to mixed farming in eastern North America because of changes in relative costs. It argues instead that they shifted because mixed farming involved less risk. We test the proposition that farmers were willing to give up a larger expected income in wheat production for a smaller but more stable income in mixed farming. The results are consistent with our hypothesis.

The poor quality of western European forests as sources of masts and the depletion of oak forests in Britain and France during the eighteenth century forced the two principal maritime powers to import naval timber and to seek far afield for naval masts. Both Britain and France gradually were forced to increase their imports of timber from neighboring states and the Baltic market. The acquisition of masts for naval vessels involved even greater dependence on markets overseas. Masting trees were sparsely scattered in western Europe; the British Isles produced none. France took some masts from forests in the Pyrenees, Auvergne, Alsace, and Dauphiné, but they were limited in quantity, lacking in flexibility, and were often condemned for their propensity to early brittleness and rot. Masts imported from French colonies in North America proved unsatisfactory in both cost and quality. Until the last quarter of the eighteenth century Britain enjoyed an advantage over France in the acquisition of colonial North American mast supplies, since die forests of New England produced excellent masts of extraordinary size. Britain's imports from New England, under a Royal Navy monopoly, satisfied a sizable part of her needs and reduced the British navy's importation of Baltic mast supplies by perhaps one third in the early 1770's. The American Revolution, however, abruptly ended Britain's monopoly of American masts. The rebellious colonists halted British imports and opened the splendid pine forests of New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and Maine to French naval exploitation.

Puerto Rico became an insular possession of the United States following the Spanish-American War in 1898. Shortly thereafter the island was brought within the monetary and tariff structures of the United States, and mainland capital began to flow into the island, especially in the form of investments in the sugar industry. These factors were mainly responsible for shaping the Puerto Rican economy and for tying it closely to the economy of the United States.

Mrs. Vatter has covered three major points in her comment on my article. She has suggested the need for further research; she has questioned the completeness of my analysis of interest rate determination; and she has suggested an alternative explanation of the apparent ceiling on interest charges. I am in complete agreement with Mrs. Vatter on the first of her points. On the second, I apologize for any lack of clarity that may have led her to misinterpret my intent. On the third, I feel that, despite her evidence, her conclusion remains, at best, unproved.

This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of the expansion of mass schooling and the long-term legacy of educational institutions. Based on a new provincial-level dataset for Italy in the period 1861–1911, we argue that different models of schooling provision adopted by the different pre-unification polities influenced primary-education organizations across macro-regions up to WWI. As a result, school access and the capability to generate literacy given current rates of enrollment differed substantially, with the Northern regions aiming to increase schooling for all, while the Center and the South implemented a more elitist model.